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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the relationship between financial performance, over- 
investment and gearing for UK and US firms. In this thesis, we test the proposition 
that debt disciplines managers and mitigates the overinvestment problem and 
therefore, this should improve firm performance. A sample of panel data from FTSE 
500 and S&P 500 companies covering a 15 year period (1988 - 2002) was 
downloaded from Datastream. Regression tests were conducted using different 
estimation models such as fixed effects and logit model estimation to test the 
hypotheses of this thesis. 
In the first stage, we find that the Residual Income model (RI) explains more than 
75% of the cross sectional variation in stock prices for both UK and US firms. 
Secondly we used this model to determine performance and we find that the RI 
component derived from the RI model outperforms both the first difference of the RI 
model and the simple RI model as a measure of financial performance. 
In the second stage, we find that the higher the gearing the lower the probability of 
over-investment. Moreover, we find that the relationship between gearing and over- 
investment is non-linear. At low levels of gearing, as the gearing increases so does 
the over-investment problem, while at high levels of gearing, the higher the gearing 
the lower the probability of over- investment. In line with Jensen's free cash flow 
theory, we find evidence of over-investment and our results suggest that the over- 
investment problem can be mitigated using mid-levels of debt. Furthermore, we find 
that the relationship between over-investment and firm performance is significantly 
negative. Finally, where gearing mitigates the overinvestment, the interaction of 
gearing and overinvestment has a positive influence on firm performance. 
This study introduces a new proxy to measure the over-investment problem, it uses a 
performance measure based on residual income model and testes the non-linearity 
between gearing, over- investment and performance using quadratic and cubic 
equations. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
A central theme in corporate finance relates to the choice that firms make between 
issuing equity or debt. The theoretical literature on this topic includes both static 
models that date back to Modigliani and Miller (1958), and dynamic models. Under 
perfect capital market conditions, Modigliani and Miller (1963) showed that, as the 
result of gains from leverage, the value of a levered firm is higher in the presence of 
corporate taxes than that of a non-levered firm in the same risk class. However, in 
practice, firms are not all-debt financed despite the tax shields benefits, and 
significant differences in the cross-sectional and time-series variations in their capital 
structure are observed. It appears that when making their financial decisions, firms 
consider the costs and benefits associated with each financing method (Bradley et al, 
1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
As a result, the trade-off theory has emerged. This theory states that the optimal level 
of leverage would emerge from a trade-off between the tax deductibility of interest 
and the expected bankruptcy costs (Brennan and Schwartz, 1978; Chen, 1978), firms' 
taxable capacity (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980), and the agency cost of debt (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). More recently, agency theory variables (as 
explained below) are regarded as the main determinants of capital structure (Barclay 
et al, 1995; Harris and Raviv, 1990; Stulz, 1990). Since the effects of taxes and direct 
bankruptcy costs, though well developed theoretically, appear to play a minor role 
empirically, the major determinants of capital structure appear to relate to agency 
theory (Titman and Wessels, 1988, Barclay and Smith, 1988). 
UniS 
Therefore, the empirical evidence has shown that the choices that firms make in 
issuing equity or debt are interdependent. Accordingly, some theories that explain 
this have been developed. These theories are based on capital-market imperfections; 
with respect to investment decisions, the existence of asymmetric information 
between the main stakeholders constitutes the foremost imperfection. Agency 
problems play an important role in this thesis. Information differences and 
divergences of interest lead to agency problems, and to costs associated with these 
problems. 
The role of asymmetric information in investment decisions has as its primary basis 
the theoretical works of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984). The first two papers emphasise the consequences of the existence of 
post-contract asymmetric information between shareholders and bondholders, while 
the paper of Myers and Majluf (1984) emphasise the role of the pre-contract 
asymmetric information between current and prospective shareholders. All the 
above-mentioned papers show that information asymmetries may lead to some 
investment projects with a positive net present value (NPV) not being undertaken. 
A second foundation in the study of inefficient investment decisions is the work of 
Jensen (1986). His work, starting from the hypothesis of the existence of asymmetric 
information between mangers and shareholders, introduces the so-called problem of 
over- investment, as a basic argument of his free cash flow theory. According to this 
theory there can be negative NPV investment projects that end up being completed 
because managers derive benefits from investment (the larger the organisation, the 
greater the economic and political power of top management team). Managers are 
empire builders and continue to choose investment projects even after all positive 
NPV projects have been taken. Accordingly, the purpose of this thesis is to test 
whether a certain level of debt can, to a certain degree, mitigate the over-investment 
problem and therefore, lead to better firm performance. 
While agency theory has generated insights into capital structure, measuring its effect 
on companies' financial performance represents a real challenge. Researchers usually 
use one of the two ways, presented below, to measure financial performance: 
I- Market returns i. e. stock price return. 
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2- Commonly used financial ratio measures of returns, such as Return on Assets 
(ROA) or Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) as proxies of financial 
performance. 
Financial ratio measures of returns are inadequate instruments because they ignore the 
cost of capital, motivating dysfunctional behaviour causing managers to pay attention 
to the "wrong" things (Aggarwal 2001). On the other hand, market returns models 
(stock price or returns based on stock price) impound market expectations about a 
firm's future and thus may not be able to capture managers' current performance. It 
also may not be an efficient contracting parameter because it is driven by many 
factors beyond the control of the firms' executives (Bacidore et al 1997)1. In this 
thesis, a residual income-based model, namely the Frankel and Lee (1998) model, 
with a solid theoretical underpinning will be used to determine firm performance (for 
reasons explained in Chapter 5) instead of returns models. However, the Frankel and 
Lee (1998) model is a valuation model, but the first difference can be used as a 
performance measure with correction for dividend. A comparison between various 
Residual Income models (RI), i. e. Economic Value Added (EVA), Economic Profit 
(EP), the Ohlson (1995) model and the Frankel and Lee (1998) model on the one hand, 
and the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model on the other hand will be carried out in 
the literature review section. The RI and the DCF models are based on theoretical 
arguments and take into consideration the cost of capital when calculating the value of 
a company. Although these models are preferable to ROA, they measure value rather 
than performance; but by correcting for dividend, the first difference can measure 
performance. 
1.2 The Aim of this Study 
The aim of this study is to find a relationship between capital structure and 
companies I performance for a sample of listed non-financial firms from FTSE 500 
and S&P 500. Agency theory variables appear to play a major role in inducing 
1 Noise trading, portfolio insurance, and other factors unrelated to firm's performance may induce 
randomness in stock prices. See Milbourn, Todd T. (1996) "The Executive Compensation Puzzle: 
Theory and Evidence" I FA Working paper No. 2-3 3 5, London Business School. 
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managers to perform better and it is hypothesised that capital structure affects 
company performance. Furthermore, according to Jensen (1986), debt can discipline 
managers and mitigate the problem of over-investment because debt provides a means 
of bonding managers' promises to pay out free cash flows rather than investing in 
wealth-destroying ventures. Debt also provides means for controlling opportunistic 
behaviour by reducing cash flows available for discretionary spending. Therefore, 
managers' attention is then clearly focused on those activities necessary to ensure that 
debt payment is met. If this is true, then in this situation debt should induce better 
firm performance. In this thesis, we will adapt Jensen's (1986) argument and 
empirically test the proposition that debt disci lines managers and mitigates the over- p 
investment problem and ultimately leads to better firm performance. The 
measurement of financial Performance represents a real challenge for researchers and 
academics. As mentioned above, a performance measure based on the Frankel and 
Lee (1998) model will be used to measure companies' performance. Previous studies 
regarding the effect of capital structure on companies' performance have focused on 
the earnings figure. However, less attention has been paid to the informative value of 
the balance sheet items. Alternatively, researchers have used the market returns to 
examine the effects of capital structure on performance. 
There are several important features of our analysis, which we believe extend the 
literature on the empirical aspects of agency problems; more precisely, Jensen's free 
cash flow argument. Firstly, whereas most studies investigate US firms our sample 
comprises both US and UK firms. Secondly, we will use a performance measure with 
a solid theoretical underpinning and empirically test and account for the cost of 
capital. Thirdly, we will show the possibilities of using the Residual Income 
Components (RIC) as a performance measure. The RIC, derived from the Frankel and 
Lee (1998) model, represents the residual income components of that model and 
accounts for the cost of capital. Fourthly, our analysis, distinct from previous 
empirical studies, introduces a simple way of measuring the over-investment problem 
through a combination of capital expenditure and growth opportunities. Fifthly, we 
will test for the non-linearity of the relationship between gearing, performance and 
over-investment. Finally, our analysis incorporates the dynamic nature of response of 
firm's performance to investment decisions and controls for the endogeneity. 
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1.3 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis consists of a review of capital structure literature, review of valuation and 
performance models literature, two main empirical studies, and the conclusions. 
Chapter I states the aims and objectives of this study as well as describes the 
structure of this study. 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on capital structure. 
Starting from the seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958), we describe their 
theoretical and empirical contributions. The description of their work provides the 
background for the subsequent chapters, with respect to the theory that is tested and 
the results of the existing empirical studies. The chapter concludes with a critical 
assessment of empirical capital structure research and discusses alternative directions 
in empirical research. 
Chapter 3 discusses performance models. It begins with highlighting the main 
weaknesses of profitability ratio analysis. We then empirically and theoretically 
compare most of the valuation and performance models in the literature. The chapter 
concludes with a critical assessment of empirical performance models and discusses 
the most appropriate one, which will be used in this thesis. 
Chapter 4 discusses data collection, methodology and research design in addition to 
the statistical software packages that will be used in this thesis. 
The empirical study in Chapter 5 investigates the relationship between the residual 
income model and market stock prices. We use a set of publicly available data of 
FTSE 500 and S&P 500 listed non-financial firms over the 1990-2002 period. We 
aim to test the hypothesis that the defined Residual Income model can significantly 
capture cross-sectional differences in stock market prices over the stated period of 
time. We apply regression analysis on panel data as well as cross-sectional analysis 
to test the behaviour of the model year by year. We further divide our sample into 
industry portfolios to assess industry differences. Chapter 5 also provides empirical 
tests for determining firm performance and assesses the possibilities of using the 
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Residual Income Component as well as the first difference of the Frankel and Lee 
model (1998) as a performance measure. 
The study in Chapter 6 aims to test the relationship between gearing, over-investment 
and firm performance. We use non-financial firms from FTSE 500 and S&P 500. 
Firstly, we investigate the relationship between gearing and over- investment, which is 
based on the proposition that gearing mitigates over-investment. Secondly, we test 
the relationship between firm performance and over-investment. The aim is to 
ascertain whether over-investment destroys firm value or not. Thirdly, we test the 
effects of the interaction variable between gearing and over-investment on firm 
performance. This will enable us to see the effect of gearing and over-investment as 
one variable on performance. The aim is to find out whether gearing, given that it 
mitigates the over-investment problem, leads to better firm performance. 
A summary and the conclusions are provided in Chapter 7. In this chapter we 
summarise the results from the preceding chapters, and discuss the findings. In 
addition, we describe the contributions to the existing literature, limitations of this 
study and extensions for further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Capital Structure 
2.1 Introduction 
The capital structure issue is concerned with the optimum balance (if any) between 
equity and debt used to finance companies. It is one of the key areas in the economics 
of corporate finance, as it has implications for new security issues, the financing of 
takeover and buyout activities, and dividend policy, as retained earnings (the profits 
retained by a firm after payment of dividends) are a major source of equity funding. 
Modigliani and Miller's (1958) analytical approach challenged the conventional view 
that a moderate amount of debt finance (in the form of corporate bonds, debentures or 
loan stock) was beneficial, but that higher levels were not prudent - indeed, high 
corporate debt levels had been cited as one of the factors causing the great stock 
market crash of 1929. Their analysis pointed initially to the irrelevancy of the debt- 
equity split, and in later work to the advantages of debt finance through corporate tax 
effects subject to financial distress costs. Miller (1977) subsequently integrated 
personal taxes into the framework and argued that the tax advantages of borrowing 
were small. In summary, in a world of perfect capital markets, Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) demonstrated that investment, financing and dividend decisions are 
independent. 
During the last decades, however, the empirical evidence has shown that those 
decisions are interdependent. Accordingly, some theories that explain the previous 
evidence have been developed. These theories are based on capital-market 
imperfection; with respect to the investment decision, agency costs and the existence 
of asymmetric information between the main stakeholders constitute the foremost 
imperfection. The role of asymmetric information in investment decisions has as its 
primary basis the theoretical works of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and 
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Myers and Majluf (1984). All the above mentioned papers show that information 
asymmetries may lead to some investment projects with a positive net present value 
(NPV) not being undertaken. 
A second foundation in this study of inefficient investment decisions is the work of 
Jensen (1986). This paper, starting with the hypothesis of the existence of 
asymmetric information between managers and shareholders, introduces the so-called 
problem of over- investment, as a basic argument of his free cash flow theory. 
According to this theory, there can be negative NPV investment projects that end up 
being undertaken. 
The objective of this chapter is to present the above-mentioned theories. It starts with 
Modigliani and Miller (195 8,1963) and Miller (1977) in the first and second sections, 
then moves to the cost of financial distress and trade-off theory in the third and fourth 
sections. In the fifth section, agency costs and asymmetry of information will be 
presented followed by free cash flow theory. This chapter ends with the conclusion, 
which aims to find a direct link between gearing and firms' performance. 
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2.2 Modigliani and Miller Theory 
2.2.1 Introduction 
There are many ways for the firm to raise its required funds. However, the most basic 
and important instruments are stocks (equity) and bonds (debt). The firm's mix of 
different securities is its capital structure. A natural question arises: What is the 
optimal debt-equity ratio? For example, if a firm needs f 100 million for a project, 
should all this money be raised by issuing stocks, or 50% of stocks and 50% of bonds 
(debt-equity ratio 1: 1) or any other combination? 
Modigliam and Miller (MM) (195 8) showed that financing decisions do not matter in 
perfect capital markets. Their famous proposition I states that: 
'The total value of afirm is the same whatever its debt-equity ratio' 
(assuming no corporate taxes). 
If this is true, the basic exercise in capital budgeting can be directly applied to project 
evaluation for firms with different debt-equity ratios. However, in practice, capital 
structure does seem to matter. Then why do we bother to learn the MM theory? This 
theory is valid under certain conditions. An understanding of MM theory helps in 
understanding these conditions, which in turn helps us to understand why one 
particular capital structure is better than another. In addition, the theory tells us what 
kinds of market imperfections to attend to. The imperfections that are most likely to 
make a difference are taxes, the costs of bankruptcy and the costs of writing and 
enforcing complicated debt contracts. 
2.2.2 MM Proposition I 
Modigliani and Miller's (1958) propositions earned them the honour of two Nobel 
prizes. They provide a good start in understanding capital structure decisions. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that under certain conditions, the total value of 
all financial securities is the same regardless of the mix of different securities. They 
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proved their argument by showing that there would be arbitrage opportunities if the 
value of the firm depended on its financial structure. Because there should be no 
arbitrage in perfect capital market conditions, it follows that firms should be able to 
choose any mix of securities without changing their value (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Their proposition on the capital structure is as follows: 
"The market value of anyfirm is independent of its capital 
structure and is given by capitalizing its expected returns at the 
rate appropriate to its risk class " (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) 
According to Brealey and Myers (2000), Modigliani and Miller (1958) made the 
following assumptions about the markets in which they were working: 
1) Capital markets are perfect 
2) There is no cost to bankruptcy. 
3) Firms issue risky debt and equity, and have the same 0 risk. 
4) All cash flow streams are perpetuities, and no growth is allowed. 
5) Managers always maximize the shareholders' wealth (implies no agency costs). 
6) Homemade leverage is a perfect substitute for corporate leverage. That is, there is 
no difference between corporate and personal borrowing (necessary for arbitrage 
arguments). 
In modern terms, capital structure is irrelevant, and firm value is equal to the present 
value of its free cash flow discounted at the relevant cost of capital. 
MM Proposition I 
Value of the levered firm = Value of un-levered Firm 
VL = VU 
Adopted from: Ross et al (2002) 
The above figure is Modigliani and Miller's proposition I and is one of the most 
important results of theory in corporate finance (Wald, 1999). It is a simple arbitrage 
UniS 
10 
argument that, in a world without taxes, any investor of the unlevered firm can borrow 
money at the same interest as the levered firm and make money by investing in the 
unlevered company. Therefore, the value of the two companies will be the same 
(Copeland and Weston: 1992). 
The key to their model, according to Megginson (1997), is the assumption which 
states that shares of firms within a given risk class have both the same expected return 
and the same probability distribution of expected returns, and can therefore be 
considered perfect substitutes for each other. Companies within a risk class thus 
differ from each other only in scale, they have the same expected profit per dollar of 
invested capital, and investors can expect their per share returns to be identical. MM 
suggested that these classes might be comparable to industrial classifications, and this 
is a useful and intuitive analogy. In addition, Higson (1998) pointed out that MM 
employ two concepts that are used in financial decisions to prove their argument, 
namely arbitrage and homemade alternative. Arbitrage is the process that ensures that 
two firms differing only in capital structure must have the same value. Homemade 
gearing describes that an investor holding an equity stake in a leveraged firm can sell 
his stake, raise a personal loan equal to the share that he held in the leveraged 
company, spend the proceeds on a firm that is not geared and increase his income at 
no cost (Higson, 1998). 
Despite the fact that many of these assumptions are far from the reality of capital 
markets, relaxing them does not always'lead to violation of the MM theory. It is 
difficult to find an example where a firm's value might plausibly depend on financing. 
The most serious violations of MM's proposition I create a moneymaking opportunity 
for firms and financial intermediaries. Any distortion of the normal function of 
capital markets creates unsatisfied investors that can become the clientele for new 
more attractive securities. Once the clientele is satisfied, proposition I is restored, 
until the next distortion (Brealey and Myers, 1991). 
Although perfect capital market assumptions are unrealistic, Garvey (1992) argues 
that most of them do not pose serious problems for the theory. However, there are 
two assumptions that need highlighting as they have a significant effect on the results: 
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1. It is assumed there is no taxation: this is a serious problem because arguably 
one of the key advantages of debt is the tax relief on interest payments. 
2. Risk in Modigliani and Miller's theory is measured entirely by variability of 
cash flows. They ignore the possibility that cash flows might cease because of 
bankruptcy. This is another significant problem for the theory if borrowing is 
high (Garvey, 1992). 
In addition, the assumption about homemade leverage also seems to contradict the 
fact that many individuals are constrained in the amount of credit they can borrow, 
and in any case cannot borrow at the same terms that firms can (Stiglitz, 1988). 
2.2.3 MM Proposition 11 
In proposition II, the required return on equity is a linear function of the debt-equity 
ratio. 
"The expected yield of share of stock is equal to the appropriate 
capitalisation rate for a pure equity stream in the same risk class, 
plus a premium related to financial risk equal to the debt-to- 
equity ratio times the spread between the capitalisation rate and 
the cost of debt. " (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
MM proposition Il is represented graphically below: 
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Figure 2.1 MM Proposition 11 
Re= Expected return on equity 
Rates of Return 
Ra= Expected return on assets 
Rd= Expected return on debt 
Risk-free debt Risky Debt D/E debt/equity 
Adopted from: Brealey and Myers (2000) 
It can be seen from the figure above, as the debt-equity ratio increases, the expected 
return on equity increases so long as the debt is risk-free. However, "if leverage 
increases the risk of the debt, the demandfor a higher return will cause the increase 
in return on equity to slow down" (Brealey and Myers, 2000). Indeed, according to 
Dickerson et al (1995), MM shows that the use of cheap debt gives shareholders a 
higher rate of return, but this higher return is precisely what they need to compensate 
for the increased risk from financial leverage. The graph of cost of capital against 
gearing (as measured by debt/equity ratio) is shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.2 Graphical Illustration of MM's 1958 Theory 
Cost of Capital: r 
The Cost of Equity increases to exactly compensate for the cheap 
debt in the capital structure. Note that Ke and Kd do not increase 
at high gearing to allow for bankruptcy risk, because this risk is 
ignored. 
Adopted from: Garvey (1992) 
Solomon (1963) points out that as far as the leverage effect is concerned, there exists 
a clearly definable optimum position, namely the point at which the marginal cost of 
more debt is equal to a company's average cost of capital. This point will be shown 
later in the Trade-off theory. 
2.2.4 MM with Corporate Taxes 
MM published a follow-up paper in 1963 in which they relaxed the assumption that 
there are no corporate taxes. The US tax code allows corporations to deduct interest 
UniS 
14 
payments as an expense, but dividend payments to stockholders are not tax deductible. 
This differential treatment encourages corporations to use debt in their capital 
structures i. e. the value of the levered firm will equal that of an unlevered firm, plus 
the present value of the tax shield provided by debt (Modigliani and Miller: 1963). 
A significant positive relationship between market values of firms and their debt tax 
shield, found in research made by Modigliani and Miller (1963), emphasises the 
importance of the leverage decision to firm value. MM theory with corporate taxes is 
represented below: 
MM Theory with Corporate Taxes 
Value of levered firm = Value of unlevered firm + Value of tax savings 
Adopted from: Modigliani and Miller: (1963) 
MM (1963) demonstrate that if the other assumptions hold, this treatment leads to a 
situation that calls for 100% debt financing. This means that a firm financed with 
100% debt would have optimal capital structure. 
Figure 2.3: MM Proposition 11 (with corporate taxes) 
Rates of Return Re= Expected return on equity 
WACC 
(I -Tc) *r debt = after-tax expected return on debt 
Debt-Equity Ratio D/E 
Adopted from: Brealey et al (1999) 
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Brigham and Houston (1999) point out that this suggestion is not observed in the real 
world due to the fact that the bondholders will become owners of the company and it 
would be unrealistic for them to ask a rate of return smaller that the previous owners. 
Baxter (1967) and Solomon (1963) point out that the tax correction model is 
unreasonable since it implies that the firm should utilise the maximum amount of debt 
in its capital structure. In addition, a question that should be raised is, what is 
happening to risk and residual claim? 
2.2.5 Implications of the MM Theory 
The implication of including corporate taxes in the model is that the firm's value is 
maximised when it is financed entirely by debt. This is not very plausible; no firm is 
financed wholly by debt. A number of real world constraints need consideration. 
Firstly, there are institutional and legal restrictions - some institutions will not 
purchase stock of a firm that has a debt-equity ratio exceeding a set cut-off Secondly, 
there are costs imposed for going bankrupt that might persuade the firm's 
management not to increase the debt-equity ratio too high. Thirdly, the interest tax 
shield, which might increase as the company uses more debt, may exhaust taxable 
income (this suggests an upper boundary to the amount of debt). Finally, there may 
be conflicts of interest between stockholders and bondholders. 
Each of these points suggests that the 100% debt policy may not be optimal for a firm. 
"If we look to the US market, the average debt-to-value ratio is less than 40%" 
(Alderson and Betker, 2000). Furthermore, "a survey of 768 of the largest industrial 
firms shows that 126 (16%) have no debt in their capital structures" (Alderson and 
Betker, 2000). This empirical evidence suggests that the 100% debt policy is clearly 
not what is observed. The wide range of debt-equity ratios in the market could 
indicate that the original proposition about the irrelevance of the capital structure may 
have more merit than we initially gave it. 
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2.3 The Miller Model 
Miller (1977) highlights the limitations of his and Modigliani's 1963 arguments by 
additionally considering the effect of personal taxation. "Miller argues that the debt 
Irrelevancy Theory could be resuscitated even in the presence of corporate taxes, if 
taxes on the dividends and interest income that individuals receive from firms were 
factored in the analysis" (Damodaran, 1997). Miller (1977) modified the MM theory 
by introducing both corporate and personal taxes. Accordingly, the gearing from debt 
is as follows: 
[I- (1-Tc)(1-Tps)/(I-TpB)l BL. 
Where: 
G is the tax advantage of gearing, 
Tc is the corporation tax rate, 
Tps is the personal tax rate on dividends, 
TpB is the personal Tax rate on interest and 
BL is the market value of the levered firm's debt 
Adopted from Miller (1977) 
In the Miller model, there is a personal tax advantage to equity because capital gains 
are taxed only on realization, and a corporate tax advantage to debt because interest is 
tax deductible. In equilibrium, people with personal tax rates above the corporate tax 
rate hold equity while those with rates below hold debt. This prediction is not 
consistent with what occurred in the U. S. in the late 1980's and early 1990's when 
there were no personal tax rates above the corporate rate. The Miller model suggests 
that there should have been a very large increase in debt used by corporations but 
there was only a small change. 
As companies begin to borrow, managers must persuade investors to hold bonds 
instead of stocks. The bigger the tax bracket of the investor, the bigger the rate of 
interest payments that the firm must give in order to attract the particular investor. 
Companies can afford to bribe investors as long as the personal tax rate is smaller 
than the corporate tax rate. Migration of investors from being equity-holders to being 
bond holders stops when the corporate tax savings are equal to the personal tax loss. 
Consequently, the debt to equity ratio of a company depends on the corporate tax rate 
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and the funds available to investors in the various tax brackets (Brealey and Myers, 
1991). 
Optimal capital structure can be explained by a Trade-Off between a gain from 
leverage and relative costs such as bankruptcy costs. Furthermore, in the observed 
market equilibrium, the effects of interest rates are seen before those of tax rates that 
are "grossed up", so that most or all of the interest rate tax shield is lost. Finally, it 
implies equilibrium of aggregate debt outstanding in the economy, determined by 
relative corporate and personal tax rates (Copeland and Weston, 1992). 
De Angelo and Masulis (1980) analysed Miller's personal tax theory and introduced 
the accounting depreciation and investment tax credits, where they stated that these 
non-debt corporate tax shields were sufficient to overturn the leverage irrelevancy 
theory. They remarked that these would lead to a market equilibrium, in which each 
firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decision solely due to the interaction of 
personal and corporate tax treatments of debt and equity. 
2.4 Cost of Financial Distress 
The Modigliani and Miller (195 8) theory of capital structure is such that the product- 
market decisions of firms are separate from financial -market decisions. Essentially 
this is achieved by assuming there is perfect competition in product markets. In an 
oligopolistic industry where there are strategic interactions between firms in the 
product market, financial decisions are also likely to play an important role. Financial 
distress is defined as a firm's inability to meet part or all of its financial obligations, a 
situation that may or may not lead to bankruptcy. Moreover, the firm is exposed to 
certain costs, direct or indirect, when it faces financial distress. Direct costs include 
expenses related to courts, lawyers, experts and accountants in addition to 
administrative expenses in case of bankruptcy proceedings. 
Indirect costs, on the other hand, are expenses or economic losses that result from 
bankruptcy but are not cash expenses spent on the process itself These include the 
diversion of management's time while bankruptcy is underway, lost sales during and 
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after bankruptcy, constraints on capital investment and R&D spending, and loss of 
key employees after a firm becomes bankrupt (Megginson, 1997). The probability of 
financial distress increases as the debt financing increases, while the benefits of the 
debt tax shield increase as the use of debt financing increases; the former decreases 
the firm's market value whereas the later increases it. 
Baxter (1967), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976) and Kim (1978) showed 
that the firm should trade off the tax advantage from debt financing against the risk of 
bankruptcy, and that an optimal capital structure would maximize the firm's total 
market value. The optimal capital structure is represented graphically below: 
Figure 2.4: Cost of Capital and the Optimal Capital Structure 
% 
Rf 
D/D+S 
Adopted from: Copeland and Weston (1992) 
Optimal capital structure is determined by taking on increasing amounts of debt until 
the gain from leverage is equal to the present value of the expected loss from 
bankruptcy costs (Copeland and Weston, 1992) 
Allen (1986), Brander and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1986) and others have 
considered various different aspects of these interactions between financing and 
product markets. Allen (1986) considers a duopoly model where a bankrupt firm is at 
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(D/D+S)* 100% 
a strategic disadvantage in choosing its investment because the bankruptcy process 
forces it to delay its decision. 
Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1986) analyse the role of debt as a pre- 
commitment device in oligopoly models. By taking on a large amount of debt a firm 
effectively pre-commits to a higher level of output. Titman (1984) and Maksimovic 
and Titman (1993) have considered the interaction between financial decisions and 
customers' decisions. Titman (1984) looks at the effect of an increased probability of 
bankruptcy on product price because of, for example, the difficulties in obtaining 
spare parts and servicing should the firm cease to exist. Maksimovic and Titman 
(1993) consider the relationship between capital structure and a firm's reputation 
incentives to maintain high product quality. 
2.5 The Trade-Off Theory 
The preceding arguments led to the development of "the Trade-Off theory of capital 
structure". The Trade-Off theory of capital structure has been the textbooks' staple 
for many years (see Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1977), Taggart (1977), 
Haugen and Senbet (1978), Marsh (1982), Kane et al (1984) and Bradley et al (1984)). 
According to Brigham et al (1999), Trade-Off theory states that the optimal capital 
structure is the trade-off between the benefit of debt (i. e. the interest tax shelter) and 
the costs of debt (i. e. financial distress and agency costs). A summary of the Trade- 
Off theory is given in the figure below: 
UniS 
20 
Figure 2.5 Effect of Leverage on the Value of Firm's Stock 
Value of the firm 
Present value of 
Interest tax shelter 
Vu 
MM Value of the firm 
The expected PV of 
Financial distress 
Actual Value of the firm 
Value of the firm with no 
financial leverage 
Optimal amount of debt (B) Debt 
Adopted from: Brigham et al (1999) 
As can be seen from the figure 2.7, the diagonal straight line represents the value of 
the firm in a world without bankruptcy costs. The curved line represents the value of 
the firm with these costs. The curved line rises as the firm moves from all equity to a 
small amount of debt. Here the expected present value of the distress costs is minimal 
because the probability of distress is so small. However, as more and more debt is 
incurred, the present value of these costs rises at an increasing rate. At some point, 
the rise in the present value of these costs from an additional dollar of debt equals the 
rise in the present value of tax shield. This is the debt level maximising the value of 
the firm and is represented by (B) in the figure above. In other words, (B) is the 
optimal amount of debt. Bankruptcy costs increase faster than the tax shield 
advantages beyond this point, implying a reduction in firm value from further 
leverage. Accordingly, value of levered firms will be as follows: 
Value of levered firm = value of un-levered firm + value of tax savings 
- Present value of expected costs of financial distress 
Adopted from: Brealey and Myers (2000) 
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Brealey and Myers (2000) point out that the Trade-Off theory recognises that target 
debt ratios may vary from firm to firm. They stated that companies with safe tangible 
assets and plenty of taxable income to shield ought to have high target ratios. 
Unprofitable companies with risky, intangible assets ought to rely primarily on equity 
financing. The table below represents trade off in a balance sheet format: 
Table 2.1: Trade-Off in a Balance Sheet Format 
Advantages to Borrowing Disadvantages to Borrowing 
A. Tax benefit: A. Bankruptcy costs: 
Higher tax rates = Higher tax benefit Higher business risk = Higher cost 
B. Added discipline: B. Agency cost: 
Greater the separation between the Greater the separation between 
managers and stockholders = greater the stockholders and lenders= Higher cost 
benefit C. Loss of future financing flexibility: 
Greater the uncertainly about the future 
financing needs = Higher cost 
Adopted from: Damodaran (1997) 
Myers (1990) argues that Trade-Off theory avoids a comer solution (i. e. it does not 
give a clear explanation to what is observed in reality) and rationalises moderate 
borrowing in a way that can easily be understood. Nevertheless, closer analysis of 
financial distress gives a testable prediction from the Trade-Off theory, since these 
costs should be most serious for firms with valuable intangible assets and growth 
opportunities (Myers, 1990). 
However, the Trade-Off theory of capital structure does not provide a satisfactory 
explanation of actual practice, because the empirical magnitudes of bankruptcy costs 
and interest tax shields do not match observed capital structures (Bernanek et al, 
1995). Ross et al (1993) pointed out that no formula exists in Trade-Off theory at this 
time to exactly determine the optimal debt level for any particular firm. This is 
because bankruptcy costs cannot be expressed in a precise way. 
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2.6 Agency Costs 
2.6.1 Introduction 
Agency theory defines the firm as "simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a 
nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of 
divisible residual claims on the assets and the cash flow of the organization which can 
generally be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals" (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976: p3l 1). In their paper Jensen and Meckling discuss agency costs as 
the key tool in evaluating alternative designs of principal-agent relations. They define 
agency costs as the sum of. 1) monitoring expenditures by the principal; 2) the 
bonding expenditures by the agent and; 3) the residual loss i. e. the monetary 
equivalent of the reduction in the welfare of the principal as the result of the 
differences between the agent's decisions and those decisions which would maximize 
the welfare of the principal. Accordingly, major insights into the problems of capital 
structure can be gained if they are understood in terms of principal-agent theory. The 
outcomes of the firm are no longer independent of financing decisions, not only 
because of tax advantages but also for reasons of conflicts of interests, which may 
result in different optimal investment decisions. 
The main issues that agency theory tries to address are: 
I To study the influence of the sharing rule in itself through a detailed analysis 
of the agent's actions if a certain capital structure is assumed and if the firm 
has already had the financing. 
2 To devise a certain kind of framework that will enable us to identify the 
ultimate bearers of the losses resulting from the agency problems. 
3 To advise different instruments that can be used to tackle these agency 
problems in different scenarios. 
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2.6.2 Agency Cost of External Equity 
The agency cost theory of financial structure was put forward by Jensen and 
Meckling in their 1976 paper. They observe that when an entrepreneur owns 100 % 
of the stock of a company there is no separation between corporate ownership and 
control. This means that the entrepreneur bears all of the costs, and reaps all of the 
benefits of his or her actions. Once a fraction (a) of the firm's stock is sold to outside 
investors, however, the entrepreneur bears only 1-a of the consequences of his or her 
actions. This gives the entrepreneur a clear incentive, in Jensen and Meckling's 
tactful phrasing to "consume perquisites". However, the entrepreneur is charged in 
advance for the "perk" he or she is expected to consume after the equity sale. Since 
selling stock to outside investors creates agency costs of equity, which are born 
solely by the entrepreneur, but which also harm society by reducing the value of 
corporate assets and discouraging additional entrepreneurship. 
The agency conflict that derives from the manager's tendency to appropriate 
perquisites out of the firm's resources for his own consumption is not the only or the 
most important conflict. It is likely that the most important conflict arises from the 
fact that as the manager's ownership falls, his effort to devote significant effort to 
creative activities such as searching out new profitable projects falls, i. e. he may 
shirk. He may in fact avoid such projects simply because it requires too much 
trouble or effort on his part to learn about them. Avoidance of these personal costs 
and the anxieties that go with them represent a source of on-job utility to him, and 
this shirking can result in the value of the firm being substantially lower than it 
otherwise could be. In practice, it is possible by expending resources to alter the 
opportunity the manager has for receiving non-money-related benefit. These 
methods include auditing, formal control systems, budget restrictions and the 
establishment of incentive compensation systems, which serve to bring the manager's 
interests closer to those of outside shareholders. 
Selling external equity is vital for entrepreneurs both because of individual portfolio 
diversification demands and because of the need to finance corporate growth once it 
outstrips personal wealth constraints. Jensen and Meckling point out that using debt 
finance can help overcome the agency problem costs of external equity in two ways. 
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Firstly, using debt by definition means that less external equity will have to be sold to 
raise a given amount of external financing. If agency costs of outside equity rise 
more than proportionally as a increases, then economising on the amount of outside 
equity sold will reduce the deadweight agency costs of the manager/stockholder 
relationship. The second and more important effect of employing outside debt rather 
than equity financing is that this reduces the scope for excessive managerial 
perquisite consumption. The burden of having to make regular, contractually 
enforceable, debt service payments serve as a very effective tool for disciplining 
entrepreneurs. With debt outstanding, the cost of excessive perk consumption might 
well include the entrepreneur losing control of his or her company following default 
and bondholder seizure of the company's assets. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) raise the question "Why don't we observe large 
corporations individually owned with a tiny fraction of the capital supplied by the 
entrepreneur in return for 100% of the equity and the rest simply borrowed? " The 
reasons they give for this are: 1) the incentive effects associated with highly geared 
firms, 2) the monitoring costs these incentive effects lead to and 3) bankruptcy costs. 
All these costs are simply particular aspects of the agency costs associated with the 
existence of debt claims on the firm. This argument has led to another agency 
problem, i. e. the agency cost of debt which will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
2.6.3 Agency Cost of Debt 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) pointed out another agency problem in corporations, the 
agency problem between equity-holders, managers and bondholders. As the fraction 
of debt in a firm's capital structure increases, bondholders begin taking on an 
increasing fraction of the firm's business and operating risk, but shareholders and 
managers still control the firm's investment and operating decisions. This gives 
managers a variety of incentives to expropriate bondholder wealth for the benefit of 
themselves and the shareholders they represent. The easiest way to do this would be 
to float a bond issue, and then pay out the money raised to shareholders as a dividend. 
After default, the bondholders would be left with an empty corporate shell, and 
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limited liability would prevent the bondholders from trying to collect directly from 
shareholders. As reported by Ross et al (1999): 
" When a firm has debt, conflicts of interest may arise between 
stockholders and bondholders. Because of this, stockholders are 
tempted to pursue selfish strategies. These conflicts of interest, which 
are magnified when financial distress is incurred, impose agency costs 
on the Firm. " 
Another way the shareholders can separate bondholders from their wealth is to borrow 
money on the promise that it will be used to finance a safe investment and then 
actually invest in a risky project. If these investments are successful, shareholders can 
fully repay bondholders and pocket any excess project returns. If the project is 
unsuccessful, shareholders simply default and bondholders take over an empty 
corporate shell. The most effective preventive steps bond investors can take, 
according to Megginson (1997), involve writing very detailed covenants into bond 
contracts, which sharply constrain the ability of the borrowing firm's managers to 
engage in inappropriate behaviour. However, these covenants make bond agreements 
immensely costly to negotiate and enforce, and in constraining management's ability 
to make valuing value-increasing investment (Smith et al, 1979). 
The second problem generated from the conflict between shareholders and 
bondholders is what is called, according to Myers (1977), the "Moral Hazard". If the 
firm were totally equity funded, shareholders would accept all positive NPV projects. 
However, when partially funded with debt the shareholders may have an incentive to 
reject some positive NPV investments (Myers 1977). Myers argues that when a 
firm's assets are largely made up of growth opportunities it would be difficult to fund 
the firm with debt because of the shareholders' incentive to under-invest. Myers 
pointed that if there is a large amount of debt outstanding which is not backed by cash 
flows from the firm's assets, i. e. a 'debt overhang', equity-holders may be reluctant to 
invest in safe, profitable projects because the bondholders will claim the lions' share 
of the cash flow i. e. equity-holders may not receive anything. 
Under the NPV rule a firm would accept a project if the present value of the generated 
cash flows exceeded the present value of the cost of investment. Some positive NPV 
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projects could generate enough proceeds to cover the basic cost of purchasing the 
required inputs and capital goods but still not generate enough cash flow to also pay 
the outstanding debt. The shareholders would not accept the project unless its 
expected proceeds would both cover the cost of investment and pay-off the debt- 
holders. 
The third problem that is generated from the conflict between shareholders and 
bondholders is the "Adverse Selection" problem developed by Stigliz and Weiss 
(198 1). Stigliz and Weiss illustrate that the inability of lenders to distinguish between 
good and bad risks ex ante prevents them from charging variable interest rates 
dependent on the actual risk. In this event, lenders are forced to increase the general 
cost of borrowing, which will tend to induce a problem of adverse selection, as good 
risks are driven from the market by the high costs of borrowing. Due to this 
information asymmetry, companies will tend to prefer internal to external financing, 
where available for financing good risks. 
The study of Jensen and Meckling (1976) predicts that managers of an individual firm, 
starting from an all-equity position, will substitute bonds for stock in the firm's capital 
structure in order to reduce the agency cost of equity. As this process continues, 
however, the agency costs of debt begin to rise at an increasing rate. The firm's 
optimal debt to equity ratio is reached at the point where the agency cost of an 
additional dollar of debt exactly equals the agency cost of the dollar of equity retired. 
This situation is represented below: 
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Figure 2.6: Total Agency Cost and the Optimal Capital Structure 
Agency Costs 
Minimum 
agency 
co-st 
0 1.0 E 
Fraction of outside financing obtained by equity 
Adopted from: Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
The agency perspective has also led to a series of important papers by Hart and Moore 
(1989,1994), Aghion and Bolton (1992), Berglof and von Thadden (1994), Von 
Thadden (1995) and Hart (1995) on financial contracts. Hart and Moore (1989) 
consider an entrepreneur who wishes to raise funds to undertake a project. Both the 
entrepreneur and the outside investor can observe the project payoffs at each date, but 
they cannot write explicit contracts based on these payoffs because third parties such 
as courts cannot observe them. The focus of their analysis is the problem of providing 
an incentive for the entrepreneur to repay the borrowed funds. Among other things, it 
is shown that the optimal contract is a debt contract and incentives to repay are 
provided by the ability of the creditor to seize the entrepreneur's assets. 
Titman (1984) points out that agency costs are important for contracts between the 
firm and the customer or between the firm and its employees. If, for example, a firm 
produces durable goods that require future servicing, the customer does not only buy 
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ownership, but also future servicing. Therefore, customers must assess the probability 
of bankruptcy and weigh it in their decision to purchase durable goods. Firms that 
produce durable goods will have lower demand for debt. Consequently, if labour 
markets are competitive, then labourers will charge lower wages to work for a firm 
that has a lower probability of bankruptcy. Thus, one should expect to find that firms 
which use a larger percentage of j ob-specific human capital carry less debt. 
In Harris and Raviv (1990) and Stulz (1990), managers disagree over an operational 
decision. In particular, in the Harris and Raviv model managers are assumed to want 
always to continue the firm's current operations even if investors prefer the firm's 
liquidation. In the Stulz model, managers are assumed to want always to invest all 
available funds even if paying out cash is better for investors, therefore creating an 
over-investment conflict. In both cases, it is assumed that the conflict cannot be 
resolved through contracts based on cash flow and investment expenditure. Debt 
mitigates the problem in the Harris and Raviv model by giving investors (debt-holders) 
the option to force liquidation if cash flows are inadequate, whereas in the Stulz 
model, debt payment reduces free cash flow. The cost of debt in Stulz's model is that 
debt payments may more than exhaust free cash flow, reducing the funds available for 
profitable investment (under-investment). The optimal capital structure in Harris and 
Raviv trades off improved liquidation decisions versus higher investigation costs. A 
larger debt level improves the liquidation decision because it makes default more 
likely. 
2.7 Signalling and Asymmetric Information Theory 
MM assumed that investors have the same information about a firm's prospects as its 
managers i. e. symmetric information, because those who are inside the firm 
(managers and employees) and those who are outside the firm (investors) have 
identical information. However, in fact managers generally have better information 
about their firms than do outside investors; i. e. asymmetric information (Besley and 
Brigham, 2000). A signal, as defined by Megginson (1997), is an action that imposes 
deadweight costs on the signaller in order to convey value to relatively poorly 
UniS 
29 
informed outsiders (usually investors). The signal is credible if it is prohibitively 
costly for a weaker firm to attempt to mimic. 
An early contribution is the Ross (1977) paper on the "incentive signaling approach", 
where he developed a signaling model of corporate capital structure based on 
asymmetric information problems between well-informed managers and poorly 
informed outsider shareholders. This model is based on the idea that corporate 
executives with favourable inside information about their firms have a clear incentive 
to convey this positive information somehow to outside investors, in order to increase 
the market price of shares. However, managers cannot simply announce that they 
have good news because every other manager has the incentive to do the same, and 
the market will be appropriately cautious towards any self-serving statement which 
can only be proved to be true as the time passes. One solution for this problem is for 
managers having "good news", i. e. those of high-value firms, to signal it to the 
investors by taking some action that is prohibitively costly for the managers that have 
"bad news" i. e., of low-value firms, to mimic. 
Ross shows that it is possible to design an incentive based-compensation contract for 
managers of high value firms that will induce them to use a heavily leveraged capital 
structure for their companies. Less valuable companies are unwilling to assume so 
much debt because they are much more likely to fall into bankruptcy. Based on these 
assumptions, a separating equilibrium occurs where high value firms use more debt 
financing and less valuable companies rely more on equity. Investors are able to 
differentiate between high and low value firms by looking at their capital structure 
and are willing to assign higher valuations to highly levered firms, since weaker firms 
are unwilling to mimic the stronger ones by borrowing extra debt, thus, the 
equilibrium is enforced. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) consider a situation where entrepreneurs use their retained 
share of ownership in a firm to signal its value. Owners of high value firms retain a 
high share of the firm to signal their type. Their high retention means they do not get 
to diversify as much as they would if there was symmetric information and this makes 
it unattractive for low value firms to mimic them. 
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Megginson (1997) points out that the signalling models explain market responses to 
the different types of security issues. Debt issues signal good news (managers are 
confident about the future, and are greeted with a positive stock price response, while 
equity issues signal bad news (earnings per share will decline in the future), and are 
met with significant stock price declines. However, leverage ratios are inversely 
related to profitability in almost every industry, not directly related as the signalling 
models predict. Furthermore, the signalling model predicts that industries rich in 
growth options and other intangible assets should employ more debt than mature, 
tangible- as set-rich industries because growth companies have more severe 
information asymmetry problems, and thus greater need to signal. In reality, exactly 
the opposite pattern is observed; asset-rich companies use far more debt than do 
growth companies. Two subsequent papers based on asymmetric information have 
been very influential (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). If managers are better 
informed about the prospects of the firm than the capital markets they will be 
unwilling to issue equity to finance investment projects if the equity is undervalued. 
Instead, they will prefer to use equity when it is overvalued. Thus, equity is regarded 
as a bad signal. Myers (1984) uses this kind of reasoning to develop the "pecking 
order" theory of financing, which will be discussed in the next section 
2.8 The Pecking Order Theory 
Myers (1984) proposed the Pecking Order Theory of Leverage, which is based on 
four observations and assumptions about corporate behaviour: 
1) Dividend policy is "sticky". Managers try at all costs to maintain a constant 
dollar-share dividend payment, and will neither increase nor decrease 
dividends in response to temporary fluctuation in current profit. 
2) Firms prefer internal financing (retained earnings) to external financing of any 
sort, debt or equity. 
3) If a firm must obtain more external financing, it will choose the safest (least 
risks) security first. 
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4) As a firm is required to obtain more external financing, it will work down the 
pecking order of securities, beginning with very safe debt, and then 
progressing through risky debt, convertible securities, preferred stock, and 
finally common stock as a last resort. 
This model focuses on the motivations of the corporate manager, rather than on 
capital market valuation principles. Megginson (1997) points out that this model had 
been largely ignored by modem economists because it seemed to be based on 
irrational, value-decreasing corporate behaviour that financial natural selection should 
have existed long before. Indeed, the simple pecking order model presumes severe 
market imperfections (very high transactions costs, uninformed investors, and 
managers who are completely insensitive to the firm's stock market valuation) that are 
hard to accept as accurate portraits of modem capital markets. 
Myers (1984) provides a viable theoretical justification for the pecking order theory, 
based on asymmetric information; Myers and MaJluf (1984) make two key 
assumptions about corporate managers. Firstly, they assumed a firm's managers 
know more about the company's current earnings and investment opportunities than 
do outside investors. Secondly, they assumed managers act in the best interest of the 
firm's existing shareholders. These two assumptions, according to Megginson (1997), 
are crucial because the asymmetric information assumption implies that managers 
who develop or discover a marvelous new positive-NPV investment opportunity are 
unable to convey that information to outside shareholders because the managers' 
statements will not be believed. 
After all, every management team has an incentive to announce wondrous new 
projects in order to bid up the firm's stock price, so they can sell shares at an 
unjustifiably high price. In addition, since investors are unable to verify these claims 
until long after the fact, they will assign a low average value to the stocks of all firms 
and will buy new equity issues only at a large discount from their equilibrium values 
without informational asymmetries. Corporate managers understand these problems, 
and in certain cases will refuse to accept positive-NPV investment opportunities if this 
would entail issuing new equity, since this would give away too much of the project's 
value to the new shareholders at the expense of the old. 
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Furthermore, information problems in financial markets are problems caused by 
human nature, and thus are not soluble through reductions in transaction costs or other 
capital market innovations. Therefore, the solution to this pervasive problem of 
modem corporate finance, according to Myers and Majluf, is to retain sufficient 
financial slack 2 to be able to fund positive-NPV projects intemally. Firms with 
sufficient financial slack will never have to issue risky debt or equity securities in 
order to fund their investment projects, and they are thus able to finesse asymmetric 
information problems between managers and investors. 
Bruner (1988) points out that this model provides an explanation for the observed 
pattern of profitable firms retaining their earnings as equity and building up their cash 
reserves; they are building both financial slack and financial flexibility. Furthermore, 
Besley and Brigham (2000) state that the Myers and MaJluf model explains stock 
market reactions to leverage-increasing and leverage-decreasing events. Since firms 
with valuable investment opportunities find a way to finance their projects internally, 
or use the least risky securities possible if they have to obtain financing externally, the 
only firms that will issue equity are those with managers who consider the firm's 
shares to be over-valued. Investors understand these incentives, and also realize that 
managers are better informed about a firm's prospects than they are, and therefore 
investors always greet the announcement of a new equity issue as "bad news" (as a 
sign that management considers the firm's shares to be over-valued or that it has 
exhausted its debt capacity). 
Unfortunately, the Pecking Order Theory cannot explain all the capital structure 
regularities observed in practice. For example, it suffers in comparison with the 
trade-off theory in its ability to explain how taxes, bankruptcy cost, security issuance 
costs, and the individual firm's investment opportunity set influence that company's 
actual debt ratio. Furthermore, the theory ignores significant agency problems that 
can easily arise when a firm's managers accumulate so much financial slack that they 
become immune to market discipline (Jensen, 1993). On the other hand, Shyam- 
Sunder and Myers (1993) empirically compare the Pecking Order and trade-off 
models of corporate leverage, and find the Trade-Off model wanting. In fact their 
tests show the power of some usual tests of the Trade-off model to be virtually nil. 
2 Financial slack is defined to include a firm's cash and marketable securities holdings, as well as 
unused (risk free) debt capacity. 
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Nonetheless, the Pecking Order theory of capital structure seems to explain certain 
aspects of observed corporate behaviour better than any other model does, and this is 
particularly true of corporate financing choice and market responses to security issues. 
2.9 Free Cash Flow Theory: Jensen (1986) 
Jensen (1986) expanded on the issues of management's deviations from optimal 
investment policies and perquisite consumption raised in Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
The work of Jensen starting from the hypothesis of the existence of asymmetric 
information between managers and shareholders, introduces the so-called problem of 
over-investment, as a basic argument of his free cash flow theory. According to this 
theory, negative NPV investment projects can be undertaken. 
The over-investment process arises from the conflict between managers and 
shareholders. When information asymmetries exist, and taking into account that 
mechanisms used to align the interests between shareholders and managers may not 
be fully efficient, managers may use the free cash flow to undertake negative NPV 
projects in their own best interests (Jensen, 1986). Note that free cash flow is cash 
flow in excess of that required to fund all positive NPV projects, hence managers 
waste these funds instead of paying them to shareholders. Managers will have 
incentives to over-invest because of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits 
associated with the larger dimension of the firm (Jensen, 1986). 
In mature industries where firms generate large cash flows, but have only few growth 
opportunities, managers tend to over-invest and diversify into industries in which they 
have little knowledge. By issuing debt in exchange for stock, managers are bonding 
their promise to pay future cash flows in a way that cannot be accomplished by simple 
dividend increases. Jensen calls this the 'Control Hypothesis' for debt creation. Debt 
creation, without retention of the proceeds of the issue, enables managers to 
effectively bond their promise to pay out future cash flows. Debt provides a means of 
bonding managers' promises to pay out future cash flows rather than investing in 
wealth-destroying ventures. It also provides the means for controlling opportunistic 
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behaviour by reducing the cash flows available for discretionary spending. Top 
managers' attention is then clearly focused on those activities necessary to ensure that 
debt payments are met. This use of debt as a disciplinary tool makes survival the 
central issue for all concerned. 
2.10 Empirical Evidence on Capital Structure 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that, due to the tax deductibility of interest 
payments, companies may prefer debt to equity. This would suggest that highly 
profitable firms would choose to have high levels of debt in order to obtain attractive 
tax shields. However, others such as Miller (1977) highlight the limitations of his and 
Modigliani's 1963 arguments by additionally considering the effect of personal 
taxation. Moreover, De Angelo and Masulis (1980) argue that interest tax shields 
may be unimportant to companies with other tax shields, such as depreciation. They 
stated that introduction of such non-debt tax shields leads to the conclusion that each 
firm has a unique interior capital structure that maximises its value. This capital 
structure is determined only by the interactions of personal and corporate taxes as 
well as positive default (financial distress) costs. 
Ashton (1989) argues that if there is a UK Tax advantage of debt, it is likely to be 
much smaller than the traditional MM value. The tax advantage of debt is 
considerably less under the UK imputation system than it is under the US classical 
system. Giner and Reverte (200 1) used the Ohlson (1995) framework to examine the 
usefulness of the information about debt level on stock prices. They take into account 
the relationship between the cost of debt and the return on investment. Thereafter, 
they consider the degree of company leverage relative to the optimal level and the 
future prospects facing the firm are included in their analysis to further examine the 
value of debt. Their results seem to support the optimal capital structure theory in that 
deviations of the debt-equity ratio from its optimal level are negatively perceived by 
investor. In addition, their results also seem to be consistent with the signalling 
theory, as debt seems to be a positive signal for firms with higher future expected 
earnings relative to those where expected earning are not so high. 
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An alternative hypothesis regarding the relationship between profitability and gearing 
relates to Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) pecking-order theory. Based on 
asymmetric information, they predict that companies will prefer internal to external 
capital sources. Consequently, companies with high levels of profits will prefer to 
finance investments with retained earnings rather than by the raising of debt finance. 
The finding of Rajan and Zingales (1995) of a negative relationship between gearing 
and profitability is consistent with Myers' (1984) pecking-order theory. 
In their cross-sectional study of the determinants of capital structure, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) examine the extent to which, at the level of the individual firm, 
gearing may be explained by four key factors, namely market-to-book, size, 
profitability and asset tangibility. Their analysis is based upon a firm-level sample 
from each of the G-7 countries, and although the results of their regression analysis 
differ slightly across countries, they appear to uncover some strong conclusions. The 
market-to-book ratio is used by Raj an and Zingales (1995) as a proxy for the level of 
growth opportunities available to the enterprise. This is in common with most studies, 
which tend to apply proxies, rather than valuation models, to estimate growth 
opportunities (Danbolt et al. 1999). Rajan and Zingales suggest that, a priori, one 
would expect a negative relationship between growth opportunities and the level of 
gearing. 
This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
based on agency theory, and the work of Myers (1977), who argues that, due to 
information asymmetries, companies with high gearing would have a tendency to pass 
up positive NPV investment opportunities 3. Myers (1977), therefore, argues that 
companies with large amounts of investment opportunities (also known as growth 
options) would tend to have low gearing ratios. Moreover, as growth opportunities do 
not yet provide revenue, companies may be reluctant to take on large amounts of 
contractual liabilities at this stage. Similarly, as growth opportunities are largely 
intangible, they may provide limited collateral value or liquidation value (in a similar 
spirit to the discussion of tangibility below). Companies with growth options may 
thus not wish to incur - nor necessarily be offered -additional debt financing. 
3 The reasons for passing up positive NPV investments are explained before in this chapter in section 
2.6.3 Agency cost of Debt. 
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However, the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between gearing and 
growth opportunities is rather mixed. While Titman and Wessels (1988), Chung 
(1993) and Barclay et al. (1995) find a negative correlation, Kester (1986) does not 
find any support for the predicted negative relationship between growth opportunities 
and gearing. Despite this controversy, however, Rajan and Zingales (1995) uncover 
evidence of negative correlations between market-to-book and gearing for all G-7 
countries. This is thus consistent with the hypotheses of Jensen and Mekling (1976) 
and Myers (1977), and lends weight to the notion that companies with high levels of 
growth opportunities can be expected to have low levels of gearing. 
Secondly, Rajan and Zingales include size (which is proxied by the natural logaritlun 
of sales) in their cross-sectional analysis. There is no clear theory to provide ex ante 
expectations as to the effect which size should have on gearing. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) state that: 
"The effect of size on equilibrium leverage is more ambiguous. 
Larger firms tend to be more diversified and fail less often, so size 
(computed as the logarithm of net sales) may be an inverse proxyfor 
the probability of bankruptcy". 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
In addition, larger companies are more likely to have a credit rating and thus have 
access to non-bank debt financing, which is usually unavailable to smaller companies. 
While the prior empirical evidence with regard to the relationship between size and 
gearing is rather mixed, Rajan and Zingales (1995) find gearing for UK companies to 
be positively related to sales, as hypothesized. 
Thirdly, consistent with Toy et al. (1974), Kester (1986) and Titman and Wessles 
(1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) find profitability to be negatively related to gearing. 
Given, however, that the analysis is effectively performed as an estimation of a 
reduced form, such a result masks the underlying demand and supply interaction 
which is likely to be taking place. Although on the supply-side one would expect that 
firms that are more profitable would have better access to debt, the demand for debt 
may be negatively related to profits. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) illustrate, as explained 
before, that the inability of lenders to distinguish between good and bad risks ex ante 
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prevents them from charging variable interest rates dependent on the actual risk. In 
this event, lenders are forced to increase the general cost of borrowing, which will 
tend to induce a problem of adverse selection, as good risks are driven from the 
market by the high costs of borrowing. Due to this information asymmetry, 
companies will tend to prefer internal to external financing, where available. 
Consistent with the findings of Bradley et al. (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Rajan and Zingales' (1995) study of capital structure in the G-7 economies produces 
evidence to suggest a positive relationship between asset tangibility, which they 
define as the ratio of fixed to total assets, and gearing. Following the theories of Scott 
(1977), Williamson (1996) and Harris and Raviv (1990), Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
suggest this may reflect the fact that debt may be more readily available to a firm 
which has high amounts of collateral upon which to secure debt, thus reducing agency 
problems. 
Almost all the above studies find a strong dependence of investment on the 
availability of internal funds, this dependence being interpreted as evidence of the 
under-investment problem due to adverse selection. However, the positive 
relationship found between investment and cash flow may not arise only from the 
under-investment problem due to adverse selection. It may also indicate that high 
levels of cash flow allows managers to undertake negative NPV projects, which 
would not happen if they had to raise external funds and explain the rationality of 
their investments. Thus, the over-investment hypothesis is confirmed whenever the 
positive relationship between investment and cash flows is maintained for firms 
whose investment opportunities are of low quality. On the contrary, for firms with 
valuable investment opportunities, a positive relationship indicates an under- 
investment problem. 
The over-investment idea has gained much support in the literature. For instance, De 
Jong and Veld (2001) find that Dutch managers avoid the disciplining role of debt i. e. 
they avoid using debt and over-invest, however, the market reaction shows that this 
over-investment behaviour is recognised, and the authors interpret this as evidence of 
over- investment. Moreover, the relation between firm performance and managerial 
ownership has been used in previous work to support the over-investment model. 
Morck et al (1988) estimate a piecewise linear relation between managerial ownership 
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and firm performance. They find that firm performance is increasing in managerial 
ownership for ownership levels below 5 percent or over 25 percent but decreasing in 
ownership for ownership levels between 5 and 25 percent of the firm. They interpret 
their results as evidence that managers make investment decisions that entrench them 
in their positions for ownership in this range. As a result of entrenchment, firm 
performance is lower. Many subsequent papers (McConnell and Servaes (1990), 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) and Palia (2001) have conducted similar 
analysis with mixed results. Other support for over-investment comes from Jensen 
(1993), who provides illustrative calculations of the destruction of shareholders' value 
at a number of the world's largest corporations. 
Roy and Mingfang (2000) investigated the argument that decisions concerning the 
choice of capital structure need to be linked with a firm's competitive environment, 
more specifically to environmental dynamism, the degree and the instability of 
changes in a firm's competitive environment. Roy and Mingfang argued that while 
the tax advantages of increased debt are recognised, by increasing debt a firm 
introduces a stakeholder group of lenders who, by definition, have a short-term 
orientation. This group is potentially able to limit the freedom of choice available to 
managers in the selection of strategies to contend with competitive threats or 
opportunities especially when firms need and depend on creative and innovative 
strategic choices to thrive and succeed. The authors integrated complementary 
elements from agency theory and transaction cost economics with elements of 
strategic management in an effort to provide a more holistic view of the capital 
structure decision as it relates to the nature of the firm's competitive environment, 
which provides opportunities to examine the linkage among environment, capital 
structure and organisational performance. 
From the literature review, the authors argued that agency theory does not te into 
consideration competitive envirorunents, or the necessity for managers to make 
choices beyond a stakeholder wealth-maximizing perspective. They added that 
debt 
and equity are not just financial instruments but are more a means of corporate 
governance; 
"From a strategic management perspective, there is a clear indication 
that external factors can influence the efficacy of the capital structure 
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decision with respect to the ability of thefirm to make critical choices in 
response to competitive pressure. However, with agency theory, 
transaction cost economics does not take into consideration the 
competitive environment such that it can provide adequate prescriptive 
advice as to how to create a capital structure that will ensure the long- 
term survival of the firm " 
(Roy and Mingfang, 2000) 
Drastic changes are taking place in the competitive landscape; advanced technologies 
are beginning to alter the effectiveness of traditional competitors' approaches, and to 
introduce a new array of competitive weapons. Accordingly, the authors argued that 
whether firms adopt some of the more traditional strategic actions or emerging actions, 
these actions seem to be associated with greater risk, novelty, the need for investment 
in specialized assets, and more importantly, they may be more difficult to value by 
outside groups. 
Miguel and Pindado (2001) analysed the firm characteristics such as: tangible and 
intangible fixed assets, tax aspects of capital structure, financial distress and aspect 
related to the interdependence between investment and debt, which are determinants 
of capital structure according to different explanatory theories. They also analyze 
how institutional characteristics (such as tax code, bankruptcy laws, state of 
development of bond markets and patterns of ownership) affect capital structure. 
Their purpose is to provide additional international empirical evidence on capital 
structure in two aspects. First, they provide evidence of firm characteristics that 
determine capital structure for a non-G-7 country (Spain). Second, they examine how 
the institutional characteristics affect capital structure. They have developed a target 
adjustment model, in order to study the debt of Spanish firms, which allows them to 
explain the firm's debt in terms of its debt in the previous period and the firm's target 
debt level, the letter being a function depending on the firm characteristics, which 
according to the different theories explain the capital structure. 
Chkir and Cosset (2001) examined the relationship between the debt level of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) and their diversification strategy. By integrating 
both the international market and the product dimension of diversification into the 
analysis and by utilizing a switching regression model that allows the effect of the 
UniS 
40 
determinants of the capital structure of MNCs to vary with the strategy of 
diversification, their paper sheds new light on the debt policy of MNCs. The 
switching regression methodology that they used, allows one to examine the trade-off 
between the debt-reducing effect of agency costs due to international diversification 
and the debt-increasing effect of risk reduction due to industrial diversification. 
2.11 Conclusion 
The main conclusion to be drawn from the diverse literature on capital structure and 
financing decisions is the absence of any universal consensus on optimal financing 
structure. The seminal work in this area was Modigliani and Miller (1958). They 
showed that with perfect markets (i. e., no frictions and symmetric information) and no 
taxes, the total value of a firm is independent of its debt/equity ratio. Similarly, they 
demonstrated that the value of the firm is independent of the level of dividends. In 
their framework, it is the investment decisions of the firm that are important in 
determining its total value. 
The purpose of the Modigliani and Miller theorems was not as a description of reality. 
Instead, it was to stress the importance of taxes and capital market imperfections in 
determining corporate financial policies. Incorporating the tax deductibility of 
interest (but not of dividends) and bankruptcy costs led to the Trade-Off theory of 
capital structure. Some debt is desirable because of the tax shield arising from interest 
deductibility, but the costs of bankruptcy and financial distress limit the amount that 
should be used. In addition, debt, from the agency's point of view, is preferable, since 
it reduces the agency cost between the managers and the shareholders. However, as 
the level of debt increases the agency problem between the bondholders and the 
shareholders increase. Hence, the result is a trade-off between debt and equity. 
The Trade-Off theory of capital structure does not provide a satisfactory explanation 
of actual practice. The tax advantage of debt, relative to the magnitude of expected 
bankruptcy costs, would seem to imply that firms should use more debt than is 
actually observed. Attempts to explain this, such as Miller (1977), which incorporates 
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personal as well as corporate taxes into the theory of capital structure, have not been 
successful. In the Miller (1977) model, there is a personal tax advantage to equity 
because capital gains are only taxed on realization and a corporate tax advantage to 
debt because interest is tax deductible. In equilibrium, people with personal tax rates 
above the corporate tax rate hold equity while those with rates below hold debt. This 
prediction is not consistent with what occurred in the U. S. in the late 1980's and early 
1990's when there were no personal tax rates above the corporate rate. The Miller 
(1977) model suggests that there should have been a very large increase for debt used 
by corporations, but the change was small. 
In imperfect capital markets, financing and investment decisions are not independent. 
In fact, capital market imperfections, such as information asymmetries and agency 
costs, could lead to either under-investment or over-investment processes, i. e., not all 
positive NPV projects will be undertaken and some negative NPV projects not 
rejected. Informational asymmetries contribute to several conflicts between the main 
stakeholders, which give rise to either over-investment or under-investment processes 
and hence either increases or decreases firm's performance. These topics and how 
they are connected are described in the figure 2.7 below: 
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The under-investment process is agency conflicts between main 
stakeholders, which are facilitated by infon-national asymmetries. In particular, the 
financial literature describes three problems that give rise to under- investment 
processes: 1) Asset Substitution arises from the conflict between shareholders and 
bondholders, since shareholders are encouraged to undertake riskier investment 
projects than those initially proposed when asking bondholders for funds (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 2) Moral Hazard also stems from the shareho Ider-bondho I der 
conflict, given the incentives of shareholders not to undertake or abandon profitable 
projects whenever their net present value is lower than the amount of debt issued 4 
(Myers, 1977). 
Finally, the adverse selection problem has a double source: the conflict between 
bondholders and shareholders (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), and the conflict between 
current and prospective shareholders (Myers and Majluf, 1984), since neither 
bondholders nor prospective shareholders have enough information on the quality of 
the investment project proposed by the firm when asking for funds. In summary, all 
these problems create a cost disadvantage of external finance that may give rise to 
financing constraints in capital markets and, consequently, that may lead firms to 
forgo positive NPV when there are no internal funds available. 
Alternatively, over-investment processes arising from the misalignment of the interest 
of owners and managers may also explain the dependence of investment on internal 
funds. When ownership and control are separated, managers have great discretion in 
the decision-making process and, rather paying out dividends to shareholders, they 
prefer to use cash flow to maximize their personal wealth. Consequently, as pointed 
out by Jensen (1986), managers have incentives to use the firm's free cash flows to 
undertake negative NPV projects, while this would not happen if they had to raise 
external capital at a higher cost. 
It follows from Jensen's (1986) free cash flows hypothesis that debt is valuable for 
firms with large cash flows and few growth opportunities, because it commits 
managers to pay out cash in the future, thereby reducing the "free" cash flow at their 
disposal for empire-building investment (and other expenditures which increase 
managerial private benefits at the expense of firm profits). Thus, debt will tend to 
This reasoning is explained in section 2.6.3 Agency Cost of Debt. 
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control for opportunistic behaviour, as debt provides a means of bonding managers' 
promises to pay out future cash flows rather than investing in wealth-destroying 
ventures. Therefore, debt in this case, mitigates the over-investment problem, and 
thus, should be positively related to high firm performance. In summary, using 
Jensen's (1986) argument, a direct link between firms' performance and debt can be 
seen. Therefore, this project will empirically test the Jensen model to ascertain 
whether a certain level of gearing can lead to a better firm performance. However, 
before we proceed to the empirical tests employed, firms' performance will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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4 
Chapter 3 
Financial Performance Measures 
3.1 Introduction 
Corporate managers now face a period in which a new economic framework that 
better reflects value and profitability must be implemented in their companies. Many 
managers, some times, are confounded by the conflicting messages the markets 
appear to send them, improvements in the reported financial performance of a 
company can be followed by a sharp fall in the price of its shares. By contrast, results 
that moderately exceed consensus forecasts can propel its share price to new heights, 
leaving managers to wonder how they can possibly achieve the superhuman feats the 
market expects from them. Looking at the academics and practitioners working in the 
field of business performance measurement, there is little agreement about which 
methods or models are the important in this field. 
This chapter looks at the valuation and financial performance models that are 
frequently used. Market returns models (stock price or returns based on stock price) 
are excluded because they impound market expectations about a firm's future and 
may not be an efficient contracting parameter because they are driven by many factors 
beyond the control of the firms executives as explained in Chapter 1. Section one 
highlights the limitation of ratios analysis in assessing firms' performance. Section 
two discusses the Discount Cash Flow models. Section three presents the Residual 
Income models. Section four compares all the above-mentioned models and 
highlights their advantages and disadvantages. Section five summarises the main 
important points that have been mentioned in this chapter and indicates the 
appropriate models to be used in assessing firm's performance. 
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3.2 Financial Ratios 
Financial ratios are one of the tools commonly used to evaluate a company's 
performance. Generally speaking, financial information relating to the status of a 
company's business operations will be reported in the yearly financial statements, and 
it is the ratio of any two accounting items in the financial statements that compose a 
financial ratio. The observation and analysis of appropriate financial ratios can serve 
as a preliminary reference for the diagnosis of the results of business operation. 
Moreover, these ratios directly or indirectly demonstrate certain aspects of a 
company's operating situation. For example, are funds being used properly? Are 
profit earnings at an average level? These financial ratios are still extensively used 
from both academics and practitioners as indicators of firms' Performance. However, 
as Lev and Sunder (1979) comment in their comprehensive review: 
It appears that the extensive use offinancial ratios by both practitioners 
and researchers is often motivated by tradition and convenience rather 
than resulting ftom theoretical considerations or ftom careful statistical 
analysis. 
Indeed, looking at ratios, such as Return on Equity (ROE) or Return on Assets (ROA), 
the reader can notice that ROE mixes operating performance with financial structure, 
making peer group analysis or trend analysis less focused. ROA is inadequate 
because it includes a number of inconsistencies between the numerator and 
denominator. Non-interest-bearing liabilities are typically not deducted from the 
denominator, total assets. Yet, the implicit financing cost of these liabilities is 
included in the expenses of the company and, therefore, deducted from the numerator. 
The profit stream in Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) is not properly related to 
the investment that produced it. In addition, as Aggrawal (2001) points out, if the 
incentives facing managers and employees are based on accounting measures of profit 
and do not reflect the cost of capital the firm uses in generating those profits, such 
capital is unlikely to be used most efficiently. In addition, Copeland et al (2000,1994) 
stated that the main weakness of ratios, such as ROA, is that they do not consider the 
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investment required to generate earnings or its timing. Keen (1999) points out that 
earnings per share (EPS) tells nothing about the cost of generating those profits. If the 
cost of capital (loans, bonds, equity) is, say 15% then a 14% earning is actually a 
reduction, not a gain, in economic value. ROA, as Keen (1999) adds, is a more 
realistic measure of economic performance, but it ignores the cost of capital. For 
instance, IBM's return on assets was over 11% but its cost of capital was almost 13%. 
The above arguments have led managers to think about profit calculated by the excess 
of the rate of return over the cost of capital i. e. economic profit. The concept of 
economic profit dates back at least to the economist Alfred Marshall who wrote in 
1890: "what remains of his (the owner or manager) profits after deducting interest on 
his capital at the current rate may be called his earnings of undertaking or 
management". Marshall is saying that the value created by a company in any time 
period (its economic profit) must take into account not only the expenses recorded in 
its accounting records but also the opportunity cost of capital employed in the 
business. Accordingly, the above-mentioned ratios ignore the cost of capital and fail 
to measure value creation. In such cases, these ratios may appear to overstate returns; 
their internal use for measuring and motivating managerial and business unit 
performance may even lead to the destruction of shareholders' value. As the purpose 
of this study is to look at a model that can capture company performance, such ratios 
will not be sufficient and will not be used in this project. 
3.3 Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF): The Free Cash Flow 
Model 
The dividend discount model (DDM) of Williams (193 8) provides the basis for most 
equity valuation models. When investors buy stocks, they expect to receive two types 
of cash flow: dividend in the period during which the stock is owned, and the 
expected sale price at the end of the period. In the extreme example, the investor 
keeps the stock until the company is liquidated; in which case, the liquidating 
dividend becomes the sale price. Under the assumption of an infinite time horizon, 
the DDM can be expressed as: 
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T=l 
(1 
+ re 
) 
Where V is equal to the present value of all expected future dividends; DIV 
discounted at the firm's cost of equity capital re, which is generally assumed constant 
through time. According to Herz et al (2001), the key ingredients necessary to apply 
the DDM are dividend forecasts and estimated re. Lee (1996) points out that more 
than 25% of firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange do not pay any dividends 
at all. When firms do pay dividends, the amount is discretionary and often does not 
reflect current firm prospects. Indeed, under the DDM, dividends are treated as the 
distribution rather than the creation of wealth. Penman (1992) describes it as the 
dividend conundrum; 'price is based on future dividends but observed dividends do 
not tell us anything about price'. These practical constraints greatly limit the 
usefulness of DDM. As a result, alternative forms of the DDM emerged with the goal 
of improved practical implementation. The most commonly used model is the DCF 
model because, as noted by Herz et al (2001), of its direct link to finance theories of 
Modigliani and Miller (195 8). 
The DCF model can be found in most financial management textbooks (Copeland et 
al (2000) for example). Most specifications of the DCF model require estimates of 
free cash flow (FCF). Free cash flow is the cash flow available for distribution to a 
defined set of capital providers after all operating and investing needs of the firm are 
met. Hence, FCF according to Copeland et al (2000) is equal to the Net Operating 
Profit Less Adjusted Taxes (NOPLAT) minus Net Investment. Although the DCF 
model has many variants, FCF in the most commonly applied version, is defined as 
the cash flow available for distribution to both debt and equity holders, and the 
discount rate is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). This model estimates 
the value of the combined debt and equity of the firm; the market value of the firm's 
debt net of the firm's excess cash must be subtracted from the total value of the firm 
to obtain the value of the equity. 
Copeland et al (2000,1994) state that a company's expected cash flow could be 
separated into two time periods and the company's value defined as follows: 
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Value = Present value of cash flow during explicitforecast period 
Present value of cash flow after explicitforecast period". 
The second term in this equation is the continuing value. It is the value of the 
company's expected cash flow beyond the explicit forecast period. They mention that 
by using simplifying assumptions about the company's performance during this 
period, for example assuming constant growth rate, permits estimation of continuing 
value with one of several formulas. Using a continuing value formula eliminates the 
need to forecast in detail the company's cash flow over an extended period. A high- 
quality estimate of continuing value is essential to any valuation, because continuing 
value often accounts for a large percentage of the total value of the company. 
Although these continuing values are large, this does not mean that most of a 
company's value will be realised in the continuing value period. It often just means 
that the cash inflow in the early years is offset by outflow for capital spending and 
working capital investment, investments that should generate higher cash flow in later 
years. Copeland et al (2000,1994) mention three techniques to calculate the 
continuing value which are as follows: 
1- Explicit forecast for long period of time: One approach to continuing value 
is to avoid it altogether by carrying out the explicit forecast for a very long 
period of time (75 or more years) so that any value beyond the explicit 
forecast would be insignificantly small. Since such a forecast is unlikely to be 
very detailed, the two formulas below often work just as well with less effort. 
2- Growing free cash-flow perpetuity formula: According to Copeland et al 
(2000,1994), the growing free cash flow perpetuity formula assumes that the 
company's free cash flow will grow at a constant rate during the continuing 
value period using the following formula: 
Continuing value (C V) = 
FCFT+j 
WACC -g 
Where: FCFT+I "::::::: the normalised level of free cash flow in the first year after the 
explicit forecast period. 
WACC = the weighted average cost of capital. 
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g= the expected growth rate in free cash flow in perpetuity. 
This technique provides the same result as a long explicit forecast when the 
company's free cash flow is forecasted to grow at the same rate. This formula 
is only valid if "g" is less than WACC and is easily misused. Copeland et al 
(2000,1994) stress the importance of correctly estimating the normalised level 
of free cash flow that is consistent with the growth rate that is being forecasted. 
For example, if growth in the continuing value period is forecasted to be less 
than the growth in the explicit forecast period (as is normally the case) then 
the proportion of NOPLAT5 that needs to be invested to achieve growth is 
likely to be less as well. Hence, in the continuing value period more of each 
dollar of NOPLAT becomes free cash flow available for the investors. If this 
transition is not taken into consideration, the continuing value could be 
significantly understated. 
3- Value-driver Formula: Copeland et al (2000,1994) argue that the third 
technique expresses the growing free cash flow perpetuity formula in terms of 
the value drivers, ROIC and Growth, as follows: 
cv = 
NOPLATT+j I-9 
ROIC 
WACC - 
(see Appendix 3. A for the derivation of this formula) 
Where: NOPLATT+I = the normalised level of NOPLAT in the first year after the 
explicit forecast period, 
g= the expected growth rate in NOPLAT in perpetuity, 
ROIC = the expected rate of return on net new investment. 
A variation of the value-driver formula is the two-stage value-driver 
formula. This 
formula allows the company to break up the continuing value period 
into two periods 
with different growth and ROIC assumptions. For example, 
it might be assumed that 
during the first eight years after the explicit forecast period the company would grow 
5 NOPLAT is the net operating profit less adjusted taxes, and represents the after tax operating profits 
of the company after adjusting the taxes to a cash 
basis. 
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at 8 percent per year and earn an incremental ROIC of 15 percent. After those eight 
years, the company's growth would slow to 5 percent and incremental ROIC would 
drop to II percent. 
cv= 
NOPLATT.,, I- 
9A 
ROICA 
I WA CC - g. 4 
+ g, 
I+ WA CC)' 
NOPLATT+l (1 + 9A 
9B 
ROICB 
(WACC 
- gB 
Xl + WACC)N-' 
Where: CV = continuing value. 
N= the number of years in the first stage of the continuing value period. 
9A= the expected growth rate in the first stage of the CV period. 
9B= the expected growth in the second stage of the CV period. 
ROICA= the expected ROIC during the first stage of the CV period. 
ROICB= the expected ROIC during the second stage of the CV period. 
Note that: gBmust be less than WACC for this formula to be valid. 
Copeland et al (2000,1994) state that they generally use the value-driver formula, 
because it is easier than developing a 75 year projection and is not as easy to misuse 
as the growing FCF perpetuity. In addition, it forces the company to think about the 
value drivers explicitly in estimating the continuing value. 
Copeland et al (2000,1994) argue that the explicit forecast period should be long 
enough so that the business will have reached a steady state of operations by the end 
of the period. This is because any continuing value approach relies on the following 
key assumptions: 
9 The company earns constant margins, maintains a constant capital turnover, and 
henceforth earns a constant rate of return on existing invested capital. 
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9 The company grows at a constant rate and invests the same proportion of its gross 
cash flow in its business each year. 
* The company earns a constant return on all new investments 
The business must be operating at an equilibrium level for the continuing value 
approaches to be useful. The forecast period should be extended until the free cash 
flow growth becomes constant. In other words, select longer rather than shorter 
explicit forecast Periods. It is rare for the explicit-forecast period to be shorter than 
seven years. Furthermore, the explicit-forecast period should not be determined by 
the company's internal planning period. Just because the company forecasts only 
three years ahead does not justify a three-year forecast period for purposes of 
valuation. A rough forecast beyond three years is better than no forecast. Finally, the 
continuing value should be discounted to the present value at the WACC before it can 
be added to the present value of the explicit free cash flow Copeland et al (2000, 
1994). 
3.4 Discounted Cash Flow: The Economic Profit Model 
Economic Profit 6 (EP), according to Copeland et al (2000), measures the value 
created in a company in a single period of time and is defined as follows: 
EP = Invested Capital *(ROIC - WACC) 
EP translates the value drivers, ROIC and growth, into a single dollar figure (growth 
is ultimately related to the amount of invested capital or size of the company). With 
the EP approach, continuing value does not represent value of the company after the 
explicit forecast period; instead, it represents incremental value over the company's 
invested capital at the end of the explicit forecast period. According to Copeland et al 
(1994), the total value of the company is as follows: 
6 EP model is another version of residual income model and conceptually is similar to EVA, OhIson 
(1995) and Frankel and Lee (1998) model but under different name. 
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Value = Invested capital at beginning of forecast + present value of 
forecasted economic profit during explicit forecast Period + Present 
value offorecasted economic profit after explicitforecast period 
The recommended continuing value (CV) for economic profit formula according to 
Copeland et al (2000,1994) is as follows: 
Cv = 
Economic Proflt7. +, 
_ 
WA CC 
(NOPLATT+l g (R OIC - WA CC) ROIC 
WACC(WACC - g) 
Where: Economic ProfItT+I = economic profit in the first year after the explicit 
forecast period. 
NOPLATT+I = NOPLAT in the first year after the explicit forecast period. 
g= the expected growth rate in NOPLAT in perpetuity. 
ROIC = the expected rate of return on net new investment. 
WACC = the weighted average cost of capital. 
This formula says that the value of economic profit after the explicit forecast equals 
the present value of economic profit in the first year after the explicit forecast in 
perpetuity, plus any incremental economic profit after that year created by additional 
growth at returns exceeding the cost of capital. If expected ROIC = WACC, the 
second half of the equation equals zero, and the continuing economic profit value is 
the value of the first year's economic profit in perpetuity. The forecasting horizon 
should be set the same as in the DCF model; i. e. not less than seven years. 
Copeland et al (2000) claim that a manager who is interested in maximising share 
value should use DCF analysis i. e. FCF and EP models, not earnings per share, to 
make decisions. They also claim that the DCF models are conceptually superior to 
the accounting models (discussed in remaining section). They also reflect how the 
stock market actually behaves and they claim that substantial evidence supports the 
view that the market takes a sophisticated approach such as DCF. They grouped their 
evidence into three classes: 
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I- Accounting earnings are not well correlated with share price 
2- Earnings 'window-dressing' does not improve share price 
3- The market evaluates management decisions based on their expected long-term 
cash flow impact, not their short-term earnings impact. 
The claimed conceptual advantages of the DCF method are based on its corporate 
finance roots that emphasise cash flows (Brealey and Myers, 2000). Practical 
valuation "handbooks" such as Copeland et al, (2000,1994) maintain that cash flows 
dominate accounting earnings for valuation purposes and thus advocate the DCF 
model over accounting-based models i. e. the RI model. Lee (1996) argues that 
valuation models based on discounted future earnings and cash flows have 
shortcomings. They typically ignore much of the information contained in the 
balance sheet by ascribing all of a firm's value to its future earnings (cash flow) 
stream. 
In effect, the DCF method pushes the portion of firm value in the balance sheet into 
future projections of cash flows (or earnings). This causes a much greater proportion 
of the firm value to appear in later periods of the forecast. As a result, DCF 
valuations tend to be plagued by significant practical problems associated with 
terminal value estimations. These terminal values are higher and more volatile than 
they need to be because a large portion of the projected cash flow pertains to the 
current capital base. 
3.5 Residual Income: The Economic Value Added Model 
The concept of Economic Value Added (EVA) is well established in financial theory, 
but only recently has the term moved into the mainstream of corporate finance, it is 
becoming increasingly popular for measuring and maximizing shareholder wealth, as 
more and more firms adopt it as the base for business planning and performance 
monitoring (Keen 1999). According to Stewart & Co. (2000), EVA is net operating 
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profit minus an appropriate charge for the opportunity cost of all capital invested in an 
enterprise: 
EVA = Net Operating Profit After Taxes (NOPA T) - 
[Capital x the Cost of Capital] 
Stewart & Co. (2002) 
As such, EVA is an estimate of true 44economic" profit, or the amount by which 
earnings exceed or fall short of the required minimum rate of return, which 
shareholders and lenders could get by investing in other securities of comparable risk. 
Accordingly, EVA is the after-tax cash flow generated by a business minus the cost of 
the capital it has deployed to generate that cash flow. Ferguson and Leistikow (1998), 
point that EVA is earnings net of a capital charge based on the firm's cost of capital 
and net asset value. Net asset value is the value of the firm's assets (book value), as 
opposed to the market value of the firm's business. 
The calculation of EVA usually involves a number of adjustments to accounting data. 
Bacidore et al (1997) point out that because of variety of accounting distortions, the 
total asset value on the typical balance sheet does not accurately represent either the 
liquidation value or the replacement-cost value of the assets in place. Therefore, it is 
of limited use for firm valuation purpose and must be transformed. The proponents of 
EVA, most notably Stern Stewart, are careful to adjust this accounting balance sheet 
before arriving at an estimate of the value of the firm's assets in place. The 
adjustments include netting the non-interest-bearing current liabilities against the 
current assets, adding back to equity the gross goodwill (i. e. adding cumulative 
amortised goodwill back to total assets), other write-offs, capitalised value of 
Research and Development (R&D) (and possibly advertising), LIFO (Last In First 
Out) reserve, and so forth. The debt balance is increased by the capitalised value of 
operating lease payments. The goal is to produce an adjustment balance sheet that 
reflects the economic values of assets in place more accurately than the inherently 
conservative, historical-cost-based balance sheet, guided by generally accepted 
accounting principles. Please refer to appendix 33 to see the two tables that 
represent the balance sheet after and before the adjustments have been made. 
Stewart & Co. (2002) argue that EVA is the financial measure that comes closer than 
any other to capturing the true economic profit of an enterprise. Stewart & Co add 
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that EVA is also the performance measure most directly linked to the creation of 
shareholder wealth over time. 
"The best practical periodic performance measure is E VA; forget EPS, 
ROE and ROI. EVA is what drives stockprices. It stands well outftom 
the crowd as the single best measure of wealth creation on a 
contemporaneous basis and EVA is almost 50% better than its closet 
accounting-based competitor in explaining changes in shareholder 
wealth ". 
(Stem et al 1995) 
Companies that have adopted EVA for performance measurement and/ or incentive 
compensation include AT & T, Coca-Cola, Eli Lilly, George Pacific, Polaroid, 
Quaker Oats, Sprint, Teledyne and Tenneco (Biddle et a15 1997). 
According to McDaniel et al (1988), EVA differs from the conventional financial 
accounting tools, such as return on investment (ROI), in three ways: 
1. EVA is not bound by the generally acceptable accounting principles (GAAP) as 
laid out by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Users can 
customise the framework to their specific business conditions. For example, many 
companies consider training to be an investment. The EVA framework can be 
modified to show training as an investment rather than an expense item. 
2. EVA can support every decision throughout a company, ranging from capital 
investment, to employee compensation, to business unit performance. 
3. Finally, the simple yet robust structure of EVA allows its use by engineering, 
environmental and other personnel as a common tool for communicating different 
aspects of financial performance. 
EVA, like other residual income models, has an advantage over earnings in taking 
into account the cost of capital consumed, which assists this study in elucidating any 
relationship between the operating performance of the company and its capital 
structure. However, its major disadvantage when compared to free cash flow is that it 
is still based on historical asset values and only measures a single period in time. 
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Despite adjusting the asset value, there is a serious danger that the adjustment fails to 
represent its fair value. This short-termism, according to 0' Hanlon and Peasnell 
(1998), can manifest itself in earnings management games 
There is also the more serious danger that the failure of the accounting system to 
reflect economic reality (i. e. its fair value) might cause the managers to run the 
business without proper regard to the long term. While these deficiencies are 
encountered with other accounting-based performance measures, the case for EVA is 
diminished if it is similarly plagued. Much of Stem Stewart's effort has been devoted 
-to addressing this problem. 0' Hanlon and Peasnell (1998) demonstrate that, in 
general, the owners' excess gain during period t is not equal to that period's residual 
income. They add that, a sufficient condition for a single-period residual income to 
equal single-period excess return is that the book value is equal to economic value, or 
equivalently that unrecorded goodwill is zero. The answer to this problem is to adjust 
the accounting book value of the entity such that it is equal to the entity's economic 
value. 
Aggarwal (2001) argues that any new performance measurement system must be able 
to balance the need for managerial compensation to reflect factors that managers can 
influence, with the need to respond to capital market signals. Although changes in 
market value theoretically equal changes in the present value of future EVA, in 
practice they can be quite noisy, as changes in stock prices often reflect market-wide 
changes that may have little to do with any given firm. Thus, it is often difficult to 
relate changes in EVA measured within the company to changes in the market value 
of equity. Moreover, EVA focuses on the efficient use of capital. This is certainly 
very important for manufacturing and many other traditional industries. However, 
most firms now operate in a new era dominated by service, high technology and 
knowledge-based work. Business success is generally determined less by physical 
capital and more by efficient development and deployment of intangible human and 
intellectual capital. It may be difficult to modify an EVA system based on traditional 
accounting data so that it is optimal for such firms. 
Bacidore et al (1997) state that financiers must earn at least their opportunity cost of 
capital on the invested capital. This condition implies that this cost of capital needs 
subtraction from operating profits to gauge the firm's financial performance. For that 
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reason EVA defines net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) and subtracts a capital 
charge for the economic book value of assets in place; this is the measure of the 
capital provided to the firm by its financiers. However, does this amount truly 
represent the capital used to generate this operating profit? They believe not; the 
creation of a true "operating" surplus for the financiers in a given period, the 
operating profit at the end of the period must exceed a capital charge that based on the 
total market value of the capital used at the beginning of the period, not simply the 
economic book value of its assets in place. The total market value of the firm, not 
simply the economic book value of the assets in place, represents the capital 
commitment of the firm's financiers. 
For that reason, Bacidore et al (1997) modified the EVA measurement and defined a 
new performance measure, a Refinement of EVA (REVA). The motivation for the 
refinement of EVA stems partly from EVA's use of the economic book value of 
assets while the capital charge for the firm derives from a market-based WACC. The 
REVA for a given time t is: 
REVA, = NOPA T, - k,, 
(MVA, 
Bacidore et al (1997) 
Where NOPAT, is the firm's NOPAT at the end of period t and MVA, -, 
is the total 
market value of the firm's assets at the end of period t-I (beginning of period t). k,, is 
the weighted-average cost of capital and AI[VA, -, 
is given by the market value of the 
firm's equity plus the book value of the firm's total debt, less non-interest-bearing 
current liabilities, all at the end of period t-1. However, REVA is criticised for failing 
to be consistent with financial theory. For further discussion refer to appendix 3. C. 
3.6 Residual Income: The Ohison (1995) Model 
OhIson's (1995) valuation model defines stock prices as a direct function of both 
earnings and book values. The model includes the bottom-line items in the balance 
sheet and income statement "book value and earnings", and its format requires the 
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change in book value to equal earnings minus dividends (net of capital contributions). 
He refers to this relation as the "clean surplus relation" because all changes in net 
assets unrelated to dividends or new equity paid in must pass through the income 
statement. The analysis starts from the assumption that value equals the present value 
of expected dividends. Then the clean surplus relation can replace dividends with 
earnings and book values in the dividend discount formula. Assumptions about the 
stochastic behaviour of the accounting data then lead to a multiple-data uncertainty 
model such that earnings and book value act as complementary value indicators. 
Specifically, the core of the valuation function expresses value as a weighted average 
of (i) capitalised current earnings (adjusted for dividends) and (ii) current book value. 
Extreme parameterisations of the model yield either (i) or (ii) as the sole value 
indicators. The combination is of conceptual interest because it brings both the 
bottom-line items into valuation through the clean surplus relation. 
Ohlson (1995) points out discounted abnormal earnings represent the difference 
between market and book values; they signify goodwill. In fact, a straightforward 
two-step procedure derives a particularly parsimonious expression for goodwill as it 
relates to abnormal earnings. Firstly, following Peasnell (1982) and others, the clean 
surplus relation implies that goodwill equals the present value of future expected 
abnormal earnings. Secondly, according to Ohlson, if one assumes that abnormal 
earnings obey an auto-regressive process, then it follows that goodwill equals the 
current abnormal earnings scaled by a (positive) constant. The result highlights that 
one can derive value by assuming abnormal earnings processes that do not refer to 
past or future expected dividends. 
Two closely related Modigliani and Miller (MM) (1958,1961) properties are satisfied: 
dividends displace market value on a dollar-for-dollar basis, so that dividend payment 
irrelevancy applies. The model accordingly separates the creation of wealth from the 
distribution of wealth. Given the importance generally attached to MM properties in 
valuation analysis, the requirement that dividends reduce book value but not current 
earnings enhances the economic significance of owners' equity accounting (OhIson 
1995). The theory rests directly on the clean surplus relation and the feature that 
dividends reduce book value but leave current earnings unaffected. Three 
straightforward analytical assumptions formulate the valuation model: 
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1- Price is equal to the present value of expected dividends: 
p C50 R -'E, ... (PVED) I T=l f 
Where: P, = the market value, or price, of the firm's equity at date t. 
d, 
= Net dividends paid at date t. 
the risk ree rate plus one. 
E, [-] = the expected value operator conditioned on the date t information. 
2- Accounting data and dividends satisfy the clean surplus relation, and dividends 
reduce book value without affecting current earnings. Thus, the clean surplus relation 
is: 
y, d, - x, (A2) 
xI= or the period (t- 1, t) Earnings f 
(Net) book value at date t. 
The clean surplus relation (A2) can be applied to express PI in terms of future 
(expected) earnings and book value in lieu of the sequence of (expected) dividends in 
the PVED formula, and "residual income" or "abnormal earnings" as follows: 
xa=x, - 
(R 
- 1)y, -,. 1 
Where x, ' are abnormal earnings for period t. 
Combined with the clean surplus restriction (A2), the definition implies 
y, + RI 
(See Appendix 3. LD for the derivation of this formula) 
Using this expression to replace d,,,, d, +2 ý'** 
In the I'VED fonnula yields the 
equation: 
UniS 
61 
00 
P, = yt +I Rf-E, [3ý, + 
T=l 
(See appendix 3.2. D for the derivation of this formula) 
So, the price can be expressed as the sum of book value and the present value of 
future abnormal earnings: 
co ' EJ3ý,,, ] 
yj +R -E, [5ý, or P, = y, +y f +rl 
r=l r=, 
OhIson refers to x, ' as abnormal earnings. 
OhIson's third assumption is that abnormal earnings satisfy the following modified 
autoregressive process: 
Xr+l --': OVCa + Vt + elt+l (2a) 
(2b) VI ++ ýVl + '621 +1 
V, Information other than abnormal earnings, the disturbance terms, 
62r 
ý '021 +1 ýT 
ýý 1, are unpredictable, zero-mean, variables; that is, E, 
Rki 
+rI 
=0, k=1,2 
and v>I, 
o) and y are fixed and known (in loose terms, a firm's economic environment and its 
accounting principles determine the exogenous parameters o), y ). 
Combining the residual income valuation model in Equation (1) with the information 
dynamics in Equations. (2a) and (2b) yields the following valuation function: 
y, ax, ' + a2v, 
Where: a 
co >0 a2 
Rf 
)o (Rf 
- ct)XRf -, Y) 
This valuation function does not require explicit forecasts of future dividends, nor 
does it require additional assumptions about the computation of "terminal value". The 
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information dynamics in Equations (2a) and (2b) along with the valuation function in 
Equation (3) embody the original empirical implications of OhIson (1995). 
Equation (3) represents the OhIson valuation model, which has been attracting the 
attention of many researchers. The ability of this model to predict the stock price will 
be discussed after examining the other version of residual income, namely the Frankel 
and Lee model and EVA. 
3.7 Residual Income: The Frankel and Lee (1998) Model 
The valuation method that is used by Frankel and Lee (1998) uses a discounted 
residual income approach. They started by using a stock's fundamental value, defined 
as the present value of its expected future dividends based on all currently available 
information: 
00 E (D, 
(I + rJ 
In this definition, V, * is the stock's fundamental value at time t, 
E, (D, 
+, 
) is the expected future dividend for period t+i conditional on information 
available at time t, 
r, is the cost of equity capital based on the information set at time t. This definition 
assumes a flat term-structure of discount rates. 
Frankel and Lee (1998) state that it is easy to show that, as long as a firm's earnings 
and book value are forecasted in a manner consistent with clean surplus accounting, 
Equation (1) can be rewritten as the reported book value, plus an infinite sum of 
discounted residual income: 
c" E [NI B 
B, +I'" 
i=l 
, (I + 
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If we substitute NI = ROE,,, * B,,, _, 
in the above Equation (2) then: 
ý2 E [(ROE, - r, 
)B, 
+, -, =B, +Y Vt (3) 
Where B, is the book value at time t, E, [. ] is expectation function based on 
information available at time t, N1,,, is the Net Income for period t+i, r, is the cost 
of equity capital and ROE,,, is the after-tax return on book equity for period t+i. 
Note that this equation is equivalent to a dividend discount model, but expresses firm 
value in terms of accounting numbers. Therefore, it relies on the same theory and is 
subject to the same theoretical limitations as the dividend discount model. However, 
the model provides a framework for analysing the relation between accounting 
numbers and firm value and as will be explained later, relies on clean surplus relation 
(CSR). 
Frankel and Lee (1998) pointed out that Equation (3) shows that equity value splits 
into two components, an accounting measure of the capital invested (13t), and a 
measure of the present value of future residual income. If a firm earns future 
accounting income at a rate exactly equal to its cost of equity capital, then the present 
value of future residual income is zero, and V, = B,. In other words, firms that neither 
create nor destroy wealth relative to their accounting-based shareholders' equity will 
be worth only their current book value. However, firms whose expected ROEs are 
higher (lower) than r, will have values greater (lesser) than their book values. 
Frankel and Lee (1998) argue that Equation (3) presents a simple procedure for 
estimating a firm's intrinsic value (V, * ). The four parameters that are needed for the 
estimation are: 
The cost of equity capital (r, ) 
Future ROE forecasts (FROEýj 
Current book value (B, ) 
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Dividend payout ratio (k) 
The first three parameters' roles are readily seen in Equation (3). The last input, the 
dividend payout ratio (k), is used in conjunction with the (CSR) to derive future book 
values. In the following section, the specifics of the model estimation procedure will 
be discussed. 
Cost of equity (r,, ): in theory, r, should be firm specific, reflecting the premium 
demanded by equity investors to invest in a firm or project of comparable risk. 
However, there is little consensus in practice on how this discount rate should be 
determined. Frankel and Lee (1998) use three different approaches: a constant 
discount rate and two industry-based discount rates derived by Fama and French (FF) 
(1995). The FF discount rates are based on a one-factor and a three-factor risk model. 
Dividendpayout ratio (k): The dividend payout ratio is the percentage of net income 
paid out in the form of dividends each period. Frankel and Lee (1998) obtain a firm- 
specific estimate of k by dividing the common stock dividends paid in the most 
recent year by net income before extraordinary items. For firms with negative 
earnings, they divide dividends by six percent of total assets to derive an estimated 
payout ratio. Six percent, they argue, reflects the average long run return-on-assets. 
They use this measure as a proxy for normal earnings when reported earnings are 
negative. This variable is used, in conjunction withB, to derive forecasted book 
values 
B, + NI, +, - 
d, 
+, = 
B, + (I - k)NI, +, = 
[1+ (1 
- k)ROE, +, 
]B, 
Since d,,, = NI, -,, 
*K and NI,,, = ROE,,, * B, 
Analogously, all future book values can be expressed as functions of B, k, and 
(FROE. J. For example, the following formula can be written: 
B, 
+ 2 
:- [I + (I - k)ROE, +, 
11 + (I - k)ROE, +2]B, 
(FRO, ý, ): The most important and difficult task in the discounted residual income 
valuation exercise is forecasting 
(FROEýj (or, its equivalent, forecasting future 
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earnings). According to Frankel and Lee (1998) two alternatives, based on ex ante 
information, are: (1) use prior period earnings or (2) use analysts' earnings forecasts. 
They use both methods and derive a value metric based on historical earnings (Vh) as 
well as a value metric based on consensus I/B/E/S analyst forecasts (Vf ). Fairfield 
(1994) shows that, in large samples, the correlation between current year ROE, and 
next year's ROE, is around 0.66, suggesting that the current period ROE, is a 
reasonable starting point for estimating (FROEJ. Prior studies, such as O'Brien 
(1988) and Brown et al (1987), show that analyst earnings forecasts are superior to 
time-series forecasts. However, the predictive superiority of an analyst-based value 
metric (Vf ) over a historical-based value metric (Vh) is an open empirical question. 
Forecast horizons and terminal value estimation: Equation (3) expresses a firm's 
value in terms of an infinite series, but for practical purpose as they point out, the 
explicit forecast period must be finite. This limitation necessitates a terminal value 
estimate; an estimate of the value of the firm based on residual income earned after 
the explicit forecasting period. They add that one approach is to estimate the terminal 
value by first expanding Equation (3) to T terms and then taking the next term in the 
expansion as perpetuity. For example, if the explicit forecast period ends after T 
period, the terminal value is: 
(ROE7,.,, 
(I + rý)" 
This procedure is mathematically equivalent to a T-period discounted dividend model 
in which year T+I earnings is treated as a perpetuity. Therefore, the resulting value 
estimate depends critically on the particular earnings forecast used in the terminal 
value. In their study, Frankel and Lee (1998) take a simple approach using short- 
horizon earnings forecasts of up to three years. They state that in theory, T should be 
set large enough for firms to reach their competitive equilibrium. However, their 
ability to forecast (FROEýj diminishes quickly over time and forecasting errors are 
compounded in longer expansions. Therefore, they estimate three forms of Vt: 
(FROE, - r, 
) 
B, + (I +0B, 
(FROE, 
- iý, 
) 
B, (I +, ý, ý, 
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L'D nUr 
B, + 
O'il 
L/F-"/ e) Bt + 
(FROEt,, 
- re 
) 
B, 
+, 
(3.2) 
r 
(1 
+ re) (1 +e )re 
FROE, -r 3 V, =BJ 
(FROE, 
+, - 
re (FROE,., 
2 - re (3.3) B, + (I+r B, +, + 
B, 
+2 
e 
)2 
r + re) e 
)2 
+r 
e 
Equation (3.1) represents a two-period expansion of the residual income model with 
the forecasted ROE for the current year (FROEJ assumed to be earned in perpetuity. 
Equation (3.2) also represents a two-period expansion of the model, but they use a 
two-year-ahead forecasted ROE (FROE,,, ) in the perpetuity. Similarly, Equation 
(3.3) is a three-period model. 
The right-hand side of each equation consists of ex ante observation. To estimate V, 
they use the return on average book (for reason explained below) equity, 
ROE, = 
NI, 
to proxy for all future (RO, ýj i. e., they substitute (ROEJ for all the JU, + -91-1 
(FROEJ in the above equations. To estimate Vf, they derive future ROE, and book 
values from I/B/E/S consensus forecasts using a sequential procedure described below: 
Their implementation of the model requires, three future ROE forecasts 
I FROEI 
, FwOEI+l , FROEI+2 ]. They derive 
future ROE, from I/B/E/S consensus EPS 
estimates. Since year-end book values are dependent on current year ROE, they use 
a sequential process to estimate future ROE, . The steps 
in the process are listed 
below. Year t refers to the year of portfolio formation. 
Step 1: estimating FROE, andB,. They require that all sample firms have a 
one-year-ahead I/B/E/S consensus EPS forecast, divided by the average book value 
per share during year t-1. They argue that, use of the average, rather than year-end, 
book value reduces the chance of an extremely low denominator. Then they use 
FROE, and the dividend payout ratio (k)to derive the ending book value for year t. 
Notionally they have: 
UniS 
67 
4 FROE, -- FYI 5 101-1 + BI-2)/21 
B, = B, -, 
[I + FROE, (I - k)]. 
Where FY I is the one-year ahead consensus forecast of EPS. 
Step 2: Estimating FROE,,, and B,,,. They also require that all sample firms 
have a two-year-ahead consensus forecast [FY2]. They then compute FROE,,, and 
analogously: 
FROE, 
+, 
FY2 
B,,, = B, [I + FROE, -,, 
(I 
- k)]. (B, + B, -, 
) 
2 
Step 3: Estimating FROE, +2 and 
B, 
+2 Where a long-term earnings growth 
estimate [Ltg] is available, they compute FROE, + 2 and 
B, +2as follows: 
FROEI+2 - 
[FY2(l + Ltg)] 
3 
BI+2 ::::: Bj+l [I + FROEI+2(l - k)] (B, 
+, + 
Bj 12 
Where [Ltg] is not available, they use FROE,,, to proxy for FROE, + 
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3.8 Comparison between the Models 
3.8.1 Theoretical Equivalence between EVA and RI in Valuation 
According to Lee (1996), Both EVA and R17 (i. e. the Ohlson and Frankel and Lee 
model) rely on the idea of 'Residual Income', defined as earnings in excess of an 
expected (benchmark) level of performance, and tied to capital employed. EVA for a 
given time period is: 
EVA = earningst -r* capital,, (1) 
Equation (1) relates wealth creation to the amount of residual income generated. A 
company's or division's activities create wealth (generate positive EVA) if actual 
earnings exceed the expected dollar return on the capital employed. Stem Stewart 
computes EVA for all long-term investors, including shareholders and long-term debt 
holders. On the other hand, RI focuses only on equity investors. In the EVA 
approach: 
Earningst = eamings before interestt = EBIt ý 
r= weighted average cost of capital = (WACC), 
Capitalt = total assetst_, = TA, j 
On the other hand, some texts refer to RI as NOPLAT I, net operating profit less 
adjusted taxes (for instance, see Copeland et al, (2000)). According to Lee (1996), 
substitution of these definitions yields equation (2a): 
EVAt EBIt - WACC * TAt-I 
EVAt =( TA, j 
- WACC * TA, j 
EVAt (ROAt - WACC) * TA, -, 
ROA is the company's return on assets. This equation shows that a firm or division is 
creating wealth for its long-term investors only if its ROA exceeds the cost of capital 
7 Although EVA is another form of RI model, to make the comparison easy we denote by RI the 
OhIson (1995) and Frankel and Lee (1998) models. 
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(WACC). The amount of wealth created depends on the amount of capital employed 
(TA). Moreover, as noted by O'Hanlon and Peasnell (1998), the decomposition of 
EVA in Equation (2a) into profitability and scale components, highlights 
shortcomings of conventional accounting-based performance measures and the 
advantages of the residual income approach. Defining performance in terms of 
profitability has long been known to result in under-investment, since ROA can be 
maximised by rejecting positive-NPV projects that dilute ROA. Defining 
performance in terms of absolute amount of profit can have the opposite effect of 
encouraging over-investment (acceptance of negative NPV projects) due to failure to 
take proper account of profitability. By combining spread and scale factors as in 
Equation (2a), one class of problems created by the use of accounting performance 
measure can be overcome. 
Lee (1996) points out that under RI (for example the OhIson model) EVA can be 
defined as economic value added for equity-holders, so the components of residual 
income can be defined as follows: 
Eamingst = net income, = Nlt 
r= cost of capital (r, ) 
Capitalt-, = total shareholder's equity, -, = 
book vlaue, _1 = 
SE, 
_1 = 
B, 
_1 
Substituting these expressions yields Equation 2b: 
EVA = NI, - 
Nl' 
B, j 
=(ROEt -r,, 
)*B, 
-, 
This equation shows a firm is only creating wealth for its shareholders if it earns a 
return on equity (ROE) in excess of the cost of equity (r, ). Moreover, the amount of 
actual wealth created depends on the amount of equity capital employed. Lee (1996) 
points out that EVA is a powerful valuation tool when it is extended to multiple 
periods. Since a firm derives value from both invested capital and future activities, 
accordingly, the following Equation (3) can be written as follows: 
Firm valuet = capitalt + present value of all future EVAs (3) 
(Stewart et al 1995) 
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Equation (3) according to Lee (1996) has engaged researchers from the academic 
community because it is based directly on the accounting numbers that can be seen on, 
or forecasted from the financial statements, and holds for any accounting system that 
satisfies the clean surplus relation. The first term on the right-hand side of Equation 
(3), capital invested at time t, comes from the balance sheet. The second term. the 
present value of future EVAs, comes from both the forecasted balance sheet and the 
income statement and can be viewed as the present value of expected residual 
earnings in the future. Lee (1996) on his research focuses on the equity-holders, and 
expressing the variables on par-share basis: 
Capital, = B, = book value at time t 
Firm valuet ='Synthetic Price'at time t= Pt* 
He uses the term 'Synthetic Price' to denote a firm's intrinsic value per share, based 
on fundamental analysis. Under this notation, Equation 3 becomes Equation 4: 
00 
B, +I EVA+i 
i=l 
(ROE, (ROE, 
-r 
(ROE, 
+3) B, + *B, + +2 e) *B + *B (4) (1 1+1 1+2 + re 
e 
)2 (1 
eY 
Dividing through by B, , we get Equation 5: 
pl* 
=1+1 
(ROE, 
i- (5) 
B, +r ,YB, 
Equation (5) is one of the RI formulas appearing in the accounting literature (this 
formula is shown under the Frankel and Lee (1998) valuation model, based on 
OhIson's (1995) model). Equation (5) provides several interesting insight: The price- 
to-book ratio is expressed in terms of future abnormal ROEs and growth in book 
value. How the RI model relates to traditional valuation models such as the DDM and 
DCF is made known in the next section. 
3.8.2 Theoretical Equivalence between the RI and DCF Models 
Although the DCF model has many variants, FCF in the most commonly applied 
version is defined as the cash flow available for distribution to both debt and equity 
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holders, and the discount rate is the WACC. This model estimates the value of the 
sum of the debt and equity of the firm; the market value of the firm's debt net of the 
firm's excess cash must be subtracted from the total value of the firm to obtain the 
value of equity 8. 
Herz et al (2001) report that because of the inherent difficulty of projecting FCF 
indefinitely into the future, users of DCF models typically forecast FCF through a 
specified terminal date, and estimate the terminal value of the net equity plus debt, VT 
+ net debt T, separately: 
T (Eo (FCF Eo 
(VT+ 
net 
debtT) 
Vo +net debto =Ir+ (I 
+ r,,. 
cc 
)T 
T=l 
('+r. 
accY 
rw, 4cc represents the WACC that is used as the discount rate. The standard approach 
to estimating the terminal value of the debt and equity assumes the firm reaches a 
steady state by the terminal date, and computes the terminal values as a FCF 
EO [FCF7, (I + g)] 
perpetuity growing at a constant g, (r"'CC 
- g) 
. The 
key ingredients of the DCF 
model are forecasts of the FCF and an estimate of r,, 4cc, the WACC depends on the 
capital structure of the firm and changes whenever the capital structure of the firm 
changes. Users often assume a constant WACC based on the firm's target debt to 
equity ratio (as is the case in Copeland et al (2000,1994)). 
However, the RI approach, introduced by Edwards and Bell (1961) and subsequently 
further developed by Peasnell (1982) and OhIson (1995), derives from the DDM with 
the assumption of clean surplus accounting; RI is a variation of the EVA approach (as 
we saw in the previous section). RI is accounting net income less a charge for equity 
capital, equal to the cost of equity capital times the beginning of period book value of 
equity: 
RI, = NI, -rBV, -, 
In the RI model, the market value of equity is estimated as the sum of the firm's 
current book value of equity, BVo, plus the present value of the expected future RI. 
8 Excess cash is defined as the cash or equivalents held by the firm in excess of the amount needed for 
working capital and investment purposes (Herz et al, 2001). 
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As with the DCF model, users of the RI model typically forecast RI only through a 
specified future terminal date, with the difference between the market and book value 
of equity at the terminal value date, VT-BVT , estimated separately: 
Vo = BV 
E0 (R 
, 
[, ) 
+ 
Eo (VT-BVT 
+r 
(1 
+r 
eYe 
)T 
Users of this model commonly assume that the firm reaches a steady state by the 
terminal date. They compute the terminal value (TV) as RI perpetuity growing at a 
,V_ 
EO[RIT(1 + 9)]. 
constant growth rate g, so I 
g) 
The key components for applying the 
RI are forecasts of BV and accounting net income, and an estimate of re. In order to 
forecast book values, net dividends also must be forecast. However, Ohlson (1995) 
made a restriction on dividends by using linear information parameters as a third 
assumption and in that case; there is no need to forecast dividends. 
Herz et al (2001) point out that because of their theoretical equivalence, the DDM, the 
DCF, and the RI all provide the same valuation when the flows are projected 
consistently to infinity and comparable discount rates applied. However, horizons 
over which the flows can be reasonably projected are limited in practice, and discount 
rates are estimated with error. These practical considerations cause some 
academicians and practitioners to prefer one valuation model to another. Indeed, as 
noted by Plenborg (2002), if the valuation approaches are improperly employed, as 
with the growth rate used in the terminal value calculation, the models yield different 
firm value estimates. 
3.8.3 Differences between the RI and DCF Models 
As illustrated, the DDM is generally considered to be the core theoretical model and is 
the subject of less empirical testing than the DCF method or RI. Both the DCF and RI 
models have many variants with adherents who perceive practical advantages for one 
specification over another. Although, as noted by Herz et al (2001), DCF is more 
popular both in the MRA classroom and on Wall Street, RI is gaining acceptance in 
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both settings. As shown by Damondara (1994), the growth rate does not have to be 
identical in the two valuation approaches due to the effect of leverage. 
The claimed conceptual advantages of the DCF method are based on its finance roots 
that emphasise cash flows (Brealey and Myers, 2000). Practical valuation "hand- 
books" such as Copeland et al (1994) favour DCF rather than accounting earnings. 
Lee (1996) argues that valuation models based on discounted future earnings and cash 
flows also have shortcomings. They typically ignore much of the information 
contained in the balance sheet. This is the essence of the DCF method. By ascribing 
all of a firm's value to its future earnings (cash flow) stream DCF valuations ignore 
the value-relevant information in balance sheets. In effect, the DCF method pushes 
the portion of firm value in the balance sheet into future projections of cash flows (or 
earnings) this causes a much greater proportion of the firm value to appear in later 
periods of the forecast. As a result, DCF valuations tend to be plagued by significant 
practical problems associated with terminal value estimations. These terminal values 
are higher and more volatile than they need to be because a large portion of the 
projected cash flow pertains to the current capital base. 
Penman and Sougiannis (1998), among others, explain the claimed practical 
advantages of the RI; in their view, a shortcoming of the DCF model is the need to 
subtract long-term capital investment from operating cash flows to compute FCF. For 
growing firms, negative FCF often results for many years (note that these also could 
be the same problem for EVA). RI adherents maintain that accrual accounting 
eliminates the distorting effect of capital investment expenditure by placing it on the 
balance sheet as an asset. However, Lee (1996) argues that the RI model naturally 
depends on reported accounting numbers. A commonly raised concern is how 
vulnerable these numbers are to managerial misrepresentation or other biases arising 
from the accounting system, such as conservatism. 
In theory, conservatism should not affect RI valuations. Ohlson shows that, in an 
infinite-horizon valuation, the mechanics of double-entry bookkeeping under clean 
surplus accounting automatically allow for conservatism. However, Feltham and 
Ohlson (1995) show that in finite-horizon valuation the level of accounting 
conservatism affects the terminal value calculation. On the other hand, Penman and 
Sougiannis (1998) demonstrate that the RI's use of accrual accounting allows for 
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more reasonable valuations than the DCF model from forecasted payouts over 
relatively short horizons. Academic accountants, such as Bernard (1995), advocate 
the RI method because of its direct ties to earnings and book values, central concepts 
in accrual accounting, whereas the DCF model is founded only in finance theory. 
Another claimed RI advantage, as Herz et al (2001) argue, is that the terminal value is 
measured as the difference between the market value and the book value of the firm's 
equity, VT - BVT . This difference is typically smaller than the sum of the firm's 
market value and its net debt, VT+ net debtT. the terminal value in the DCF model. 
This is an advantage because the terminal value often constitutes a large percentage of 
the computed total value of the firm in both models and is the component estimated 
with the greatest uncertainty; minimising the influence of the terminal value reduces 
uncertainty in the valuation process. 
Clubb (2002) points out that the assumptions required for equivalence of the valuation 
models are not incorporated into practitioner-oriented valuation methodologies in the 
financial analysis literature. This suggests that the theoretical equivalence of the 
models may not be easily captured in practical applications of the models and hence 
that there is potential merit in research that identifies the assumptions and procedures 
required for generating equivalence valuation. The main problem in generating a set 
of equivalent valuations is in the reconciliation of the cost of equity-based models 
with WACC-based models. Miles and Ezzell (1980) demonstrate that discounting 
free cash flow at the after tax WACC provides a correct firm valuation (in an MM 
capital market setting with corporate tax) only if the firm pursues an active debt 
management policy of maintaining a constant market value leverage ratio. 
Lundholm and 0' Keefe (2001) assume that the equity valuations based on the cost of 
equity are correct, and characterise deviations from this valuation resulting from the 
use of an estimated WACC, as valuation errors due to the use of inconsistent discount 
rates. This approach has the merit of drawing attention to the impact of inconsistent 
discount rate assumptions on valuations in the empirical studies, which they review. 
However, the use of the cost of equity-based valuation as the bench-mark against 
which to compare WACC based valuation, is much less satisfactory from practical 
valuation viewpoints. In particular, following Modigliani and Miller (1958,1963), it 
has been the conventional wisdom in corporate finance that the value of equity should 
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be determined by valuing the operations of the business plus the value of any tax 
shields arising from debt financing and deducting the value of the debt. For instance, 
Copeland et al (1994) advocate thinking in terms of target capital structure for two 
reasons; firstly, they argue that at any point a company's capital structure may not 
reflect the capital structure expected to prevail over the life of the business. Secondly, 
using a target capital structure solves the problem of circularity involved estimating 
the WACC. This circularity arises because the market value weights need elucidation 
in order to determine the WACC, but the market value weights cannot be known 
without identifying what the market value is in the first place, especially the market 
value of equity. To determine the value of equity, which is the objective of the 
valuation process itself, the expected free cash flow must be discounted at the WACC. 
In essence, the WACC cannot be known without discerning the market value of 
equity, and the market value of equity cannot be established without knowing the 
WACC. 
However, Penman (2001) advocates cost of equity rather than WACC. His argument 
is that the cost of equity will vary over time reflecting changes in financial risk linked 
to changes in leverage. While the WACC may also change as operations change, the 
task of forecasting the discount rate is reduced and an advantage of this approach is 
that dividends are irrelevant and financing is irrelevant. Penman and Sougiannis 
(1998) and Francis et al (2000) apply a target capital structure and constant cost of 
debt and equity, which is consistent with Copeland et al (1994). However, Levin and 
Olsson (2000) show that the weights implied by the forecasted debt and equity should 
be applied. Ideally, the cost of equity and debt should also be adjusted according to 
the capital structure in order to reflect the underlying financial risk (Gregory, 1992). 
In a related study, Levin and Olsson (2000) demonstrate that by using the DCF 
approach, and disregarding the weights in the WACC formula changing when the debt 
ratio (in the market value) changes, leads to bias in firm value estimates. 
Plenborg (2002) argues that in the absence of taxes, and as known from the literature, 
WACC is constant across different capital structures. This is expected as in those 
circumstances WACC is independent of the capital structure. Accordingly, the DCF 
approach yields firm value estimates that are theoretically correct. On the other hand, 
ývhen financial leverage increases, the cost of equity increases as well. Thus, if the 
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target capital structure deviates from the implied capital structure in the forecasted 
financial statements and the cost of equity is adjusted according to the target capital 
structure, the RI approach yields biased firm value estimates. 
3.9 Empirical Research 
Many Values Based Management advocates contend that an organisation's primary 
objectives must be stated in terms of "economic value" measures, such as EVA, in 
order to align internal goals with the maximisation of shareholder value (e. g., 
Copeland et al (1994) and Stem et al (1995)). This contention is based on assertions 
that changes in economic value measures track changes in shareholder wealth more 
closely than traditional accounting measures for goal setting, capital budgeting, and 
compensation purpose (Stem et al, 1995). 
Moreover, claims that economic value measures are superior to traditional accounting 
measures are not limited to consultants and the business press. Compared to such 
common performance measures as return on capital, return on equity, growth in 
earnings per share, and growth in cash flow, EVA has the highest statistical 
correlation with the creation of value for shareholders; EVA drives stock prices 
(Garvey and Milbourn 2000). Analytical studies by Anctil (1996), Rogerson (1997) 
and Reichelstein (1997) show how the use of residual income-based measures such as 
EVA can ensure goal congruence between the principal and agent. Evidence provided 
by Wallace (1997) suggests that managers compensation based on EVA (instead of 
earnings) take actions consistence with EVA-based incentives. 
However, much of the support for the claimed superiority of economic value 
measures, as reported by Biddle et al (1997), is based on relatively unsophisticated 
studies examining the relation between market measures (e. g., market value or 
shareholder returns) and EVA. Simple univariate tests by Milunovich and Tseui 
(1996) and Lehn and Makhij a (1997) find market-value added more highly associated 
with EVA than with accounting returns, earnings per share, free cash flow or free cash 
growth. O'Byrne (1996) uses regression models to examine the association between 
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market value and two performance measures: EVA and Net Operating Profit after Tax 
(NOPAT). Both measures have similar explanatory power when no control variables 
are included in the regression models, but a modified EVA model has greater 
explanatory power when industry indicator variables and the logarithm of capital for 
each firm are included as additional explanatory variables. However, O'Byrne does 
not make similar adjustments to the NOPAT model, making it impossible to compare 
results using the different measures. 
Furthermore, Chen and Dodd (1997) examine the explanatory power of accounting 
measures (earnings per share, return on assets and return on equity), residual income 
and various EVA related measures. Although the EVA measures outperform 
accounting earnings in explaining stock returns, the earnings measures provide 
significant incremental explanatory power above EVA. The authors also find the 
explanatory power of the EVA measures to be far lower than claimed by proponents. 
Biddle et al (1997) use contemporary capital markets research techniques to examine 
the power of accounting measures (earnings and operating profits) to explain stock 
market returns relative to EVA and five components of EVA (cash flow from 
operations, operating accruals, after-tax interest expenses, capital charge and 
accounting adjustments). They find that traditional accounting measures generally 
outperform EVA in explaining stock prices. While the EVA measures' capital 
charges and adjustments for accounting 'distortions have some incremental 
explanatory power over traditional accounting measures, the contribution from these 
variables is not economically significant in their test. 
Wallace (1997) examines relative performance changes in 40 adopters of residual 
income-based compensation measures such as EVA, and a matched-pairs control 
sample of firms where incentive compensation continues to be based on traditional 
accounting earnings (e. g. EPS, operating profit). The results indicate significant 
increases noted in residual income for the firms adopting residual income-based 
compensation relative to the control firms. Compared to the control firms, residual 
income firms decrease new investments and increase dispositions of assets, increase 
payouts to shareholders through share purchases and utilise assets more intensively, 
leading to significantly greater change in residual income. He also finds weak 
evidence that stock market participants respond favourably to the adoption of residual 
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income-based compensation plans as evidence by increased stock return. Wallace's 
(1997) study examines changes in performance rather than performance levels, and 
only examines performance changes over one year. 
Hogan and Lewis (1999) extend his study by investigating performance changes over 
a four-year period, and by matching control firms on past performance to control for 
possible mean reversion in performance levels. They find that adopters of residual 
income measures are relatively poor performers prior to the compensation plans' 
implementation and that the improved stock returns and operating performance 
reported by Wallace (1997) may not be unique to economic value adopters. After 
introducing past profitability as an additional matching criterion, they find no 
significant differences in the stock prices or operating performance of their two 
groups, and conclude that economic value plans are no better in their ability to create 
shareholder wealth than traditional Plans blending earnings-based bonuses and stock- 
based compensation. 
Ittner and Larcker (2001) argue that perhaps the biggest limitation in the preceding 
studies is the use of publicly available data on EVA values and uses. Studies of 
EVA's predictive ability typically employ published EVA data estimated by the 
consulting firm Stern Stewart. However, these numbers are computed using public 
financial data, and contain relatively few of the accounting adjustments EVA 
proponents encourage companies to make to more closely approximate economic 
profits. 
Considerable debate exists over the relative ability of different economic value 
measures, (EVA, Cash Flow Return on Investment, Cash Value Added or variant of 
these measures) to predict stock returns, with many consulting firms claiming that 
their economic value measures are far better indicators of value creation than EVA 
(Myers, 1996; The Economist, 1996). Evidence on the benefits from tying 
compensation to EVA is mixed. As discussed earlier, studies by Wallace (1997) and 
Hogan and Lewis (1999) reach conflicting conclusions regarding the performance of 
firms adopting residual income-based compensation plans (such as EVA) relative to 
the performance of control samples. In contrast, Wallace's (1998) survey of EVA 
users finds that firms using this measure for compensation purposes report greater 
awareness of the cost of capital reduced average accounts receivable age increased 
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sales revenues, and a longer accounts payable age than EVA users who do not use the 
measure for compensation. Given these mixed results, the benefits of EVA-based 
compensation plans remain an open issue 
The RI and the DCF 9 have received considerable attention in the past decade. Despite 
the theoretical equivalence between the RI and DCF approaches 10, the finance 
literature has argued in favour of the DCF approach for firm valuation since it is 
unaffected by accounting methods (Copeland et al, 1994). However, as demonstrated 
by OhIson (1995), the RI model is insensitive to different accounting methods if clean 
surplus accounting is applied. Penman and Sougiannis (1998) and Francis et al (2000) 
examined empirically the accuracy of the RI and DCF models. Both studies find that 
RI model yields more accurate firm value estimates than the DCF model. However, 
since both valuation models employ the same theoretical framework, a proper 
implementation, as reported by Plenborg (2002), would imply that both approaches 
yield similar firm value estimates. Moreover, Olsson (1998) argues that the 
introduction of simplifying assumptions II occurs when during the implementation of 
the different valuation approaches. Since simplifying assumptions introduce bias in 
the firm value estimates, they are likely to affect firm value estimates based on the RI 
and DCF approaches differently. 
Bernard (1995), employing only the first 4 years of forecast data, finds that the RI 
approach explains 68 percent of a firm's stock price, while the Discount Dividend 
Model (DDM) explains only 29 percent. Plenborg (1999) finds similar results when 
comparing the information content of earnings and cash flows. Using Danish data, 
Plenborg (1999) finds that four years of RI earnings explains 22 percent of the stock 
price variation in the same measurement period. In comparison, accumulated free 
cash flows explain less than I percent of stock price variation in the same four-year 
9 RI approach means models that are introduced by OhIson (1995) and relative's studies such as 
Frankel and Lee (1998). This model was termed the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) by Bernard (1994) 
and has been called the residual earnings model (Frankel and Lee, 1998). The DCF model can be 
found in the Copeland et al (1994) finance textbook. 
1ONote that the theoretical equivalence between these two approaches is presented in the previous 
section of this chapter. 
11 The introduction of a simplifying assumption implies that the internal coherence between the 
forecasted financial statements and the valuation approach (including cost of capital) is not intact 
(Plenborg, 2002). 
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period. The results of both Bernard and Plenborg indicate that the required forecast 
period is shorter for the RI approach than for both the DDM and DCF approach. 
Penman and Sougiannis (1998) and Francis et al (2000) compare the reliability of 
firm estimates based on the DDM, RI and DCF approaches respectively. Although 
both studies use US data, a primary difference between them is that the forecast data 
are determined differently. Francis et al employ Value Line's forecast data while 
Pem-nan and Sougiannis use realised data as estimates of historical forecasts. 
Although these two studies employ different sources of forecast data, both show that 
the RI approach yields less biased firm value estimates than the DDM and the DCF 
approaches. This result is insensitive to different methods for calculating the terminal 
value. However, according to Plenborg (2002) the RI approach did not perform 
particularly well when terminal value calculations are important. This is the case 
when the book value of equity is a bad indicator of firm value. 
The Penman and Sougiannis (1998) and Francis et al (2000) findings suggest that the 
RI approach yields more accurate firm estimates than the DDM and the DCF 
approaches. However, their findings conflict with the finding in Plenborg (2002) that 
the RI and DCF approaches are both inherently based on the DDM and thus, from a 
theoretical perspective, should yield the same firm value estimates. Plenborg (2002) 
also finds that the three valuation approaches generate the same point estimate of firm 
value in practice, if the same assumptions are applied. This indicates that, as Plenborg 
(2002) argues, neither Penman and Sougiannis (1998) nor Francis et al (2000) have 
taken into consideration that the same assumptions must be applied. An examination 
of their test methods also indicates that this is the case. For example, the growth rates 
used to estimate the terminal value are arbitrarily set at 0 and 4 percent in both studies. 
Thus, the link between the forecasted financial statements and the input in the 
different valuation approaches is most likely inconsistent. Furthermore, according to 
Plenborg (2002), both studies seem to ignore that growth generally affects the free 
cash flow negatively. They adjust the growth rate without a corresponding adjustment 
of the free cash flow. 
Bernard (1995) estimates intrinsic value for a large sample of firms during 1978-1993 
using Value-Line earnings forecasts for four years, in part to demonstrate the validity 
of the model over short horizons. Bernard (1995) argues that the RI model explains, 
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on average, 68 percent of the variation in share price. He advocates the RI model for 
its accuracy and for its reliance on earnings and book value predictions over relatively 
short time periods compared with the longer periods generally needed for the DCF 
model. On the other hand, Lee et al (1999) do not compare valuation models but use 
the RI to estimate the intrinsic value of the Dow over 1963-1996. They use security 
analysts' consensus earnings forecasts after 1979 when they became available and 
time-series projections of earnings before that. Their estimates of intrinsic value 
predict both the future value of the Dow and the future stock returns to the Dow. 
Based on these results, Lee et al (1999) advocate use of the RI over alternative 
valuation models. 
Accordingly, if the valuation approaches are not properly employed (as with the 
growth rate used in the terminal value calculations), the approaches yield different 
firm value estimates. Thus, the studies of Penman and Sougiannis and Francis et al 
indicate that if the internal coherence between the three valuation approaches is 
violated, the RI approach should be preferred for firm valuation at the expense of 
DDM and DCF approaches. Levin and Olsson (2000) demonstrate that if the steady 
state condition is not reached when the terminal value is calculated, the RI approach 
yields more accurate firm value estimates than DCF. Penman and Sougiannis (1998) 
argue that an attractive valuation approach should be easy to use and understand and it 
should help the user to perform better firm value estimates. Thus, valuation 
approaches based on measures that show value creation rather than value distribution 
are easier to understand and interpret and consequently analytically attractive 
(Penman, 1992). 
Plenborg (2002) demonstrates that simplifying assumptions affect firm value 
estimates differently. In some cases the RI approach yields more accurate firm value 
estimates, while in others the DCF approach yields more accurate estimates. His 
study also shows that each of the assumptions examined affects firm value estimates 
in a predictable manner. For example, applying the growth term in the forecasted 
financial statements, the RI approach yields more accurate firm value estimates than 
the DCF approach. His study also argues that since the framework for forecasting is 
based on accrual accounting and since budget control is generally based on 
accounting numbers rather than cash flow measures, it seems logical to estimate firm 
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values based on concepts known from accrual accounting and financial statement 
analysis. According to this reasoning, the RI approach seems to be an attractive 
altemative to the DCF approach. 
Dechow and Kothari (1998) pointed out that previous empirical applications of the RI 
model ignored Ohlson's information dynamics' 2. In many cases, the resulting 
valuation model is similar to past applications of dividend-discounting models that 
capitalise current or forecasted earnings, but make no appeal to book value or residual 
income. He argues that it is important to note that these empirical models are just a 
restatement of the DDM, which in no way depends on the properties of accounting 
numbers other than through the clean surplus relation. In their study, they find that 
residual income follows a mean reverting process. Their pricing tests indicate that 
stock prices partially reflect the mean reversion in residual income. An important 
implication of this result is that book value conveys additional information over 
earnings in explaining contemporaneous stock prices. However, they also find that 
book value provides very little additional information about stock prices beyond that 
contained in analysts' forecasts of next year's earnings. They conclude that OhIson's 
formulation of the residual income valuation model provides a parsimonious 
framework for incorporating information in earnings, book value and earnings 
forecasts in empirical research. 
3.10 Conclusion 
EVA, DCF, DDM and RI are compared theoretically and empirically in order to 
highlight whether it is possible to infer a superior method among them to be used in 
this research. Although these models are preferable to ROA, they are measuring 
value rather than performance. However, the first difference can be used as a 
performance measure but with a correction for dividend. It is difficult to infer from 
prior literature whether one valuation approach is superior to the other. Because of 
12 Example from these models: Frankel and Lee (1998), it can be seen from this model that the authors 
used the book value + present value of residual income without using the third assumption of OhIson's 
(1995) model. 
UniS 
83 
I 
their theoretical equivalence, the four approaches, DDM, DCF and RI (including the 
Ohlson model, the Frankel and Lee model and the EVA model), all provide the same 
valuations when the flows are projected consistently to infinity and comparable 
discount rates are applied. However, horizons over which the flows can be reasonably 
projected in practice are limited, and estimated discount rates are subject to error. 
These practical considerations cause some academics and practitioners to prefer one 
valuation model to another. The claimed conceptual advantages of the DCF model 
are based on its corporate finance roots that emphasise cash flows (Brealey and Myers, 
2000). Practical valuation 'handbooks' such as Copeland et al (2000,1994) maintain 
that cash flows outperform accounting earnings for valuation purposes and thus 
advocate the DCF model. 
However, as reported by Herz et al (2001), the claimed practical advantages of the RI 
are explained by Penman and Sougiannis (1998). In their view, a shortcoming of the 
DCF model is the need to subtract long-term capital investment from operating cash 
flows to compute FCF. For growing firms, negative FCF often results for many years. 
RI adherents maintain that accrual accounting eliminates the distorting effect of 
capital investment expenditure by placing it on the balance sheet as an asset. 
Depreciation and amortisation then allocate this investment cost to expense over time; 
in principle matching it against the revenues that it generates. Penman and 
Sougiannis (1998) also demonstrate that the RI model's use of accrual accounting 
allows for more reasonable valuations than the DCF model for forecasted payoffs 
over relatively short horizons. On the other hand, the DCF model's reliance on FCF 
may require many more years of forecasts to attain steady state and positive FCF- 
In short, these methods, namely, EVA, DCF, and EBO (the OhIson and the Frankel 
and Lee models) have a link with capital structure through cost of capital. Moreover, 
the literature showed that the cost of capital is very crucial in estimating the value on 
each model. This link can be very helpful in examining the relation between capital 
structures and firms' performance. As will be explained in Chapter 5, the main 
shortcoming of implementing the EVA model in this project is due to the 
difficulties 
in obtaining the required information. In addition, DCF model looks at valuation 
more explicitly than performance, while RI models can be used for performance more 
explicitly than DCF. This gives preference for the RI models since the concern of 
this 
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project is for performance rather than valuation. From the literature, we can see that 
certain difficulties would be encountered in implementing the linear information 
dynamics in Ohlson's model. Consequently, this gives preference in this study to the 
Frankel and Lee (1998) model for reasons explained in Chapter 5- Testing the 
Residual Income Model. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Design and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design and methodology to be applied in this study. 
Section two gives a brief idea of the research objectives, followed by the hypotheses 
in section three. The models that will be applied to test and analyses the formulated 
hypotheses are presented in section four. Section five discusses the type of data 
followed by data and sampling description. The appropriate software packages 
chosen for the analysis will be identified in section six, followed by the conclusion in 
section seven. 
4.2 Research Objectives 
This section outlines the research objectives. The aim of this study is to test for a 
relationship between capital structure and firm performance. From the literature, it 
was found that agency theory provides a major role for debt in disciplining managers 
and forcing them not to invest in negative NPV projects. This disciplining role should 
be reflected in better firm performance (Jensen 1986). Thus, a theoretical relationship 
between capital structure and firm Performance was established. On the other hand, 
measurement of financial Performance represents a real challenge since implementing 
different perfon-nance measures would lead to different results. In this study, the 
Residual Income model, presented by Frankel and Lee (1998), will be modified and 
used as a performance measure for reasons explained in Chapter five. Previous 
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studies have focused on the earnings figures, and less attention has been paid to the 
informative value of the balance sheet items. Alternatively, researchers have used the 
market returns to examine the effects of capital structure on performance. However, 
market returns reflect market expectations about a firm's future and thus may not be 
able to capture managers' current performance. 
Accordingly, the main objectives of this study are: 
* Testing the full Residual Income model (Frankel and Lee, 1998 version) as 
a valuation model using non-financial companies from FTSE 500 and S&P 
500. 
9 Testing the Residual Income Component model (derived from the full 
Frankel and Lee model) to measure firm performance. The Frankel and 
Lee model (1998) is a measure of value creation that can be applied as a 
performance measure by adjusting the first difference for dividends (see 
Chapter 5). 
e Testing whether the use of debt can mitigate the over-investment problem. 
* Testing whether the use of debt, where it serves as mitigation for the over- 
investment problem, can lead to a better performance using the above 
tested performance measures (objectives I& 2). 
* Examine country differences between UK and US, if any. 
4.3 The Hypotheses 
The research objectives can be transcribed into the following hypotheses: 
The Residual Income model (the F&L 1998 model) is expected to perform well as a 
valuation model against the market stock prices in our sample and therefore, it will be 
hypothesised: 
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HIO: There is no relation between the Residual Income valuation and stock 
market prices. 
Hl,: The defined Residual Income model can, to a significant degree, capture 
cross-sectional variation in market stock prices of the sample over a significant 
period of time. 
If the above null hypothesis is rejected, then firms performance will be determined 
based on the F&L (1998) model in two ways: 
Firstly, by looking at first difference in the valuation model; as the F&L model is a 
valuation model the difference between the value at time t+1 and t will represent 
performance from an accounting point of view after adding back the dividends (see 
Chapter 5- Determination of Performance). In this case,, this hypothesis will be 
tested against market stock price performance i. e. first difference. Accordingly, our 
second hypothesis will be as follows: 
H20 : There is no relation between first difference of the Residual Income 
valuation (F&L model) and the performance of the stock market prices (first 
difference). 
H21 : The first difference of the defined Residual Income model can, to a 
significant degree, capture the first difference of the cross sectional variation 
in market stock prices of the sample over a significant period of time. 
Secondly, firm performance can be determined from the F&L valuation model by 
using the components of the residual income model excluding beginning book value 
and continuing values. The book value at the beginning and the continuing value at 
the end of the model are important for valuation but not for perfon-nance as such (see 
Chapter 5). The modified model (the residual income components) will also be tested 
and the following will be hypothesised: 
H30: There is no relation between the Residual Income Components (the 
modified F&L model) and the performance of the stock market prices (first 
difference). 
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H3,: The defined Residual Income Components can, to a significant degree, 
capture cross-sectional differences in the performance of the market stock 
prices of the sample over a significant period of time. 
Hypotheses two and three will then be compared against each other and against the 
simple residual income measure 13 in order to choose a performance measure. 
Although the simple residual income can be used as a performance measure, the 
above two performance measures, the first difference and the RIC (hypotheses 2 and 3) 
are expected to outperform the simple residual income because they include 2-year 
analysts' earnings forecasts. Evidently, analysts' earnings forecasts contain more 
value-relevant information than is reflected in a historical simple one-period residual 
income model. 
Testing for firm performance, debt and over-investment will be carried out in several 
steps. Firstly, since gearing can theoretically mitigate the over-investment problem to 
a certain degree, the following will therefore be hypothesised: 
H40: There is no relationship between gearing and over-investment. 
H41: There is a negative relationship between gearing and over-investment. 
Where gearing mitigates the over-investment problem, this should be related to a 
higher performance and the following would therefore be hypothesised: 
H50: There is no relationship between over-investment and firm performance. 
H5 1: There is a negative relationship between over-investment and firm 
performance. 
Introducing the interaction term between gearing and the over-investment problem 
would capture the link between the fourth and the fifth hypotheses and the following 
would therefore be hypothesised: 
H60: the interaction between the presence of over-investment and level of 
gearing is not related to firm Performance. 
13 The simple residual income model will be tested as well and compared with the above two 
performance, namely, the first difference and the RIC in the model. 
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H61: the interaction between the presence of over-investment and level of 
gearing is related to better firm perfonnance. 
The research is divided into several steps. The first step is to test the Residual Income 
model on its ability to capture, to a significant degree, the cross-sectional variation in 
stock market prices of FTSE 500 and S&P 500 companies over a significant period of 
time (Hypothesis one). Although, the residual income model has been tested by F&L 
(1998), however, the sample was from the US market only. In this study, we will test 
this model for both the US and the UK market. 
The second step tests the first difference of the Residual Income model against first 
difference of market stock prices, and tests the modified Residual Income model's 
ability to capture, to a significant degree, the cross-sectional stock market 
performance (first difference) of the same sample over a significant period of time 
(Hypothesis two and three). Then performance measure will be defined based on 
results of hypotheses one to three. 
ypothesis four tests whether gearing, can to a significant degree, mitigate the over- 
investment over the sample and period. Hypothesis five tests the relation between 
over-investment and performance, and the final step tests the relation between firm 
performance, leverage and over-investment (Hypothesis SiX) 14. 
4.4 Research Methods 
4.4.1 Regression Analysis 
In order to test the above hypotheses, a regression analysis will be used. Regression 
analysis is concerned with the study of the dependence of one variable, the dependent 
variable, on one or more other variables, which are identified as the explanatory or 
independent variables, with a view to estimating and or predicting the mean or 
average value of the former in terms of known or fixed values of the latter (Gujarati, 
2002). The single regression equation is of the following format: 
14 The developments of these hypotheses together with research design are explained in Chapter 5. 
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Yj =a +, O, Xil 
Panel data regression 15 differs from a regular time series or cross-section in that it 
combines both in a double subscript on its variables, i. e. Xit. 
Yj =a+ 18IXil + J82Xi2 
+****'---+, 8, X j, +uj, 
Where the i subscript denotes the cross-sectional dimension whereas t denotes the 
time-series dimension. Yj is the dependent variable and Xil, Xi2 ... Xit are the 
explanatory variables. (x is the constant and 8, ........ . 6, are the slopes of the 
explanatory variables. The error terms are assumed to have the properties: 
E(ui)=O 
Var(u i)= c' 
Cov(u uj)=O fori: p, -j 
These relationships state that the error terms are assumed to have normal distribution 
with mean 0 and variance c', and that error terms must be independent. Most of the 
panel data applications utilise a one-way error component model for the disturbances, 
with: 
it --,: A+ 
Vit 
Where pi denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and vi, denotes the 
remainder disturbance. Note that p, is not time variant and it accounts for any 
individual specific effect that is not included in the regression. The reminder 
disturbance vi, varies with individual and time and can be thought of as the usual 
disturbance in the regression. 
15 Panel data analysis will be used in this study, for more information refer to section 4.5 of this chapter 
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4.4.1.1 Sample Regression Function 
The sample regression function (SRF) is determined based on the Population 
Regression Function (PRF) represented in Equation (1) and is determined using the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. The OLS method defines the SRF in such a 
way that the sum of the sample residuals is as small as possible, as a result of which 
the SRF is as closely aligned as possible to the PRF. The sample Regression Line has 
the following properties: 
* It passes through the sample means of Y and X; 
9 The mean value of the estimated Y is equal to the mean value of the actual Y; 
e The mean value of the estimated residuals is zero; 
9 Residuals are un-correlated with the estimated Y; 
9 Residuals are un-correlated with the estimated X. 
4.4.1.2 Quality of the Sample Regression Function 
Since data vary from sample to sample, estimates will change, which results in the 
requirement to measure the reliability or the precision of the estimates. The precision 
of the regression model is determined by its standard error(s). The standard error is 
simply the standard deviation of the Y values about the estimated regression line and 
is often used as a summary of the goodness of fit of the estimated line. The goodness 
of fit is determined by R2, which measures the proportion or percentage of the total 
variation in Y explained by the regression model. The T-test or Chi2 test is a test of 
significance, by which sample results are used to verify the validity or invalidity of 
the rejection of the null hypothesis. It is the measure of the overall significance of the 
estimated regression, and it is also a test of the significance of R2. 
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4.4.1.3 Fixed and Random Effects Models 
As we have already mentioned, most of the panel data applications utilise a one-way 
error component model for the disturbances, with: 
Uit -A+ Vit 
Where pi denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and vit denotes the 
remainder disturbance. Note that pi is not time variant and it accounts for any 
individual specific effect that is not included in the regression. The remainder 
disturbance vit varies with individual and time and can be thought of as the usual 
disturbance in the regression. A simple way to take account of heterogeneity across 
individuals and/or through time is to use variable intercept models. The basic 
assumptions of such models are that, conditional on the observed explanatory 
variables, the effects of all omitted variables are driven by three types of variables: 
individual time-invariant, period individual-invariant, and individual time-variant 
variables. 
The individual time-invariant variables are variables that are the same for a given set 
of cross-sectional unit through time, but vary across cross-sectional units. Examples 
of these are attributes of the individual-firm management, ability, sex etc. The period 
individual-invariant variables are variables that are the same for all cross-sectional 
units at a given point in time, but vary through time. Examples of these are prices, 
interest rates, and widespread optimism or pessimism. The individual time-variant 
variables are variables that vary across cross-sectional units at a given point in time 
and also exhibit variations through time. Examples of these variations are a firm's 
sales, profits, and capital stock. 
The variable intercept model assumes that the effects of numerous omitted variables 
are each individually unimportant but are collectively significant and possess the 
property of a random variable that is un-correlated with all other included and 
excluded variables. On the other hand, because the effects of the remaining omitted 
variables either stay constant through time for a given cross-sectional unit or are the 
same for all cross-sectional units at a given point in time, or a combination of both, 
they can be absorbed in the intercept term of a regression model as a means to 
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explicitly allow for individual and/or temporal heterogeneity contained in the 
temporal cross-sectional data. The variable intercept model can provide a useful 
specification for fitting regression models using panel data. 
The fixed effects estimation method treats the unobservable specific effects pi as 
fixed constants. In this case A are assumed to be fixed parameters and the remaining 
disturbances stochastic, with vi, independent and identically distributed. The Xit are 
assumed independent of the vi, for all i and t. The fixed effects model is an 
appropriate specification for focusing on specific sets of firms, and our inferences are 
restricted to the behaviour of these sets of firms. 
On the other hand, random effect models treat the individual specific effects Pi like ui, , 
i. e. as random variables. It is standard practice in regression analysis to assume that 
large numbers of factors affect the value of the dependent variable, but which have 
not been explicitly included as independent variables, can be explicitly appropriately 
surnmarised by a random disturbance. When numerous individual units are observed 
over time, it is sometimes assumed that some of the omitted variables will represent 
factors peculiar to both the individual units and the time periods for which 
observations are obtained, whereas other variables will reflect individual differences 
that tend to affect the observations for a given individual in more or less the same way 
over time. Still other variables may reflect factors peculiar to specific time periods, 
but affecting individual units more or less equally. The random effects model is an 
appropriate specification if we are drawing n individuals randomly from a large 
population. In this case, n is large and a fixed effects model would lead to an 
enormous loss of degree of freedom. 
The issues of whether to treat unobserved heterogeneity as random or fixed is a 
question with no easy answer, and it has aroused significant interest among 
econometricians and has paramount importance in panel data modelling16 (Matyas 
and Sevestre, 1996). To decide on an appropriate structure for the analysis, namely 
random effects verses fixed effects; it appears that consideration should be given to: a) 
16 Hausman (1978) specification test can be used to determine the appropriate method i. e. fixed or 
random effect. However, this kind of test is not available in the software packages that will be used in 
this study namely, E-Views and PC-give. 
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the objectives of the study, b) the context of the data, the manner in which they are 
generated, and the environment from which they came. Thus, the fixed effects model 
is an appropriate specification if we are focusing on specific sets of firms, and our 
inferences are restricted to the behaviour of these sets of firms, while the random 
effects model is an appropriate specification if we are drawing n individuals randomly 
from a large population. Fixed effect models may be more appropriate for this study 17 
4.4.1.4 Other Issues to be Considered 
Several aspects connected with regression analysis have to be taken into consideration 
when writing the final conclusions. Two of these issues are Heteroscedasticity, which 
will be controlled by the software used in this study, and Multicollinearity, which 
means the existence of a perfect or exact linear relationship among some or all- 
explanatory variables of a regression model. Therefore, the quality of the regression 
analysis will be based on a robustness test of the model. 
4.4.2 Regression on Dummy Dependent Variable 
A basic statistical method for social science is linear regression analysis, which 
requires a continuous dependent variable and explanatory variables that are either 
continuous or categorical. However, the classical regression model cannot be applied 
in situations where the dependent variable refers to characteristics, attitudes, 
behaviours and decisions that are measured in discrete, nominal, ordinal, or any non- 
continuous way. In such situations the dependent variable takes a discrete number of 
mutually exclusive and collectively exclusive values (Borooah, 2001). 
In this study, and in hypothesis three, the dependent variable is a discrete variable, 
which takes a value of one if there is an over-investment and zero otherwise. The 
statistical methods that are used to analyse such data are known as qualitative choices 
models and present a common characteristic, i. e. they all model the probability of an 
event, namely, how likely the event is to occur (Liao, 1994). Examples of such 
methods of statistical analysis are "binary data analysis", "ordered analysis" or 
17 Although it has been decided to use fixed effect models, in the analysis we use random effect models 
as well and the results are comparable. 
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"discrete choice analysis", such as the logit and probit models. When the dependent 
variable is the outcome of more than two choices, then a multinornial logit model is 
used, and when there is an ordered choice in which the discrete variable can take the 
values of 0,1 and 2, then the ordered model should be used. When the dependent 
variable is a count variable, e. g. number of accidents, number of visits in a theme park, 
it is assumed that the random component in Y resembles the Poisson distribution and 
thus the logarithmic model is used. As the dependent variable in this study takes two 
values only, i. e. either 0 or 1, a logit or probit model should be used. 
When we study a random variable Y (dependent variable) using a linear model, we 
specify its expectation as a linear combination of K independent variables (X) as 
follows: 
K 
E(Y) Lflk Xk. 
K=l 
This is the ordinary linear model, and it can be used when the normality of the 
distribution of the random component in Y (i. e. the part that cannot be explained by 
the independent variables) can be assumed. However, when the dependent variable is 
measured in a non-continuous way, the random component in Y does not follow the 
normal distribution, in which case the ordinary linear model in Equation (3) cannot be 
applied. 
There are four main reasons why the classical regression (and the OLS estimator) 
cannot be applied to estimate models where the dependent variable is non-continuous 
(Gujarati, 2002). The first refers to the fact that the random component in Y does not 
follow the normal distribution. Another problem is that the random component is 
heteroscedastic and thus one needs to find appropriate transformations to make it 
homoscedastic. Yet, the most important handicap of using the OLS estimator is that 
there is no guarantee that the estimated probability that the event under examination 
will occur will lie within the limits of 0 and 1. For example, if the estimated 
probability Pi is negative, or greater than 1, it will have no practical meaning. Finally, 
by applying classical regression one would assume that the rate of change of 
probability per unit change in the value of the explanatory variable is constant and is 
given by the value of the slope. 
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However, when a logit or probit model is used, the estimated probabilities will always 
fall between 0 and 1. Moreover, the probability of an event occurring does not 
increase linearly with a unit increase in the value of the explanatory variable. Rather, 
the probability approaches zero (or one) at a slower and slower rate as the value of the 
explanatory variable gets smaller (or larger) respectively. This is a more realistic 
pattern of change in the probability compared to linear model. More specifically, if 
the dependent variable is a binary outcome (0/1), which is the case in this study, the 
random component in Y follows the binomial distribution and according to Liao 
(1994) the appropriate model to be used for estimation is either logit: 
E(Y) = log[ (I 
P)] (4) 
-, u 
or Probit: 
E(Y) = o-(p) 
Where 0-'is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
4.4.2.1 Binary Logit/Probit Model 
As the simplest types of probability model, binary logit and probit models have only 
two categories in the response variable, i. e. 0 and 1. Binary models are usually 
denoted as latent variable specifications in which the response variable y* is linearly 
related to a set of k explanatory variables, Xk = (XI5 X2... Xk) and is defined by the 
regression relationship: 
k 
L13A + (5) 
k=l 
In practice, y* is unobserved and F, is systematically distributed with zero mean and 
has its cumulative density function (CDF) defined as F(F- ). The observed dependent 
variable is determined by whether y* exceeds a threshold value: 
if y* >0 or y =0 ot erwise. 
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Then, the probability of observing a 
relationship: 
value of I is denoted by the following 
prob(y = 1) = prob x+ -c >0= prob 
k8=I-Fk 
(6) L )qk k6> -LI AL PkXk 
k=l k=l k=l 
Where F is the CDF of E; . 
The functional form of F depends on the assumption made about the distribution of 
the random component F- . If the random component is assumed to follow the logistic 
distribution, then the binary model is known as logit model, where, substituting L 
(signifying the logistic distribution) for F in Equation (6): 
k 
k expl 
A Xk 
prob(y = 1) =I-LLx 
k=l 
- 
L)6kXk Pk 
k(k 
k=l k=l I+ exp 
JA Xk 
ý, k=l 
If the random component is assumed to follow the standard normal distribution, then 
the binary model is known as the probit model and Prob(y=l) is given by the 
following equation: 
kkk 
prob(y = 1) =I- F- 
L 
lgkXk = 
FIA Xk =01A Xk (8) 
k=1 k=1 k=1 
4.4.2.2 Should the Logit or the Probit Model be Chosen? 
It can be seen from the above formulas that there is little difference between the two 
CDFs, i. e. the logit and the probit model. Normally, a logit model has flatter tails 
compared to probit. That is, the probability Pi approaches I or 0 at a slower rate 
in 
logit models than in probit. Given the similarities between them, either model will 
give very comparable conclusions in most applications' 
8. It is, in fact, easy to go 
from one set of estimates to the other. If a probit estimate is multiplied 
by a factor of 
approximately 1.6, then the corresponding logit estimate can be obtained. 
18 In the analysis, both logit and model have been used and the results are comparable. 
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There are situations, though, where estimates from logit and probit models may differ 
substantially, and in such cases care must be taken in choosing the more appropriate 
one. These are cases with an extremely large number of observations and with heavy 
concentrations of observations in the tails of the distribution. Logit models are more 
appropriate for distributions with heavier tails. That is, if movement towards 
probability of 0 or 1, after certain values of the regressors have reached, occurs 
quickly, then a probit model provides a better approximation to the data generation 
process. Otherwise, the logit model is preferred and more commonly used (Seddighi, 
Lawler and Katos, 2000). 
4.5 Panel Data 
Three types of data may be available for empirical analysis: time series, cross- 
sectional and pooled (combination of time series and cross-sectional) data. Panel data 
analysis is at the watershed of time series and cross-section econometrics. While the 
identification of time series parameters traditionally relies on notions of stationary, 
pre-determinedness and uncorrected shocks, cross-sectional parameters appealed to 
exogenous instrument variables and random sampling for identification. By 
combining the time series and cross-sectional dimensions, panel data sets have 
enriched the set of possible identification arrangements, and forced economists to 
think more carefully about the nature and sources of identification of parameters of 
potential interest. 
Hsiao (2003), Klevrnarken (1989), Solon (1989) and Baltagi (2003) list several 
benefits from using panel data. These include the following: 
Panel data give the researchers a large number of data points, increasing the 
degree of freedom, variability and efficiency, and reducing collinearity among 
explanatory variables. The large number of data points is very important when 
using financial accounting data, which are published only annually. 
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4.1 w 
W 
Panel data allow a researcher to analyse a number of important economic 
questions that can not be addressed using either pure cross-sectional or time series 
data sets. Panel data are better able to study the dynamics of adjustments and are 
able to identify and measure effects that are simply not detectable in pure cross- 
sectional and time series data. They also provide a dynamic picture of the 
samples' financing behaviour. 
Panel data better control individual heterogeneity. Panel data allow for the fact 
that individuals, firms, countries are heterogeneous. Time series and cross- 
sectional data not controlling for this heterogeneity run the risk of yielding biased 
results. 
Panel data models allow us to construct and test more complicated behaviour 
models than do purely cross-sectional or time series data, and also fewer 
restrictions can be imposed in panels than in a purely time series study. 
Panel data are usually gathered for micro-level units, like individuals, firms, and 
households. Many variables can be more accurately measured at the micro level 
and biases resulting from aggregation over firms or individuals are eliminated. 
Accordingly, panel data analysis will be used in this study to empirically examine the 
hypotheses formulated before. Panel data analysis is very popular in product 
placement and marketing research, as well as 
' 
in studies concerned with the labour 
force. Econometric analysis in finance is mainly carried out using time-series or 
cross-sectional data. The availability of long time series or disaggregated price data 
partially explains this phenomenon. None of the empirical work for testing the 
Residual Income model using panel data has been done. In fact, all of the previous 
studies that have tested this model have either used cross-sectional or time-series 
models. Therefore, it will be of interest to examine the behaviour of the Residual 
Income model using the panel data model. Conversely, although many new empirical 
studies use panel data to examine for capital structure, this is still limited in scope. 
However, one should be careful in analysing panel data and paying attention to the 
following limitations: 
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Design and data collection problem: these include problems of coverage i. e. 
incomplete account of the population of interest. 
9 Distortions or measurement errors: measurement errors may arise because of 
inappropriate information, misrecording of data. 
* Selectivity problems: in the form of self-selectivity, non-response or attrItion. 
9 Short time series dimension: typical panels include annual data covering a short 
span of time for each individual. Increasing the number of years is not without 
cost either. This increases the chances of attrition and increases the computational 
difficulty for limited dependent variable panel data models. 
4.6 Data and Sample Description 
Most of the data used in this study were gathered from secondary sources. The main 
source of information has been the Datastream database, which contains published 
accounts data as well as stock prices. In a few cases, copies of companies' annual 
reports were used in order to complete the set of data or to make certain clarifications. 
The original sample consists of both FTSE 500 and S&P 500 comprising both US and 
UK markets to allow a comparison between these two markets. In addition, 
companies from both markets were grouped based on the industry to which they 
belong. This sorting of companies will allow us to make a comparison between 
industries and to analyse the differences. The sample including industry classification 
and based on the above classification is presented below in two separate tables 
representing both FTSE 500 and S&P 500 respectively as follows: 
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Table 4.1: Description of FTSE 500 and S&P 500 
Industry No. of Companies 
FTSE500 S&P 500 
Financial Services 64 106 
Utility 28 66 
Business Support (Services) 45 11 
Media & Publication 38 26 
Engineering 41 16 
Retail 47 40 
Construction 38 5 
Transportation 31 13 
Real Estate Development 35 12 
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 28 44 
Computer 32 
Electronic and Telecom Equip. 45 50 
Hotels and Food 48 31 
Miscellaneous 12 21 
Health Care & equipment 27 
Total Firms 500 500 
Financial companies have specific characteristics in their capital structure that may be 
affected by regulatory requirements such as capital adequacy. In addition, debt-like 
liabilities of financial firms such as banks and insurance companies are not strictly 
comparable to debt issued by non-financial firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Due to 
the above-mentioned reasons, and the desirability of a homogenous sample, it has 
been decided to exclude financial firms from both FTSE 500 and S&P 500. Moreover, 
by examining the sample it has been observed that real estate development companies 
have some special characteristics and legislation that are different from the non- 
financial companies as well. For instance, such companies do not report sales figure 
in their trail balances and they are therefore excluded. As a result, FTSE 500 has 
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decreased from 500 to 401 companies while S&P 500 has decreased from 500 to 382 
companies, giving a total of 783 companies 
Only companies with a full set of data for the 15-years (1988-2002) period were 
selected. Furthermore, companies were required to have a one-year-ahead and a two- 
years-ahead earnings-per- share (EPS) forecast from I/ B/ E/ S in order to test the 
Frankel and Lee (F&L) (1998) model. Further, it was realised that many companies 
within the sample have different fiscal-year-ends. In order to have a comparable data 
within the companies, the sample was constrained to companies with fiscal-year-ends 
between September 3 oth and December 3 l't as well as between January 3 I't and 
March 3 l't. The number of companies was thus reduced from 783 to 317 comprising 
185 companies from the US market and 132 companies from the UK. 
The initial number of firms was reduced so drastically because many companies had 
only a few years' data or have no reported EPS forecast. Some of them had "died", or 
were young companies, or were taken over. Some others were excluded because of 
their fiscal-year-ends. A few firms had negative book values and these firms were 
also excluded because according to F&L (1998) model, return on equity (ROE) for 
these firms cannot be interpreted in economic terms. Finally, it was clear that the 
F&L (1998) model does not work when the dividend pay-out ratio (K) exceeds 100% 
(see definition of the variables on Chapter 5 section 5.4). Such firms with k above 
100% were also eliminated. 
The above common sense filters ensure the subsequent results are not driven by 
outliers. The tests are carried out on the overall sample of 185 US firms and 132 UK 
firms as well as on the specific portfolios created in order to see if there were any 
differences among them. These differences are expected because different firms 
belong to different industries as well as different markets and therefore may face 
different business risk. A careful investigation of firms' business line was made by 
looking at all the SIC classifications to which these firms belonged and ensuring that 
the grouped firms were as similar as possible as well as ensuring that the portfolios 
were large enough in order for them to contain the necessary number of observations 
19 for the statistical tests to be robust . 
19 The seven major sectors used by FT Actuaries/Goldman Sachs were also used in this study. See 
Richard Roll, the Journal of finance, Vol. 47(l), (Mar., 1992), 3-4 1. 
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The year 1988 was selected as a cut-off year because 9 years of data were deemed 
necessary in order to draw sound statistical conclusions from the tests described later. 
This takes into consideration the fact that some of the variables are calculated by 
using two years' previous accounts; ftiture return on equity at time t is calculated by 
using book value at time t-I and t-2 respectively. Furthermore, some of the 
variables are also calculated as averages or standard deviations of three years. In 
addition, one more year was needed in order to obtain a variable (performance), which 
is calculated as the difference between two years. Therefore, an initial 15 year period 
of raw data was needed in order to produce a9 year period for both dependent and 
independent variables. 
4.7 Statistical Packages 
Several software packages could be used to carry out the empirical analysis of this 
study. SPSS, E-Views, LIMDEP and PC-give are among the most commonly used. 
Although SPSS is a very user-friendly statistical package, which is widely used, it 
could not be used for the current analysis, since it accepts a maximum of 10 
dependent and independent variables (combined). Moreover, SPSS has limited 
functions for panel data analysis, which will be applied in this study. Because of the 
previous mentioned restrictions, SPSS would not be used in this study. LIMDEP was 
another option; however, due to unavailability of the software, it could not be 
considered either. 
'E-Views' statistical package provides all required tools to deal with regression 
analysis. For instance, 'E-views' does not weight observations in pooled estimation 
by default, but there is the option of estimating weighted versions of the specifications. 
E-views can control for heteroscedasticity through White heteroscedasticity consistent 
covariance. 'E-Views' allows for options such as fixed and random effects. However, 
'E-Views' has a limited function to deal with discrete choice models. These models 
have to be performed either using cross-sectional or time-series analysis. On the other 
hand, 'PC-give' has almost the same features of 'E-Views' such as controlling for 
heteroscedasticity and allowing for fixed and random effects, in addition to analysing 
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discrete models using panel data. Therefore, 'E-Views' and 'PC-give' will be used in 
this study. 
4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter describes the type of research design and methodology used in the 
following empirical research. The objectives of this study were highlighted in the 
first section. The main objectives were to determine firm performance and then to 
link this to capital structure through hypotheses based on agency theory and the over- 
investment problem. These objectives were then transcribed into five main 
hypotheses, which will be tested in the following empirical research. Two main ways 
were then discussed to analyse and test the formulated hypotheses. The first was OLS 
regression analysis, which will be used to analyse the results where the dependent 
variable is a continuous variable. The second was binary discrete choice (logit and 
probit) models which will be used to analyse the results where the dependent variable 
is a discrete choice such as 0 or 1. The main properties and features of each model 
were then highlighted. 
This chapter discussed the advantages of using panel data in this study as well as the 
problems that might arise as the result of pooling together time series and cross- 
sectional data. The chapter describes the data and sample description that will be used 
in the following empirical research. The data used in this research come from 
secondary resources, more specifically from the Datastream database. The study uses 
15 years of accounting data from 1988 to 2002, during which the databases provided 
full set of accounts. FTSE 500 and S&P 500 are the sources used in the sample of this 
study. After filtering the data, the remaining samples consist of 184 companies from 
US and 132 companies from UK, comprising a total of 317 companies. Finally, this 
chapter discusses the use of both 'E-Views' and 'PC-give' to carry out the empirical 
analysis of this study. 
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Chapter Five 
Testing the Residual Income Model 
5.1 Testing the Residual Income Model 
This chapter examines the ability of the Residual Income model (RI) to capture and 
explain, to a significant degree, cross sectional variation in market stock prices of the 
selected sample over a significant period of time. This test provides, in addition to 
how performance will be determined based on a valuation model, an answer to the 
question of how best to measure performance. Such a question is important because 
accounting and budgeting systems, performance measurement systems, transfer 
pricing systems, and decision support systems affect how people and organisations 
interact. 
It can be seen from the literature that the continually growing criticism of traditional 
performance measures, which ignore the cost of capital, motivate dysfunctional 
behaviour causing managers to pay attention to the wrong things. Back in 1979, Lev 
and Sunder commented that in using such traditional measures, i. e. ratio analysis, it 
appears that the extensive use of financial ratios by both practitioners and researchers 
is often motivated by tradition and convenience rather than resulting from theoretical 
considerations or from careful statistical analysis. For this purpose, it has been 
decided to exclude such performance measures and look at models that take into 
consideration the spread between return on capital and the cost of capital. 
Consulting firms are developing and marketing alternative financial measures of 
performance such as economic value added, cash value added, shareholder value, etc. 
They claim that they provide "superior" measures of performance and better 
incentives in motivating managers to take the right actions. It has been found that the 
most attractive model among them is the economic value added since it is based on 
the strong economic argument that the "profit" should be calculated after the cost of 
capital is deducted. However, empirical research carried out shows that EVA may be 
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a good proxy for economic profits, but may not outperform the current realisations of 
other performance measures (Biddle et al, 1997). 
Most importantly, implementing the model requires adjusting a company's balance 
sheet and income statement. Practically, the points that might arise are: 
* It is difficult to make all the recommended adjustments, and to ensure that 
these adjustments reflect the economic value in order to implement this model. 
Estimated accounting adjustments may contain measurement error relative to 
what the market is using for valuing firms. 
9 Data required to compute EVA are not easily estimated from secondary 
sources, since the data required are often not directly available on the balance 
sheet and income statements or notes to the accounts, and it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to obtain inside information. 
This suggests that such a measurement might be useful for consultancy companies 
when they have easy access to inside information and are therefore able to make the 
recommended adjustments; this is not the case here. Therefore, EVA will not be used 
as a performance measure in this project. 
It is clear from the literature that RI models such as those of Ohlson (1995) and 
Frankel and Lee (1998), the Economic Profit model (EP) presented in Copeland et al 
(1994,2000) and the Discounted Cash Flow model (DCF) presented in many practical 
valuation handbooks such as Copeland et al (2000,1994) are the most competitive 
models in many of the recent academic books and research papers. Therefore, the 
first task of this project is to choose one model among RI, EP and DCF. Although 
each model can be used as a performance measure, DCF, as discussed in the literature 
review5 looks at the valuation of firms more explicitly than performance, while RI and 
EP can be used for performance more explicitly than DCF. For example, RI and EP 
models have an advantage over the DCF model in a way that they are useful measure 
for understanding a company's performance in any single year, while discounted cash 
flow is not. Since the purpose of this project is to look at the performance 
measurements rather than valuation, it seems logical to use RI and EP models , in 
accordance with their function to evaluate periodic performance, rather than DCF- 
Therefore, DCF will not be used in this project as a performance measure. 
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On the other hand, as can be seen from the literature, an obvious limitation concerns 
the absence of a leverage concept in the Ohlson (1995) model. His model has been 
based on risk neutrality, and this does not permit the required return to reflect any 
compensation for the inherent risk in equity securities or firm specific risk. In 
addition, it should be noted that certain difficulties would be encountered in 
implementing the linear information dynamics in the OhIson (1995) model, which 
frames the stochastic time series behaviour of abnormal earnings. The difficulty is in 
setting parameter values such as vt which represent other information in the model. 
Obversely, Frankel and Lee (1998) operationalised the residual income model in 
which the cost of capital is risk-adjusted by using an overall assessment of the 
perceived risk of the investment as a whole. This leads to a more easily implemented 
model and therefore, leads to preference for the operationalised RI in Frankel and Lee 
(1998) model over the OhIson (1995) model. 
The EP model, from both a mathematical and theoretical point of view, looks very 
similar to RI (Frankel and Lee version)20 . The two main 
differences between them are: 
* The forecasting over time horizon (period). RI (Frankel and Lee version) has 
a shorter explicit forecast period than EP (Copeland et al, 2000,1994). 
* Using the cost of equity in RI (Frankel and Lee version) because it measures 
the value of firm's equity, while the EP (Copeland et al (2000) use the WACC 
as a cost of capital because it measure the firm's value (equity + debt). 
The latter point, i. e. cost of equity or cost of capital in the form of WACC, seems to 
be less important, as Lee et al (1999) point out: the RI model can be adjusted to 
reflect cost of capital (WACC) rather than just the required return on equity: 
00 E, ((Earnings Before Interest)- (invested Capital* WACQ) 
V, - Bt +I I 
i=1 
(1 + WACC)* 
This valuation formula looks the same as EP (Copeland et al (2000): 287) where: 
V, = Invested Capital + CV of economic profit. 
20 RI and EP as can be seen from the literature are just two names for the same concept. 
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Accordingly, the main difference between these two models is the choice of forecast 
horizon. Copeland et al (2000) stated that the explicit forecast should be long enough 
so that the business will have reached a steady state of operations by the end of the 
period. Similarly, Frankel and Lee (1998) pointed out that in theory the explicit 
forecast period should be set long enough for firms to reach their competitive 
equilibrium. However, Frankel and Lee (1998) argued that the ability to forecast 
future ROEs diminishes quickly over time due to the difficulties in estimating future 
ROE for more than three years, and forecasting errors are therefore compounded in 
longer expansions. Henceforth, they estimated only three years of RI, which is also 
consistent with the consensus forecasts, which give projections for 3 years. 
From the literature, it can be seen that Bernard (1995), Penman and Sougiannis (1998), 
Lee et al (1999) and Frankel and Lee (1998) have tested the RI model and have 
concluded that it yields to smaller valuation errors, as measured against stock price 
and over short horizons. Moreover, F&L (1998) point out that the estimated intrinsic 
values from the RI explain more than 70% of the variation in stock prices over the 
period of 1975-1993. In summary, many empirical studies conclude from large 
sample results that the RI, even with a short time horizon, explains stock prices and 
stock returns better than the alternative valuation models. It also can be concluded 
that short time horizons eliminate the possibility of large errors that are usually 
generated by long time horizons, since the larger the time horizon, the bigger the 
estimated errors. 
In general, it can be concluded that RI, modified by Frankel and Lee (1998) among 
others, provides the preferred model. It can easily be applied using accounting 
data, 
requires estimates for a smaller number of variables, and as suggested by the 
literature, 
explains a significant percentage of cross sectional variation in market stock prices. 
This good measure can also be achieved with a short time 
horizon, which is 
appropriate for the sample that will be used in this thesis 
21 
. 
Nevertheless, with such a 
large sample, forecasting for long time horizon (an average of 7 years)22 , as suggested 
by Copeland et al (2000) in order to implement the EP model, presents 
difficulties. 
21 For more information about the sample size, please refer to data sampling section. 
22 Copeland et al (2000) did not mention a specific time horizon; they said 
it should be long enough in 
order to insure that the company reaches a steady situation. 
However, from their examples, it seems 
that they favourite the time horizon to be a minimum of 7 years. 
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Therefore, the F&L (1998) model will be used in this study to determine firms' 
performance. 
5.2 Definition of the Variables 
The dependent variable in the above model (P) is the closing market price. The 
current price on Datastream's equity program is the latest price available from the 
appropriate market in primary units of currency. P was calculated by taking the 
average of eight weeks (four prior to the publication of the firm's annual profit and 4 
weeks after) in order to avoid as much as possible the effect of announcing a firms' 
annual result on its stock price. 
The independent variable V as stated above is the RI model and is defined as in 
Frankel and Lee (1998) as well as in Lee, Myers and Swarninathan (1999) as follows: 
=B, + 
(FR OE, - r, 
) 
B+ 
(FROE, 
+, - 
re 
)B+ (FROEI+2 
- re 
) 
B, 
+2 (1 + re 
) (1 
+ re 
)2 (1 
+ re 
)2 
re 
B is the book value per share (Datastream Item 1308) calculated on an issued basis, 
using that portion of share capital and reserves (excluding preference capital) minus 
intangibles attributable to the issue, divided by the year-end number of shares in that 
issue. It is adjusted for subsequent rights and scrip issues. 
FROE is the future return on equity per share calculated as follows: 
FROE, = (B, 
FYI 
-1 
+ B, -2) 
2 
(The use of the average, rather than year-end, book value, as Frankel and Lee (1998) 
argue, reduces the chance of an extremely low denominator). 
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Where FYI is the earnings-per- share forecasts one-year-ahead derived from the 
I/B/E/S mean 23 (also called consensus) forecast24. 
B, 
-, and 
B, 
-2 are the book values at time t-I and t-2 respectively, defined as stated 
above, where book value at time t is calculated as follows: 
B, = B, -, 
[I+ FROE, (1 - K)]. 
K in the above equation is the dividend payout ratio. The dividend payout ratio is the 
percentage of net income paid out in the form of dividends each year. K is estimated 
by dividing the Dividends paid by Earnings (Earned for ordinary). Dividend paid 
(Datastream Item 434) is defined as the total amount of cash dividends listed for 
common shares. Dividend per share is defined as dividend per share declared during 
the fiscal year, including extra dividends declared during the year. 
Earned for ordinary (Datastream item 625) is defined as the net profit arrived at after 
deducting tax, minority interest and preference dividends, but before any post-tax as 
reported extraordinary items, allocations to reserves other than untaxed reserves and 
post tax disclosed extraordinary items. 
For firms with negative earnings, K was estimated by dividing the common stock 
dividends by six percent of total assets to derive an estimated payout ratio 25 - 
In estimating FROE, -,, and 
B, 
-,, all companies 
in the sample were required to have a 
two-year-ahead consensus forecast (FY2). Then FROE,,, and B,,, were computed 
analogously: 
FROE 
FY2 and 
(B, + BI-11 
2 
23 Using median rather than mean forecasts is unlikely to affect results because the distribution of 
forecasted growth is quite symmetric. 
24 We use analyst's forecast of ROE rather than the historic or actual ROE because the forecast ROE 
includeds analysts' earnings forecasts and evidently, analysts' earnings forecasts contain more value- 
relevant information then is reflected in historical simple residual income model. 
25 Six percent reflects the average long-run retum-on-assets (see appendix A); as in F&L this measure 
was used to proxy for normal earnings when reported earnings are negative. 
UniS 
B, [I + FROE, +, 
(I 
- K)] 
Estimating FROE, 
+2 and 
B, 
+2 where a long-term earnings growth estimate (LTG) is 
available, then 
FROEt+2 
and B, +2were computed as follows: 
FROEI+2 -- 
FY2(l + LTG) 
(B, 
-, + B, 
)--- 
2 
B, 
+2 ý B, +, 
[I+ FROEt+2 (1- K)] 
Where LTG is not available, FROE,,, was used to proxy for FROE, 
r, is the cost of equity. In theory, cost of equity should be firm specific, reflecting the 
premium demanded by equity investors to invest in a firm or project of comparable 
risk. In practice, however, there is little consensus on how this discount rate should 
be determined. For this study, the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM)26 will be 
used to estimate r, . The 
definitions of the variables are summarised below: 
2' There are other methods for calculating the cost of equity such as market model. However, there 
is 
little consensus on which one is better. Therefore, the question of which of these models is better is 
still an open one. 
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Table: 5.1 Definition of the Variables as in Data-stream 
Item Not. Description 
190 (DPS) Dividend per share. This item is used to determine the dividends pay out ratio 
and the related effect on the future book value. 
305 (TBV) Equity Capital and Reserves. This item is used in combination with number of 
shares (NOSH) to determine book value per share in the event that item 1308 is 
not available. 
392 (TA) Total Assets. 
625 (NI) Earned for Ordinary. This is the net profit arrived at after deducting tax, minority 
interest and preference dividends, but before any post-tax as reported 
extraordinary items, allocation to reserves other than untaxed reserves and post 
tax disclosed extraordinary items. 
1308 (B) Book value per share. Calculated on an issued basis, using that portion of share 
capital and reserves (excluding preference capital) minus intangibles attributable 
to the issue, divided by the year-end number of shares in that issue. It is adjusted 
for subsequent rights and scrip issues. 
NOSH NOSH Number of shares 
FIMN FIMN FYI. The earn ings-per-share forecasts one-year-ahead taken from I/B/E/S. 
(FYI) (FYI) 
F2MN F2MN FY2. The earnings-per-share forecasts two-year-ahead taken from I/B/E/S. 
(FY2) (FY2) 
LTM LTNIN Long-term growth (LTG). I/B/E/S consensus long-term earnings growth estimate 
N (LTG) 
(LTG) 
Beta Annual average of monthly betas provided by Datastream. Beta is calculated 
based on monthly observations extending over 5 years i. e. 60 months and for 
each of the proceeding 60 months return on security (RJ) is calculated for every 
security and regressed against market rates (Rm). 
Rf Rf Risk free rate. Government bond rates for both US and UK were used over the 
sample period for US and UK sample 
Rm Rm Market rates. The return for FTSE 500 and S&P 500 obtained from Datastream 
were used as a proxy for market return for UK and US sample respectively. 
Price (p) Market stock price. Calculated as an average of 8 weeks around year-end. 
Table 5.1: DataStream data items. 
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5.3 The Hypothesis and the Regression 
Based on the literature and the above discussion, the Residual Income valuation 
model (the F&L (1998) model) is expected to perform well against the market stock 
prices in our sample and therefore, it will be hypothesised: 
HO : There is no relation between the Residual Income valuation and stock 
market prices. 
H, : The defined Residual Income model can, to a significant degree, capture 
cross-sectional variation in market stock prices of the sample over a significant 
period of time. 
HO will be accepted if the results of the data analysis for both UK and US data 
lead to the conclusion that there is no relationship between Residual Income 
and the market stock prices. 
The model to be tested is: 
P =a +, gVit + uit It I 
Where P is the market stock price and V is the valuation using the RI model (the F&L 
model). The definitions of these variables are presented in the following section. 
Data are analysed using panel data as well as cro ss- sectionally. 'PC-Give' is used as 
statistical software. The results of the both panel and cross-sectional data for both UK 
and US markets are presented below. 
5.4.1 Panel Data Analysis 
The sample is initially analysed by grouping all data from FTSE 500 in UK market 
and all data from S&P 500 in US market separately. Then two separate regressions 
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for both UK and US data were carried out using the criteria presented in the following 
table: 
Table 5.2: Criteria Used in Analysing Panel Data 
Criteria Value Description 
Dependent Variable P Market Price 
Independent Variable V Value calculated using Residual Income see 
definitions of the variables on this chapter. 
Intercept Fixed The basic value (intercept) for each company 
depends on organisation-specific issues such as 
balance sheet size. As a result, the intercept is 
defined as fixed, whereby for each individual pool 
member the intercept is estimated. 
White heteroskedasticity Yes Controls covariance matrix on the error term for 
_Covariance 
hetero skedasti city. 
Table 5.3 shown below provides the statistical properties of the dependent and 
independent variables: 
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Table 5.3: UK and US Descriptive Statistics in "Pence" and in 
"Dollars" Respectively, IT" and 'IV" 
UK descriptive data US descriptive data 
P (Pence) V (Pence) P (S) v (s) 
_Mean 
292.0012 216.0230 27.87653 16.50428 
_Median 
238.9323 165.9100 24.98500 11.97354 
Maximum 1383.500 1785.11 126.5750 241.3767 
_Minim 
m 6.650000 1.789292 0.190000 0.3678 
Std. Dev. 1 214.4708 191.0904 17.96594 16.8 
P is the market stock price. V is the value per share calculated using the F&L (1998) RI model. 
Table5.4: Correlation Matrix between V and P 
UK Correlation Matrix US Correlation Matrix 
p I p 
v . 715* v- 
1 
. 519* -. Correlation is significant at 1% level (2-tailed). 
P is the market stock price. V is the value per share calculated using the F&L (1998) RI model. 
The results of the pooled data fixed effect cross section regression, using the above- 
described criteria for both UK and US, are shown in Table 5.5 below: 
ItS27 p Table 5.5: UK and US resu I= aj +)YVit + ui, 
UK Results US Results 
Coefficient 0.551697 0.489471 
Std. Error 0.05706 0.017357 
t-Statistic 9.67 28.20 
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.779622 0.766467 
ChiA2-Statistic 93.48 28.20034 
Prob (ChiA2-Statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 
The above table shows a high correlation between the market prices and the values 
estimated using the residual income model, with R-squared (goodness of fit) 77.16% 
and 76.46% for both UK and US respectively and significance level based on Chi^2- 
27 We use non-parametric test as well, specifically, we use Spearman's correlation as this test is used 
by 
Franke I and Lee ( 1998) in order to compare our results with their results. For more information please 
refer to appendix 5. A.. We also used random effect models and the results are comparable. 
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statistic of 99% for both UK and US respectively. This implies that, for the UK 
market, more than 77% of the cross sectional variation in stock prices can be 
explained by the value calculated using the residual income model. For the US 
market, it means that more than 76% of the cross sectional variation in stock prices 
can be explained by the value calculated using the residual income model. The above 
results are in line with F&L (1998), who find that the model explains more than 70% 
of the cross-sectional variation in stock prices 28 . 
As a consequence, the above results of panel data analysis are statistically significant 
enough to reject the null hypothesis, which states that there is no relationship between 
residual income (F&L, 1998 version) and the stock market prices. This leads to 
accept the alternative hypothesis, which states that the residual income model (F&L, 
1998, version) can to a significant degree, capture cross-sectional differences in stock 
market performance of companies used in this sample and over a significant period of 
time. In addition, the results also reveal that there is no significant difference in this 
respect between the UK and the US markets 29 
5.4.2 Pooling the Data Cross-Sectionally 
In this section, the data will be analysed cro ss- sectionally only. This will enable us to 
look at the behaviour of the model year by year, as the same sample size will be used 
in all different years. The results on a year-to-year basis, using the Least Squares 
Method, for both UK and US data are presenting in the following tables: 
28 We also transform the original data logarithmically and the results are almost the same. For more 
information, please refer to table 5.6 in appendix 5. B. 
29 We also compared the F&L model with a na*fve book value model i. e. how much of the variation 
in 
market stock price does book value explain. The results are very similar to the F&L results and are 
presented in appendix 5. C. 
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Table 5.7: Cross Sectional Results 
Cross-sectional analysis for UK data Cross-sectional analysis for US data 
Year Observation R2 Year Observation R2 
1991 132 0.622301 1991 185 0.509813 
1992 132 0.577217 1992 185 0.420980 
1993 132 0.551555 1993 185 0.500816 
1994 132 0.713151 1994 185 0.386706 
1995 132 0.758446 1995 185 0.437766 
1996 132 0.686234 1996 185 0.545072 
1997 132 0.653593 1997 185 0.686413 
1998 132 0.544850 1998 185 0.646051 
1999 132 0.558608 1999 185 0.630983 
2000 132 0.402171 2000 185 0.313806 
2001 132 0.571652 2001 185 0.135261 
2002 132 0.581902 2002 185 0.276742 
It is clear that R-squared is higher for panel data than for cross-sectional data. The 
reason is because panel data captures both time-series and cross-sectional influences 
which the cross-sectional analysis is unable. On the other hand, although the value of 
R-squared differs between the years, these differences, except for the last two years in 
US data, are not very significant and can largely be explained by market dynamics 
and overreaction to shocks in these particular years. The results are controlled for 
heteroscedasticity using the White Consistent Coefficient Covariance. On the other 
hand, unlike panel data, cross-sectional results have revealed some differences 
between the UK and US markets. Therefore, in order to examine the differences in R- 
squared between UK and US in the above table, the model will be tested for each 
industry i. e. a regression will be carried out for each portfolio in both the UK and US 
samples. 
Table 5.8 below provides R-Squared for each portfolio for UK companies, with PI 
standing for Chemical Industry, P2 Engineering, P3 Food and Hotel, P4 Media, P5 
Retail, P6 Transportation, P8 Electronic, P9 Services, and P 10 construction industry. 
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Note that the number of companies in P7, Utility industry, is only 5 and therefore this 
industry has been excluded. 
Table: 5.8 Cross-Sectional Results R-squared for UK Portfolio. 
Pi P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P8 P9 Plo 
1991 0.66 0.92 0.82 0.95 0.82 0.60 0.69 0.74 0.52 
1992 0.63 0.26 0.86 0.91 0.76 0.58 0.64 0.88 0.73 
1993 0.41 0.11 0.71 0.64 0.82 0.77 0.68 0.80 0.68 
1994 0.91 0.27 0.64 0.77 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.91 0.78 
1995 0.93 0.76 0.86 0.39 0.89 0.51 0.84 0.86 0.84 
1996 0.90 0.72 0.78 0.56 0.83 0.68 0.82 0.70 0.92 
1997 0.81 0.63 0.76 0.33 0.86 0.63 0.84 0.54 0.92 
1998 0.82 0.50 0.52 0.28 0.88 0.49 0.57 0.53 0.91 
1999 0.60 0.41 0.76 0.82 0.72 0.38 0.53 0.34 0.85 
2000 0.63 0.51 0.55 0.34 0.87 0.78 0.26 0.44 0.73 
2001 0.42 0.61 0.62 0.51 0.81 0.71 0.46 0.12 0.60 
2002 0.97 0.83 0.72 0.43 0.86 0.78 0.81 0.30 0.71 
The above results are controlled for heteroskedasticity using the White Consistent Coefficient Covariance. 
Table 5.9 below provides R-Squared for each portfolio for US companies, with P1 
standing for Chemical Industry, P2 Engineering, P3 Food and Hotel, P4 Media, P5 
Retail, P6 Transportation, P7 Utility, P8 Computer, P9 Miscellaneous, and PIO 
Telecom Equipment and PII for Pharmaceutical industry. 
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Table: 5.9 Cross-Sectional Results R-squared for US Portfolio. 
Pi P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 - P7 P8 P9 
1991 
1992 
1993 
0.37 
0.52 
0.69 
0.58 
0.45 
0.38 
0.95 
0.93 
0.82 
0.93 
0.95 
0.97 
0.50 
0.55 
0.54 
0.59 
0.66 
0.66 
0.49 
0.42 
0.57 
0.96 
0.50 
0.71 
0.57 
0.54 
0.72 
1994 
1995 
0.80 
0.56 
0.15 
0.30 
0.81 
0.86 
0.99 
0.96 
0.56 
0.83 
0.63 
0.53 
0.45 
0.36 
0.79 
0.62 
0.85 
0.86 
1996 0.51 0.29 0.61 0.99 0.88 0.62 0.23 0.87 0.73 
1997 0.66 0.06 0.62 0.99 0.65 0.97 0.48 0.87 0.91 
1998 0.37 0.26 0.31 0.95 0.14 0.64 0.42 0.84 0.68 
1999 0.44 0.37 0.12 0.92 0.21 0.44 0.06 0.31 0.79 
2000 0.33 0.12 0.34 0.89 0.70 0.60 0.14 0.68 0.79 
2001 0.62 0.27 0.40 0.96 0.28 0.86 0.05 0.73 0.74 
2002 0.50 0.08 0.40 0.98 0.43 0.89 0.07 0.77 0.85 
I he above results are controlled for heteroskedasticity using the White Consistent Coefficient Covariance. 
Examining the above two tables, P5 (UK retail industry) data has the highest 
significance with average R-squared equal to 0.83. The utility industry in UK data 
was excluded since it cannot be taken into consideration, as the number of companies 
in the portfolio was very small (5 companies only). The total average R-squared for 
UK portfolio for 12 years is equal to 0.64. On the other hand, P4 i. e. Media industry 
is the highest significant industry in the US data with average R-squared equal to 0.96. 
PII (Pharmaceutical industry) together with P 10 were excluded (added later to 
miscellaneous) as the number of companies in these portfolios were also very small. 
The total average R-squared for US portfolio for 12 years is equal to 0.60. 
It can be concluded that the residual income model performs very well in explaining 
the variation in market stock prices for all UK portfolios except for Utility where 
there were insufficient observations in order to make a decision. The main weakness 
of the residual income model for the US portfolio was in the Pharmaceutical industry 
(later added to miscellaneous). The reason why the residual income model performs 
poorly in the Pharmaceutical industry might be that the number of observations is 
very small. In addition, such companies usually invest heavily in R&D, which is 
classified as an intangible asset, and it could be difficult for those intangibles to be 
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valued by the market. In addition, many take-overs in the Pharmaceutical industry 
have taken place in the past few years. 
5.4.3 Conclusions from Both Panel and Cross-Sectional Data 
The results of both panel and cross-sectional data analysis are statistically significant, 
yet the UK data set provides more significant results than US in cross-sectional results. 
This could be due to the fact that the residual income model performs poorly for the 
pharmaceutical industry in the US sample, while there was no pharmaceutical 
industry in UK portfolios. From the US portfolios' results after the pharmaceutical 
industry was removed R-squared gets approximates to the UK figure. Moreover, 
these differences also could be due to the characteristics of each UK and US market. 
For instance the Utility industry represents a very high proportion in US data (41 
companies) while there were only 5 companies in the UK data set. In addition, cross- 
sectional data analysis has shown that R-squared for US data set has dropped to a low 
figure of 0.135261 (table 5.7) in year 2001. This might be attributed to the accidents 
that happened in US on II September 2001 when most of the stock prices went down. 
In general, the above results from both panel and cross sectional data analysis are 
statistically significant and therefore the null hypothesis, which states that there is no 
relation between residual income and the stock market prices, is rejected. This will 
lead us to accept the alternative hypothesis that states that the residual income model 
can, to a significant level; explain the cross sectional variation in stock prices of the 
sample firms and over a significant period of time. 
5.5 Determination of Performance 
Iii the previous section, the test results of panel data and cross-sectional analysis show 
that the majority of the cross-sectional variations in the levels of stock market prices 
of both UK and US firms can be explained by the value calculated using the Residual 
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Income model specified in Equation (1). However, despite the fact that the RI model 
can be employed for performance measurement, it is still a measure of value creation 
over the time interval concerned (12-years) and as stated previously, the model 
estimates the value of equity at a particular point in time, but does not directly 
indicate the value created during a certain period. For this reason, this model can be 
operationalised as a performance measure in two wayS30: 
From an accounting point of view, the first difference in Equation (1) page 
I 10, namely the first difference between Vt and Vt -1 
divided by (Vt ) and 
adjusted for dividends, represents firm performance. Therefore, the 
determination of firms performance using Equation (1) will lead to the 
following Equation (2): 
Peformancet = Vt - V, j + Dividendt (2) 
The reason we add back the dividend is that it is part of the value created during the 
period; it is a component of performance that is not included in Vt. 
* The value of equity at a particular point in time (Vt) is largely dependent on 
the value of equity in the previous period (Vt-j). The actual value created in a 
certain period of time consists of earnings (including dividend) over and above 
the cost of capital employed, which is the Residual Income Component (RIC) 
of the Residual income model as defined in Equation (1) page 110 and is 
represented in Equation (3): 
Performance(,,, 
+, ) - 
FROE, -B 
(I + r,, ) 
(FROE,,, 
-r')B 
(I 
+ re 
)2 (3) 
The RIC from the accounting point of view represents a performance measure. The 
concern of this study is performance rather than valuation and it can be argued that the 
performance measure can manifest itself in the residual income component rather than 
in book value and continuing value. These are important in valuing companies and 
30 As explained in Chapter four, although the simple residual income, which will also be tested and 
compared with the above two performance measures in appendix 5.13, can be used as a performance 
measure. However, the above two performance measures (Equation 3 and 4) are expected to 
outperform the simple residual income as they include analysts' earnings forecasts; evidently, analysts' 
earnings forecasts contain more value-relevant information than is reflected in simple historical 
residual income model. 
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not in calculating their performance. Furthermore5 
assets per share to account for firm size. 
we scaled Equation 3 by total 
Accordingly, two regression analyses will be carried out to test for Equation (2) and 
Equation (3) in the next section. The results from both regressions will be compared 
in order to identify the performance measurement that will be used in the next chapter. 
5.5.1 The Hypotheses and the Regressions 
If the RIC model presented in Equation (3) scaled by total assets per share is validated, 
then it will be used instead of the full one presented in Equation (2) to measure the 
performance as a dependent variable in next section. Accordingly, the following will 
be hypothesised: 
H 02 : There is no relation between first difference of the Residual Income 
valuation (F&L model) and the performance of the stock market prices (first 
difference) corrected for dividends. 
H 12 : The first difference of the defined Residual Income model can, to a 
significant degree, capture the first difference of the cross sectional variation 
in market stock prices of the sample over a significant period of time. 
H03 : There is no relation between the Residual Income Components (the 
modified R&L model) and the performance of the stock market prices (first 
difference) corrected for dividends. 
H13 : The defined Residual Income Components can, to a significant degree, 
capture cross-sectional differences in the performance of the market stock 
prices of the sample over a significant period of time. 
The above two hypotheses will be tested and compared in order to choose a 
performance measure from one of them. These two hypotheses will be tested using 
the two following models respectively: 
AP, =a, + 8C Vit +u it 
UniS 
123 
AP =a. +, 8RIC +u (3.1) it I it it 
Equation (2.1) is to test H2, which is based on Equation (2) while Equation (3.1) is to 
test H3, which is based on Equation (3). In Equation (2.1), AP is the market stock 
prices performance calculated as the first difference i. e. A P, = P, - P, -, + 
D, where Dt 
is the dividend at time t. CV is the performance measure calculated based on first 
difference of the RI i. e. CV, = CV, - CV, -, + 
D,. Both CV and Pt were divided by the 
base year to account for size and percentage; D is included in both equations for 
reasons explained above. However, in Equation (3.1), AP is the same as in Equation 
(3.1); however, it is for two periods of time i. e. P,, P, -,, and 
RIC is the residual Income 
component as represented in Equation (4) and scaled by total assets per share. All the 
above variables are defined as before. 
5.5.2 Results 
Table 5.10: Descriptive Statistics for Performance Measures 
UK us 
AP/ Pence RIC / Pence AP/$ RIC $ 
Mean 52.45 6.17 6.11 0.071 
Median 43.7 4.31 5.19 0.029 
Maximum 1266.67 169.46 230.47 1.66 
Minimum -865.7 -80.15 -60.05 -0.90 
Std. Dev. 148.45 14.64 14.09 0.16 
The above table reveals that the mean of the performance measured by the RIC in 
both the US and the UK markets is very close. The standard deviation is very close as 
well. On the other hand, the above table reveals that P in the US market is higher than 
the one in the UK market. The criteria in Table 5.2 used in the previous results will 
be reused here. The results of the panel data fixed effect cross section regression from 
Equation (2.1) for both UK and US are shown in the tables below: 
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Table 5.11: Results from Equation (2.1) First Difference: 
A. P., = ai +)6CV (2.1) 1 it + Uit 
UK Results US Results 
Coefficient 0.29 0.24 
Std. Error 0.014 0.011 
t-Statistic 20.61 21.13 
_ Prob. 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.22 0.26 
T-Statistic 2.98 3.75 
Prob (T Statistic) 0.000 0.000 
The results of the panel data fixed effect cross section regression from Equation (3.1) 
for both UK and US are shown in the tables below: 
Table 5.12: Results from Equation (3.1) RIC: 
AP =a. + 8RICit +u it It I 
UK Results US Results 
Coefficient 0.54 0.51 
Std. Error 0.103 0.097 
t-Statistic 5.26 5.19 
Prob. 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.22 0.29 
T-Statistic 3.01 4.06 
Prob (T-Statistic 0.000 0.000 
Table 5.11 shows the correlation between the market stock prices performance and the 
performance estimated using Equation 2.1. R-squared (goodness of fit) is 22% and 
26% for both the UK and US markets respectively. These results are also significant 
at T-statistic of 99% significance level for both UK and US respectively. This implies 
that, for the UK market, more than 22% of the cross sectional variation in stock prices 
performance can be explained by the performance calculated using the RI first 
difference. For the US market, it means that more than 26% of the cross sectional 
variation in stock price performance can be explained by the performance 
measurement calculated using the RI first difference. These results lead us to reject 
the null hypothesis and to accept the alternative. 
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On the other hand, Table 5.12 shows also a correlation between the market stock price 
performance and the performance estimated using Equation (3.1). R-squared 
(goodness of fit) is 22% and 29% for both the UK and US markets respectively. 
These results are also significant at T-statistic of 99% significance level for both UK 
and US respectively. This implies that, for the UK market, more than 22% of the 
cross sectional variation in stock prices performance can be explained by the 
performance calculated using the RIC in Equation (3.1). For the US market, it means 
that more than 29% of the cross sectional variation in stock price performance can be 
explained by the performance calculated using the RIC in Equation (4) scaled by total 
assets per share. These results lead us to reject the null hypothesis and to accept the 
altemative. 
Although the above results are statistically significant, allowing us to conclude that 
the majority of the changes in the market stock prices can be explained by either 
Equation 2.1 or 3.1. However, the results also reveal significant differences between 
the full RI valuation model (Equation (2)) and the two-year performance model i. e. 
Equation 2.1 and 3.1. This can be attributed to the fact that the full model explains 
the cross sectional variation of the levels in stock prices rather than the first 
differences; this does not mean that either the RIC or the first difference model can 
explain the cross sectional variation of the levels in stock prices the same as the full 
RI valuation model does. 
5.5.3 Comparison between the two Performance Mode, S31 
Table 5.13: Comparison between the Two Performance Models 
Equation 2.1 based on the Equation 3.1 based on the 
Residual Income first Residual Income Component 
difference Model 
UK Results US Results UK Results US Results 
R-squared 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.29 
F-Statistic 2.98 3.75 3.01 4.59 
Prob (F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
31 We also test for the simple residual income model in appendix 5. D. However, as expected, the above 
two performance measures reveal better and significant results. 
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The above table reveals that both models are statistically significant and they lead us 
to reject the null hypothesis. In addition, R2 from both models are very close. This 
means that both the RIC and the first difference models can be used in explaining 
performance measure for the US and the UK markets. 
5.6 Conclusions 
The first purpose of this chapter was to test the hypothesis that states that the defined 
Residual Income model can, to a significant degree, capture cross-sectional variation 
in stock market price of the sample over a significant period of time. The results from 
both panel and cross-sectional data support the above stated hypothesis. This leads to 
the conclusion that the residual income model represented in Equation (1) captures 
cross-sectional variation in stock market prices and therefore, it can be used to 
determine firm performance in the next chapter. However, as stated previously in this 
chapter, Equation (1) measures equity value and not firm performance. Therefore, 
two ways were proposed in order to determine firm performance. The first is 
represented in Equation (2.1). From an accounting point of view, the first difference 
in Equation (1) namely first difference between Vt and Vt_j (adding back dividend at 
time t) represents firm performance. The second is represented in Equation (3.1) and 
it is based on the argument that the actual value created in a certain period of time 
consists of earnings (including dividend) over and above the cost of capital employed, 
which is the Residual Income Component (RIC) of the Residual income model as 
defined in Equation (1). Furthermore, these two performance models i. e. Equation (3) 
and Equation (4) were empirically tested and compared. The results revealed that the 
RIC model represented in Equation (3.1) is very close the first difference in equation 
(2.1) in capturing stock price returns performance. This leads to the conclusion that 
either Equation (2.1) or Equation (3.1) can be used as a performance measure in the 
next chapter to test the relationship between firm performance, gearing and over- 
investment problem. 
UniS 
127 
4 Chapter Six 
The Relation between Over-investment, Gearing and Firm 
Performance 
6.1 Introduction 
Modigliani and Miller (195 8) demonstrated that in a world of perfect capital markets, 
investment, financing and dividend decisions are independent. However, during the 
last decades, the empirical evidence has shown that these decisions are in practice 
interdependent. Accordingly, some theories that explain this evidence have been 
developed. These theories are based on capital-market imperfections; in particular, 
with respect to investment decisions, the existence of asymmetric information 
between the main stakeholders is the foremost imperfection. 
The role of the asymmetry of information in investment decisions has its primary 
basis in the theoretical work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and Myers 
and Majluf (1984). The first two papers emphasise the consequences of the existence 
of post-contract asymmetric information between shareholders and bondholders, 
while the paper of Myers and Majluf (1984) emphasises the role of the pre-contract 
asymmetric information between current and prospective shareholders. All the above- 
mentioned papers show that information asymmetries may lead to some profitable 
investment projects not being undertaken. 
A second foundation in the study of inefficient investment decisions is the work of 
Jensen (1986). His work, starting from the hypothesis of the existence of asymmetric 
information between mangers and shareholders, introduces the so-called problem of 
over-investment as a basic argument of his free cash flow theory. According to this 
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theory, there can be negative NPV investment projects that end up being undertaken, 
which is known as the over-investment problem, and will be tested empirically in this 
chapter. More precisely, we test whether a certain level of gearing can, to a certain 
degree, mitigate the over-investment problem and thus increase firm performance. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section two summarises the 
existing literature, while section three develops the hypotheses tested in this chapter. 
Section four illustrates the model that will be used in this study to capture the over- 
investment problem, followed by the definition of the variables in section five. 
Section six presents descriptive statistics and discusses the regression results. The 
testing of the hypotheses will be carried out through a three-stage process. In the first 
stage, the effect of gearing on over-investment will be tested, using a logit model 
since the dependent variable is dichotomous. In this stage, the results of using book 
value of gearing, market value of gearing, industry-adjusted gearing and classification 
of gearing (high, middle and low gearing) will be presented as well as the results from 
both linear and non-linear logit models, followed by a conclusion on the relationship 
between gearing and investment decisions. The second stage will test the relationship 
between over-investment and performance. The third stage will test at the 
relationship between over-investment, gearing and performance. The final stage links 
the two previous stages together and draws conclusions from the three stage results. 
Section seven summarises the main findings of this chapter and their implications. 
6.2 The Relationship between Firm Performance, Debt and Over- 
investment 
Agency theory argues that an appropriate ownership structure is a key factor in 
motivating managers' investment decisions consistent with shareholder objectives 
32 
. 
While the above control variable addresses the role played by the firm's ownership 
32 Initially ownership structure was to be included in this study; however, we were unable to get such 
information as Datastream does not provide ownership information, so it was decided to omit this 
variable. 
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structure in aligning the incentives of managers and shareholders, it does not consider 
the role of management's discretion in investment decisions. Agency theory contends 
that a firm's investment decisions are also influenced by the size of the internally 
available funds. According to the theory, given abundant resources for investment 
activity managers have an incentive to grow the firm beyond its optimal size. 
Managers derive benefits from investment (the larger the organisation, the greater the 
economic and political power of the top management team), so that their utility is 
increasing with the level of investment. Managers are empire-builders and continue 
to choose investment projects even after all positive net present value projects have 
been taken up. 
The idea that a firm might systematically over-invest originated with Jensen (1986), 
who argues that shareholders must find a mechanism to induce managers to disgorge 
excess cash flow 33 rather than to over-invest. Jensen (1986) gives the following 
example from the oil industry in 1970s. Given increases in oil prices and slow 
industry growth, managers used internal funds to diversify outside the industry in 
some of the worst performing acquisitions of the 1970s. By contrast, firms with 
smaller available cash flows are less likely to engage in value-destroying venture 
activity due to the scrutiny of external financial markets (Jensen 1986). Moreover, as 
observed by Agency Theory, ownership and control have become separated in large 
corporations because of the dilution in equity positions. This situation has provided 
an opportunity for professional managers, as those in control, to act in their own 
interests. The central issue for agency theory is how to resolve the conflict between 
owners and managers over the control of corporate resources (Jensen, 1986) by using 
contracts that seek to allocate decision rights and incentives. 
Managers have a number of incentives to pursue growth-oriented strategic options. 
The larger the organisation, the greater the economic and political power of the top 
management team, and the greater the ability of the organisation to marshal the 
resources necessary to deal effectively with its competitive and social environment 
(Morck et al, 1989). As a generalisation, it can be said that growth 
from investment 
does lead to increases in the shareholders' wealth. However, the concern is that too 
many of the activities associated with that growth in investment and 
hence with 
33 Excess Cash Flow, as this term is used by Jensen (1986), is the cash flow that remains after all 
positive NPV projects are undertaken. 
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increasing the size of organisations is motivated not by a desire for maximising 
shareholders' wealth, but by opportunities for the self-aggrandisement of management 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The problem, according to Jensen (1986), is how to 
control managers contractually so that they will return profits or excess cash flow to 
investors rather than invest funds in projects with returns below the cost of capital. 
The contractual device suggested by Agency Theory to accomplish the transfer of 
wealth from the organisation to the investors is debt creation (Jensen, 1986). Debt 
provides a means of bonding managers' promises to pay out future cash flows rather 
than investing in wealth-destroying ventures. It also provides the means for 
controlling opportunistic behaviour by reducing the cash flow available for 
discretionary spending. Top managers' attention is then clearly focussed on those 
activities necessary to ensure that debt payments are made. Companies failing to 
make interest and principal payments can be declared insolvent. This use of debt as a 
disciplinary tool makes survival the central issue for all concerned. 
The over-investment idea has gained much support in the literature. For instance, 
Jong and Veld (2001) find that Dutch managers avoid using debt (they want to avoid 
the disciplining role of debt) because debt disciplines managers and prevents them 
from over-investing. However, the market reaction shows that this over-investment 
behaviour is recognised as they found a negative relationship between firms with FCF 
(defined as operating income minus taxes, interest an dividends, divided by the 
market value of equity) and low growth opportunities (measured by Tobin's Q) and 
stock market returns, and the authors interpret this as evidence of over-investment. 
Moreover, the relation between firm performance and managerial ownership has been 
used in previous work to support the over-investment theory. Morck et al (1988) 
estimate a piecewise linear relation between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. They find that firm performance is increasing in managerial ownership- 
for-ownership levels below 5 percent or over 25 percent but decreasing in ownership- 
for-ownership levels between 5 and 25 percent of the firm. They interpret their results 
as evidence that managers make investment decisions that entrench them in their 
positions for ownership in this range; entrenchment reduces firm performance. Many 
subsequent papers (McConnell and Servaes (1990), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 
(1999) and Palia (2001)) have conducted similar analyses with mixed results. Other 
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support for the over-investment theory comes from Jensen (1993), who provides 
illustrative calculations of the destruction of shareholders' value in a number of the 
world's largest corporations. 
However, recent papers by Aggarwal & Samwick (2003) and Hadlock (1998) have 
concluded with differing results. For instance, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) 
estimate a non-linear regression between investment, firm performance and 
managerial incentives (measured as pay-performance sensitivities and representing 
incentives provided by direct ownership of stock and stock options for each top 
management team). They find that firm performance is increasing in incentives for all 
levels of incentives. Investment is also increasing in incentives. These two results 
jointly imply that agency problems do not necessarily lead firms to over-invest. More 
exactly, incentives increase both performance and investment. Accordingly, the 
argument of Jensen that firms with FCF over-invest will be tested in this chapter. The 
main hypothesis to be tested is: debt can, to a certain degree, mitigate the over- 
investment problem, and this should be related to betterfirm performance. 
6.3 Developing the Model 
Jensen (1986) explains that firms may engage in projects with negative net present 
values (NPV), because managers aim for firm growth. Increasing firm growth, as 
explained before, is not motivated by a desire for maximising shareholders' wealth 
only, but by opportunities for self-aggrandisement of management. He points out that 
the reaction to a securities issue depends on the expected purpose of raising the capital 
and the type of security that is issued. As managers have an incentive to increase the 
size of the firm, even with negative NPV projects, the firm's performance 
is 
determined by the value created through positive NPV investments. Over-investment 
(i. e. investment in negative NPV projects) cannot be directly observed. 
Previous 
studies have used free cash flow together with low growth opportunities measured 
by 
Tobin's Q as a proxy for the over-investment problem. Furthermore, previous studies 
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assumed that a company that has free cash flow together with low growth 
opportunities suffers from an over-investment problem 34 . 
Although having FCF together with low growth opportunities could lead to over- 
investment this does not necessarily mean that a company has an over-investment 
problem. In addition, according to Myers and MaJluf (1984) the firm could face 
asymmetric information in which investors are less informed about the value of the 
firm than insiders. In this case, equity may be mis-priced. If the firm has a project 
with a positive NPV available, the under-pricing of the equity may be greater than the 
value of the project, and it will be passed over. This problem (usually called the 
under-investment problem) can be overcome by using a less risky form of financing 
i. e. internal funds. For this reason, firms prefer maintaining financial slack 35 in order 
to have internal funds available for valuable projects. 
In this study, we introduce a simple way to proxy for the over-investment problem. 
Logically, firms with low growth opportunities should not invest heavily; if they do, 
they might over-invest. Tobin's Q will be used to capture growth opportunities and 
industry average investment expenditure will be used to capture the expected 
investment level. Companies with low growth opportunities should not invest above 
their industry average. In other words, companies may be in a state of over- 
investment if they have low growth opportunities and are at the same time investing 
above their industry average. Therefore, the combination of a low Tobin's Q with 
capital expenditure (scaled by total assets) in excess of the industry average will be 
used as a proxy to capture the existence of over-investment. For example, if 
companies have capital expenditure in excess of the industry average together with 
low growth opportunities as measured by Tobin's Q, this indicates that companies 
belonging to this category are experiencing over-investment. 
Accordingly, if firms issue debt, and the effect of it is to discipline the over- 
investment behaviour, a positive relationship will be expected between the firm's 
3' Despite the difficulties in finding good proxies for FCF, this method has been employed by many 
researchers such as Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), Lang, et al (1996), Lamont (1997), Chen and 
Ho (1997), Chakraborty, Kazarosian and Trahan (1999), Jong and Veld (200 1), Miguel and Pindado 
(2001) and Del Brio. 
35 The difference between financial slack and free cash flow is important. Financial slack is cash, 
liquid assets and unused borrowing power (Myers and MaJluf, 1984). Free cash flow is the cash that 
remains after all positive NPV projects are undertaken. 
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performance and level of debt, as the latter is expected to mitigate the over-investment 
problem. Debt is valuable for firms with low growth opportunities (as measured by 
Tobin's Q), and also capital expenditure in excess of the industry average, because it 
commits managers to pay out cash in the future, thereby reducing the free cash flow at 
their disposal for empire-building investments. 
6.4 Definition of the Variables 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable (dummy variable DI) and is 
designed to capture the over-investment problem, i. e. (DI) =1 if Tobin's Q is below I 
and capital expenditure (scaled by total assets) is above industry average and Dj=O 
otherwise. For companies with Tobin's Q below I the market considers that they 
have no growth opportunities and therefore one would not expect their investment to 
exceed the industry average. As a consequence, the over-investment problem can be 
captured in companies with Tobin's Q below I i. e. low growth opportunities, and at 
the same time a level of capital expenditure is above the industry average. 
Tobin's Q: This is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the 
replacement cost of its assets (e. g. Lindenberg and Ross, 198 1; Lang and Stulz, 1994). 
This measure of Q is likely to capture growth opportunities. If Q is greater than one, 
the inference is that the market values current the firm's assets (including intangibles) 
more highly than it would in their next best alternative use, their replacement cost. 
There are a number of methods used in the previous literature to capture Tobin's Q. 
Perfect and Wiles (1994) argue that the Lindenberg and Ross method for estimating Q 
values is difficult to use because it relies upon companies' reporting replacement cost 
estimates which are not available all the time. On the other hand, Chung and Pruit 
(1994) and Perfect and Wiles (1994) summarise and compare these measures. Chung 
and Pruit (1994) define an approximate Q by assuming that the book value of assets is 
equal to their replacement cost and find that this simple measure is highly correlated 
with Lindenberg and Ross' more theoretically correct model. In this study, 
replacement costs for most of the companies in our sample are not available and 
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therefore we will assume that the book value of assets is equal to their replacement 
cost. Accordingly, Tobin's Q equals: 
B VTA + MVE -B VE 
B VTA 
BVTA (the book value of total assets, Datastrearn item 392) is the sum of Cash and 
due from banks, total investments, net loans, customer liability on acceptance, 
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, real estate assets, net property, plant and 
equipment and other assets. 
MVE (market value of equity, Data-stream item MV)) is the share prices multiplied 
by the number of ordinary shares in issue. The amount in issue is updated whenever 
new tranches of stock are issued or after a capital change. In order to avoid the effect 
of financial statement publication on the stock price formation, the average stock price 
of four weeks prior and 4 weeks after the balance sheet date was used to calculate 
market value of equity. 
BV (book value of equity, Data-stream item 305) is the equity share capital and 
reserves of the company i. e. ordinary share capital, other equity capital, share 
premium account and reserves. 
Capital Expenditure: (Payments-fixed assets, Data-stream item: 1024). The 
amount specified by the company under capital expenditure. It is cash paid for 
tangible fixed-assets (expenditure on machinery, equipment, plant, vehicles and 
buildings) during the year including payments deferred from previous. 
Capital Expenditure, Industry averages: based on the panel median of US and 
UK data respectively. We also calculated the industry average based on the means 
and the results are comparable. Capital expenditure industry average is also 
calculated based on portfolios. We calculated the mean and median of each industry 
in our sample and compared each company's capital expenditure to 
its industries' 
mean and median, and the results are almost the same. 
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Capital Gearing36: it should be noted that there is contradictory evidence about the 
use of the market value of equity or book value of equity. Some of the previous 
studies have used the book value of equity, arguing that although the theory of capital 
structure suggests that debt ratios should be measured in market value terms 
management prefers to use the book value. Myers (1977) argues that market values 
incorporate the present values of future growth opportunities. Debt issued against 
these values can distort ftiture real investment decisions. Accordingly, in this study 
capital gearing will be measured using two ratios: the book value of gearing and the 
market value of gearing defined as follows: 
Book value of Capital Gearing (BG): is the ratio of total debt plus preference 
share capital to total assets, where: Total debt is the total of all long and short-term 
borrowings (Data-stream, item: 1301). Preference share capital is the capital, which 
has a fixed dividend and does not participate further in the company's profits (Data- 
stream, item: 306). Total Assets is the book value of total assets and is defined above 
(Data-stream, item: 392). 
, 37: Market value of Capital Gearing () MQ this is the ratio of total debt plus 
preference share capital to total debt plus preference share capital plus the market 
value of the common stock, where market value of equity capital share is defined as 
the number of shares outstanding (data-stream, item: NS), multiplied by the stock 
prices (data-stream, item: P) at the balance sheet date. In order to avoid the effect of 
financial statement publication on the stock price formation, the average stock price of 
four weeks prior and 4 weeks after to the balance sheet date was used to calculate 
market value of equity. 
Firm Performance: firm performance will be measured by the residual income 
model component as represented in Equation (3.1) scaled by total assets per share 
(tested in Chapter 5). 
36 We have also used book and market values of debt in calculating the debt-to- equity ratio 
37 One could argue that this ratio is the proportion of debt in the capital structure, rather than the debt- 
to-value ration. For this reason, we have also used the ratio of total debt plus preference share capital 
to total assets plus the difference between market value of common stock and book value of common 
equity. For more information about the results, refer to appendix 6.13. 
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Control Variables: three control variables are used: the natural logarithm of total 
sales (LnTS), the dividend payout ratio (DPU) and the stock price volatility. Total 
sales controls for firm size, and a positive and significant coefficient for size is 
suggestive of managers pursuing size and growth strategies that are not necessarily in 
the principal's best interest. DPU is quite relevant to over-investment issues; if 
companies have high dividends it signals one of two things: either they have abundant 
current cash balances and expect future cash flows or future investment opportunities 
are not extant. DPU is equal to dividends paid divided by profits after interest and 
taxes but before dividends. High stock price volatility necessitates careful evaluation 
of a firm's investment decisions. The reason for including this control variable is that 
stock price volatility encourages managers to reduce gearing in order to over-gearing. 
Stock Price volatility is a measure of a stock's average annual price movement to a 
high and low from a mean price for each year. 
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Table: 6.1 Definition of the Data-stream Variables 
item Not. Description 
392 BVTA BVTA. The book value of total assets. This item is used to calculate 
Tobin's Q as well as to determine capital gearing. 
305 BVE Equity Capital and Reserves. This item is used in combination with 
BVTA to determine Tobin's Q. 
MV MV Market value of equity. Is used together with 392 and 305 to 
determine Tobin's Q. 
1024 CE Payment Fixed Assets. This item is used to calculate capital 
expenditure. 
1301 TD Total debt including long and short-term debt 
306 PC Preference capital. This item is added to item 1301 to determine 
corn any's overall debt. 
NS NS The number of shares used in the calculation of market value of equity. 
P P Is the market stock price used in combination with NS to calculate the 
market value of equity 
Ln(l 04) Ln(TS) Natural logarithm of total sales. This item is used as a control variable 
for firm's size. 
DPU DPU Dividend Payout Ratio is the ratio of dividends paid to the profit after 
interests and taxes but before dividends. This item is used as a control 
variable. 
MG MG Market value of gearing calculated as TD (1301) + PC (306) to TD 
1) + PC (306) + MV. 
BG BG Book value of gearing calculated as TD (1301) + PC (306) to BVTA 
TQ TQ Tobin's Q is the BVTA (392) + MV + BVE (305) to BVTA (392) 
E002 Vol. Stock Price volatility is a measure of a stock's average annual 
movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. 
item is used as a control variable. 
Source: Data-stream data items. 
6.5 The Hypotheses 
In this chapter, testing for firm performance, debt and over-investment will be carried 
out through several steps. Firstly, theoretically, debt can mitigate the over-investment 
problem to a certain degree, and the following will therefore be hypothesised: 
UniS 
138 
HO: There is no relationship between gearing and over-investment 
HI. - There is a negative relationship between gearing and over-investment 
The above hypothesis will be tested using a discrete choice model since the dependent 
variable in this case is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of I if there is over- 
investment and 0 otherwise. HO will be accepted when the results of the data analysis 
lead to the conclusion that there is no relation between debt and over-investment. It 
should be noted that even if the null hypothesis is rejected, and a negative relationship 
between gearing and over-investment has been found, this should not be considered as 
enough evidence to support the over-investment argument. Over-investment should 
be linked to performance at the end to make the final conclusion. Accordingly, 
testing the second and the third hypotheses (listed below) is very important in order to 
draw the final conclusion. 
If firms over-invest, this should negatively influence performance and it would 
therefore be hypothesised that: 
Ho: There is no relationship between over-investment andfirm performance 
HI: There is a negative relationship between over-investment and firm 
performance. 
Theoretically and intuitively, when debt mitigates the over-investment problem this 
should lead to better performance. Introducing the interaction term between debt and 
over-investment would capture the link between the first and the second hypothesis 
and hence the next hypothesis would be as follows: 
HO. - the interaction between the presence of over-investment and the level of 
gearing is not related to firm performance 
HI: the interaction between the presence of over-investment and the level of 
gearing is related to betterfirm performance 
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6.6 Analysis and Results from the Regression Analysis 
As mentioned above, the dependent variable in the first hypothesis is a dichotomous 
variable and takes the value of 1 for companies experiencing an over-investment 
problem (as defined above) and of 0 otherwise. On the other hand, the explanatory 
variable is a quantitative or continuous variable. Accordingly, the above stated 
hypothesis will be tested and analysed by estimating model (1) below using a logit38 
model: 
Dil = aj +, 8Gi, + u,, (1) 
Where D is the over-investment variable which takes a value of I if there is over- 
investment and 0 otherwise. G is either the market or book value of gearing. P, 
a and v, are the slope coefficient, intercept and residual terms respectively. P 
represents the effect of gearing on the over-investment problem and it is expected to 
be significantly negative in order to reject the null hypotheses. Before we proceed, it 
should be noted that in models where D is qualitative, our objective is to find the 
probability of something happening. Hence qualitative response regression models 
are often known as probability models. This is because the conditional expectation of 
Di given Gi, E(Di/Gi) can be interpreted as the conditional probability that the event 
will occur given Gi, i. e. Pr(Di=I/Gi). Thus, in our case, E(Di / Gi) gives the 
probability of a company experiences an over-investment problem where the level of 
gearing is the given amount of GI. 
Table 2.6 shown below provides statistical properties of the sample used for both the 
UK and US markets: 
38 We also use Probit and the results are very similar. 
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Table6.2: UK and US Descriptive Statistics 
UK Descriptive Data 
Vol. LnTS RIC DPU CE/TA BG MG 
Mean 32.0 13.52 6.17 47.4 0.017 20.92 21.36 
Median 30.33 13.54 4.32 44.8 0.007 19.84 18.42 
Maximum 47.86 9.15 169.76 100 0.97 68.17 92.75 
Minimum 13.42 18.61 -80.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 8.91 1.54 14.64 1 20.24 0.05 1 12.61 16.54 
US Descriptive Data 
Vol. LnTS RIC DPU CE/TA BG MG 
Mean 29.56 15.50 7.098 36.08 0.068 26.76 22.60 
Median 27.18 15.55 2.973 32.92 0.057 27.04 17.33 
Maximum 86.63 19.19 166 305.60 0.57 78.58 91.16 
Minimum 12.75 9.87 -90.21 -281.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 10.32 1.3 15.83 36.96 0.046 14.42 18.52 
CE/TA is the capital expenditure scaled by total assets. BG (the book value of gearing) is the ratio of total debt 
plus preference capital to total assets. MG (the market value of gearing) is the ratio of total debt plus preference 
capital to total debt plus preference capital plus market value of the common stock. RIC is the performance 
measured by the Residual Income Components scaled by total assets per share (RIC Chapter 5 Equation 4). LnTS 
is the natural logarithm of total sales. DPU is the dividend out ratio. Vol. is the market stock price volatility 
Table 6.3: Correlation Matrix between Over-investment and Gearing 
Variables. 
UK Correlation Matrix US Correlation Matrix 
D BG BG 2 D BG BG 
BG -. 050 BG -. 126 
BG 2 -. 081*** . 
937 169*** 
BG 3 -. 089*** . 826 . 
966 BG 3 -. 184*** . 
871*** . 
974 
***. Correlation is significant at 1% level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at 5% level (2-tailed). 
*. 
Correlation is significant at 10% level (2-tailed). D is the dummy variable takes a value of I if there is over- 
investment 0 otherwise. BG, BG 2 and BG': book value of gearing squared book value of gearing and cubed book 
value of gearing respectively. 
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Table 6.4: Correlation Matrix between Performance and Interaction 
Variables of Over-investment and Gearing. 
UK Correlation Matrix US Correlation Matrix 
- -- 
RIC DBG DBG2 DBG' RIC DBG DBG 2 DBG2 
-5 B G 
- -- 
-. 153* DBG . 035 
-dB-G T 176 
. 920 
DBG 2 
. 
013 
. 
949* 
168 . 786 . 958 
3 DBG . 00, i6- -2 ý75 
v -. 089* -. 017 . 029 v -. 096* 
-. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). RIC is the firm performance measure based on the residual 
income components calculated in Chapter 5. DBG is the interaction variables between D (over- investment) and 
book value of gearing. DBG 2 and DBG 3 are the squared and cubed of the interaction variables. 
The above Table (6.2) reveals that the mean and median for both UK and US samples 
are analogous, indicating that the distribution of the gearing variable is very close to 
normality. It also reveals that companies in the US sample are using more debt than 
companies in the UK market in our sample. For example, the US mean and median 
are around 27% where the UK mean and median are around 20%. The mean of 
Market Value of Gearing (MG) in the UK data is slightly higher than the mean of 
Book Value of Gearing (BG) and the standard deviation of MG is also higher than the 
standard deviation of the BG. This is unforeseen since one could expect that the BG 
to be higher than the MG. This indicates that book value of assets in the UK was 
higher than the market value of assets. The reason might be that firms in the UK are 
allowed to restate the non-current assets to current values while firms in the US are 
not. This might suggest that firms in the UK restate their assets at high current values 
to make their gearing appear smaller. Furthermore, BG and MG are not strictly 
comparable as MG is the proportion of debt in the capital structure not to debt-to- 
value ratio. 
On the other hand, the mean of BG in the US data is higher than the mean of MG. 
This is expected since US firms are not allowed to restate their assets to their current 
values in their balance sheets. The standard deviation of MG for both the UK and the 
US are higher than for the BG. This is because the market value of equity is subject 
to the fluctuation of stock prices movement on the market. The above table also 
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reveals that capital expenditure in the US market is higher than the in UK market. 
This is could be because the US firms are larger than in the UK. It also reveals that 
capital expenditure scaled by total assets in the UK market is more skewed than the 
capital expenditure scaled by total assets in the US market. These differences, 
although they are not very significant, might affect the results in both UK and US 
data. 
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6.6.1 Over-investment and Gearing Assuming Linearity 
The following table presents the estimated output of the above model (1) page 140: 
Table 6.5: Modelling D by Logit Results from UK and US Data 
39 
: 
UK Data US Data 
C BG C MG C BG C MG 
Coefficient -0.0725 0.00347 0.12854 -0.006026 0.673816 -0.017760 0.642740 -0.019763 
Std. Error 0.09856 0.00404 0.08335 0.003098 0.09282 0.003031 0.06952 0.002395 
t-value -0.735 0.858 1.54 -1.94 7.26 -5.86 9.25 -8.25 
t-prob. 0.462 0.391 0.123 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Loglikelihood -1072.62296 -1071.09176 -1494.21362 -1476.29076 
Baseline 
loglikelihood -1072.992 -1072.992 -1511.708 -1511.708 
Test ChiA2 0.73774 3.8001 34.988 70.833 
ChiA2 prob. 0.3904 0.0512 0.0000 0.0000 
AIC/n 1.38840176 1.38642346 1.3627178 1.3463486 
C is the constant. BG is the book value of gearing. MG is the market value of gearing 
Table 6.5 reveals the results from the UK and US markets. Modelling D using BG for 
UK data, the coefficient of gearing has an unexpected positive sign but is statistically 
insignificant. This implies that gearing would have no significant effect on the over- 
investment problem for the UK market. This result is in conflict with our hypothesis, 
which states that there is a negative relationship between gearing and over- investment. 
However, modelling D using MG the coefficient is negative and significant at the 
5.2% level. Unlike the BG, MG would have a significant effect on the over- 
investment. Hence, using MG leads us to reject the null hypothesis in this study at the 
5.2% level of significance and to accept the alternative, which states that there is a 
negative relation between gearing and over-investment. MG has different results 
39 We have also used book and market value of debt-equity ratio and the results were significant with 
the expected negative sign. Furthermore, we have used the ratio of total debt plus preference share 
capital to total assets plus the difference between market value of common stock and book value of 
common equity as another way of measuring the market gearing. For more information about these 
results, refer to appendix 6. A and 6.13 respectively. 
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from BG. This could be explained by the fact that firms in the UK restate their assets 
(this is why the mean and median for BG and MG are very close) in a way that their 
asset value may be higher to make their gearing appear smaller. More analysis will be 
carried out in the next sections to analyse these differences. 
Table 6.5 also reveals that for US data the coefficients of both BG and MG are 
statistically significant at I% level and both have the expected negative sign. The 
finding suggests that the higher the gearing, the lower the probability of over- 
investment. This result, using both BG and MG, leads us to reject the null hypothesis 
at I% level of significance in the sample used in this study (over 12 years) and to 
accept the alternative which states that there is a negative relationship between 
gearing and over-investment. This finding is in line with Jensen's (1986) free cash 
flow theory; he argued that debt provides a means of bonding managers' promises to 
pay out future cash flows rather than investing in wealth-destroying ventures. Debt 
also provides the means for controlling opportunistic behaviour by reducing the cash 
flow available for discretionary spending. Top managers' attention is then clearly 
focused on those activities necessary to ensure that debt payments are made. 
Companies failing to make interest and principal payments can be declared insolvent. 
This use of debt as a disciplinary tool makes survival the central issue for all 
concerned. 
6.6.2 Over-investment and Gearing Assuming Linearity (Industry 
E ffe c t) 
The above results do not control for industry effects, which may be an important 
element in determining both firms' investment and their capital structures. We follow 
Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) and estimate the above results while adjusting the 
gearing variables by their industry medians. Capital expenditure average is also 
calculated based on each industry. Each company's median capital expenditure was 
compared with its industry median to see if it is investing above or below its industry 
median. Industries are as defined before (Chapter 4: methodology). The results 
reported in the following section are industry-adjusted: 
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Table 6.6: Modelling D by Logit-Industry-Adjusted Results from UK 
and US Data: 
UK Data US Data 
Cý BG C MG C BG C MG 
Coefficient -0.0792 0.0698 0.16446 -0.1348 0.4526 -0.4355 0.4060 -0.3388 
Std. Error 0.09529 0.07601 0.07599 0.04523 0.08536 0.07150 0.06586 0.04247 
t-value -0.831 0.919 2.16 -2.98 5.30 -6.09 6.16 -7.98 
t-prob. 0.406 0.358 0.031 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Loglikelihood -1072.56329 -1068.31514 -1501.58158 -1472.80431 
Baseline 
loglikelihood -1072.987 -1072.987 -1522.15 -1513.8 
Test Chi"2 0.84675 9.343 41.137 81.992 
Chi/^\2 prob. 0.3575 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 
AIC/n 1.38832466 1.3828361 1.36938213 1.3505534 
C is the constant. BG is the book value of gearing industry-adjusted. MG is the market value of gearing 
industry-adjusted 
Table 6.6 reveals very similar results to the above reported industry-unadjusted results 
in Table 6.5. BG for the UK sample is still insignificant with unexpected positive 
sign, while for the US sample BG is still significant with the expected negative sign. 
On the other hand, MG is negatively significant for both US and UK data. 
6.6.3 Over-investment and Gearing Assuming Linearity (Gearing 
Classification)40 
The above reported results do not demonstrate whether the effect of gearing on over- 
investment is a continuous function given that the degree of gearing (i. e. high or low 
gearing) may have different implications for over-investment. Therefore, the degree 
of gearing might play an important role in deterring the over-investment problem 
since in theory the higher the level of debt the greater the pressure on managers to 
perform. Hence, UK and US data were spilt into four quartiles. UK and US data 
40 We tested the relation between over-investment and debt-equity ratio classification in appendix 6. C. 
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41 were sorted based on median gearing from top to bottom. Then each UK and US 
data set was split into four quartiles, the top and the bottom quartile representing the 
top and bottom gearing. The two middle quartiles are middle gearing. The following 
tables present the estimated model (1): 
Table 6.7: Modelling D by Logit Results from UK Data 42: 
Top Gearing Middle Gearing Bottom Gearing 
Constant BG Constant BG Constant BG 
Coefficient 0.794714 -0.018636 0.782961 -0.02836 -0.564323 -0.003952 
Std. Error 0.3460 0.009883 0.1895 0.008554 0.1526 0.01189 
t-value 2.30 -1.89 4.13 -3.32 -3.70 -0.332 
t-prob. 0.022 0.060 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.740 
Loglikelihood -271.223025 -522.675596 -249.539774 
Baseline 
logliklihood -273.0249 -528.3693 -249.5953 
Test Chi"2 3.6037 11.387 0.11115 
Chi-A2 prob. 0.0577 0.0007 0.7388 
AIC/n 1.37991427 1.3663427 1.31010299 
41 We also sorted the leverage based on mean gearing and the results are almost the same. 
42 We also split market value of leverage into three percentiles, high, middle and bottom the results are 
very similar with MG = -0.0 111526 and significant at 10% level in top percentile, = -0.0 131714 and 
significant at 10% level in the middle percentile and = -0.00421284 with t-probability of 0.703 which 
is 
insignificant in the bottom percentile. 
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Table 6.8: Modelling D by Logit Results from US Data 43: 
Top Gearing Middle Gearing Bottom Gearing 
Constant BG Constant BG Constant BG 
Coefficient 1.50779 -0.045189 0.879735 -0.01487 -0.060333 0.03218 
Std. Error 0.4870 0.01133 0.1939 0.006862 0.1418 0.01139 
t-value 3.10 -3.99 4.54 -2.17 -0.425 2.83 
t-prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.671 0.005 
Log-likelihood -370.445456 -731.484751 -357.45498 
Baseline 
Log-likelihood. -378.9204 -733.8471 -361.5907 
Test ChiA 2 16.95 4.7247 8.2715 
Chi^2 prob. 0.0000 0.0297 0.0040 
AIC/n 1.32072857 1.32877672 1.36157189 
From Table 6.8 it is clear that as leverage increases the probability of over-investment 
in the US data decreases. In the top firms, gearing G is negatively and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Moving to the middle firms, gearing G also has the 
expected negative sign and statistically significant at the 5% level. However, in the 
bottom firms, gearing G is statistically significant with unexpected positive sign. This 
suggests that a low level of gearing may increase financial slack. This also suggests 
that the higher the gearing level the higher the pressure on managers to invest less. 
These results are also in the same line with Table 6.5 where the overall gearing was 
significantly negative at the I% level. This means that US data, using top and bottom 
gearing, leads us to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative, which states 
that there is a negative relationship between gearing and over-investment. It should 
be noted that the coefficient of the gearing in tables 6.5 and 6.8 appears to be small. 
This is because debt is only one of the factors to mitigate the over-investment 
problem. 
43 We also split market value of leverage into four quartiles, I top, 2 middle and bottom, the results are 
very similar with MG = -0.0430527 and significant at 1% level in top percentile, = -0.00620971 and 
significant only at 5% level in the middle percentile and = 0.00710119 with t-probability of 0.654 
%vhich is insignificant in the bottom percentile. 
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On the other hand, results from Table 6.7 reveal that for UK data, unlike Table 6.5 
and US result, gearing is significantly negative at the 6% in the top percentile. It is 
significantly negative at the 1% level in the middle percentile and non-significant in 
the bottom percentile. Based on these results, the relationship between gearing and 
over-investment in the UK market is most significant in the middle percentile, while 
in the top percentile, this relationship becomes less significant (6%) and it becomes 
negligible in the bottom percentile. The UK market does not follow the same pattern 
as the data in the US market where the higher the debt the lower the probability of 
over-investment. This could be related to sample size and the average of leverage in 
each market. Moreover, this method of splitting the sample into three sub-samples 
may be subjective and a regression model with non-linear variables, which will be run 
in the next paragraph, may provide more robust results. 
On the other hand, Table 6.7 reveals that both top and middle BG are significant, 
while the bottom BG is insignificant, taking into consideration that the total BG for 
the UK was insignificant. Accordingly, another reason for observing non-significance 
for the total BG in the UK sample could be because of the bottom percentiles. For 
this reason, we ran the same logit model using only top and middle BG percentiles for 
the UK sample. The results are shown in the following table: 
Table 6.9: Modelling D by Logit-Results from UK Top and Middle 
Percentile Data: 
Constant BG 
Coefficient 0.628161 -0.0175112 
Std. Error 0.1453 0.005328 
t-value 4.32 -3.29 
t-prob. 0.000 0.001 
Loglikelihood -795.958746 
Baseline loglikelihood -801.4267 
Test Chi, ^, 2 10.936 
Chi^2 prob. 0.0009 
AIC/n 1.37106314 
BG is the book value of top and middle percentiles in the UK sample 
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Table 6.9 shows that BG for the UK sample is negatively significant at the 1% level 
when we excluded the bottom percentile. This means that the bottom Percentile could 
be the reason for driving the total UK BG to be insignificant. As stated above, the 
method of splitting the sample into three sub-samples may be subjective since the 
number of observation in each sub-sample is not identical and a regression model with 
non-linear variables, which will be run in the next paragraph, may provide results that 
are more robust 
6.6.4 Over-investment and Gearing Assuming Non-Linear 
Variables 44 
The working hypothesis of most empirical studies in this area is that certain financial 
policies, in particular, the use of debt financing, should uniformly either boost or 
hinder firm performance (see for example, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). However, later 
analysis has considered non-linear forms (see Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990,1995; Kole, 1995). The non-linear analysis follows from the 
possibility that influences the relation between a firm's performance and gearing, that 
there is an optimal level of gearing, and hence, gearing could increase or decrease a 
firm's performance depending on whether a low or high degree of gearing is used. 
For instance,, trade-off theory predicts that the relation between gearing and value is 
parabolic and takes an "n" shape i. e. gearing increases firm's value until a certain 
degree, and then gearing starts to decrease the firm's value. 
Moreover, results from the 3-step linear regression analysis suggest that the relation 
between gearing and over-investment could also be non-linear. According to our 
initial results, the gearing coefficient has shown different signs when we split our 
sample into three sub-samples based on bottom, middle and top gearing. This 
suggests that the relation between gearing and over-investment may be cubiC45. 
Accordingly, below is the estimated non-linear regression using the cubic equation: 
a +, 8Gj, +, 8Gi, 
2+ 8G3 + Uil 
it I it 
" We also tested the non-linear relationship between over-investment and the debt-equity ratio. 
However; the results revealed that the debt-equity ratio cannot be expressed in a non-linear form with 
over- i rive stment, as explained in appendix 6.13 
45 We used a cubic equation because we believe that there may be only two turning points. There could 
be only one turning point if the results reveal that G3 is insignificant. 
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Where D is a dichotomous variable described above and G is the gearing defined 
above, G2 and G' are the squared and cubed, respectively, of the gearing variable. 
Table 6.10: Modelling D by Logit: the Cubed UK and US ResUjtS46 
UK results US results 
Cons. BG BG 2 BG 3 Cons. BG BG 2 BG 3 
Coeff. -0.6034 0.0826 -0.0026 T05 ý . 05 -0.1499 0.0737 -0.0019 5.67e-006 
Std. Error 0.1724 0.0256 0.0010 0.0032 0.1630 0.0233 0.0009 1.136e-005 
t-value -3.50 3.22 -2.35 1.55 -0.920 3.16 -2.08 0.499 
t-prob. 0.000 0.001 0.019 0.121 0.358 0.002 0.038 0.618 
Loglikelihood -1063.93067 -1454.69818 
Baseline 
loglikelihood -1072.992 -1503.528 
Test Chi^2 18.122 97.659 
Prob. 0.0004 0.0000 
AIC/n 1.37975539 1.3358042 
Cost. is the constant. BG is the book value of gearing. 136' and 136' are the squared and cubed book value ot gearing. 
From Table 6.10, it seems that levels of gearing exert a significant influence on over- 
investment for both the UK and US data. Moreover, the results provide evidence for 
the possible functional form of the relationship between gearing and over-investment 
problem. More specifically, the estimated coefficients of G, G2 and G' suggest that 
over-investment varies at different stages of the gearing level. The estimated 
coefficient of G is statistically significant at the I% level in both US and UK data, but 
with an unexpected positive sign. The positive coefficient of G in both UK and US 
suggest that, at a low level of gearing, the higher the debt level the greater the 
probability of having over-investment. The positive coefficient of G suggests that a 
low level of gearing increases the over-investment not the opposite i. e. a low level of 
gearing may increase financial slack. 
46 We run the same regression using MG and the results are almost the same for more information see 
appendix 6. E. 
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On the other hand, G2 is also statistically significant in both UK and US data at less 
than 5% level with the expected negative sign. This means that the more the gearing 
the lower the probability of over- investment. The negative coefficient of G 'suggests 
that a high level of gearing does put pressure on managers to reduce the over- 
investment. On the other hand, the non-significant results for G' in both UK and US 
suggests that more gearing (above a certain level) has no further effect on the over- 
investment problem. Moreover, because G' is insignificant, this could suggest that 
the relationship between gearing and over-investment might be quadratic rather than 
cubic. Accordingly, we estimated the same logit regression using the following 
quadratic equation: 
ai +, 8Gi, +, 8Gi, 
2+ 
ui, (3) 
Table 6.11: Modelling D by Logit the Squared UK and US Results 
UK results US results 
Const. BG BG 2 Const. BG BG 2 
Coefficient -0.45 0.048 -0.00091 -0.081 0.0615 -0.0015 
Std. Error 0.140 0.012 0.0002 0.132 0.0108 0.00019 
t-value -3.22 3.88 -3.78 -0.610 5.70 -7.48 
t-prob. 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.542 0.000 0.000 
Loglikelihood -1065.10332 -1463.65227 
Baseline -1072.992 -1511.708 
Test Chi'12 15.777 96.11 
Prob. 0.0004 0.0000 
AIC/n 1.37997845 1.33574888 
Const. is the constant. BG and BG' are the book value of gearing and the square book value of gearing respectively. 
Results from Table 6.11 reveal no differences from Table 6.10, the level of gearing 
has an impact on over- investment. At low levels of gearing, the higher the gearing, 
the greater the probability of over-investment. By contrast, at higher levels of gearing, 
the higher the gearing the lower the probability of over-investment. Calculations 
carried out on the coefficients of the variables MG and MG 2 for the UK sample reveal 
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that gearing below 26-67% has no effect on the over-investment problem, from 
26.67% gearing starts to mitigate the over-investment problem. On the other hand, 
for the US sample, gearing becomes effective after 20.5 %47. It should be noted that 
using a non-linear relation between gearing and over-investment has revealed similar 
results between book value and market value for both US and UK data. 
To interpret the results from a logit model meaningfully, the model itself must first fit 
the data. In other words, the explanatory variables included in the model must be able 
to explain the response variable significantly better than the model with the intercept 
only (Liao, 1994). While in classical regression the F-test is used, in a logit model the 
most commonly used test is the likelihood ratio statistic, which approximately follows 
the chi-squared distribution. If chi-squared indicates that the model fits the data 
significantly better than the model with the intercept only, one can move on to the 
intercept parameter estimates. 
For the UK data (table 6.5), chi-squared is statistically insignificant when using a 
linear book value of leverage but it is significant when we removed the bottom 
percentile from the sample, and it is statistically significant at the 6% level when 
using market value of leverage. On the other hand, the chi-squared probability in 
Table 6.5 (for US data) is zero and therefore one can argue that the explanatory 
variable included in the model (BG and MG) is able to explain the response variable 
significantly better than the model with the intercept only. This is also the case when 
non-linear regression has been used; all chi-squared probabilities are significant. Both 
market value and book value for the US and UK data reveal similar results. This also 
suggests that the explanatory variables including in the model are able to explain the 
response variable significantly better than the intercept only. This leads us to reject 
the null hypothesis and to accept the alternative, which states that there is a relation 
between gearing and over-investment. 
The next step involves the assessment of predictive efficiency. In classical regression, 
the most common measure of goodness-of-fit is R-squared. However, in a logit 
model it would not be right to think of this as the proportion of variance explained by 
47 The maximum point of a quadratic function is calculated as follows: Assuming all other variables are 
constant and denoting MG by x: D=0.048x - 0.00091X2 . 
The maximum point is found by 
differentiating y (D) with respect to x, letting dy/dx =0 and solving for x. This implies that 0.048 - 
0.00 1 8x =0 this implies x= 26.67. The same calculation for US gives x= 20.5 
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the model. Typically, R-squared reported in logistic regression underestimates the 
proportion of variation explained by the model (Gujarati, 2002). Accordingly, some 
other criteria for model selection should be used such as Akaike Infon-nation Criterion 
(AIC). The model, which best fits the data is the one with the lowest AIC. In all the 
above reported models, AIC is around 1.3, which leads to a conclusion that whether 
the model is estimated using linear regression or non-linear, BG or MG, industry- 
adjustment or non-adjusted, AIC is almost the same in all circumstances and gives no 
preference to one estimated model over the other. 
All the above non-linear regression results suggest that the higher the level of gearing 
the lower the probability of over-investment. This leads us to reject the null 
hypothesis and to accept the alternative, which states that there is a relationship 
between gearing and over-investment. However, this should not be interpreted as 
evidence to support the existence of the over-investment problem, as this should be 
related to the level of performance. Accordingly, to demonstrate the over-investment 
problem, one should relate this to performance, expecting to find a negative relation 
between over-investment and performance since over-investment in negative NPV 
projects destroys firm value. This test will be carried out in the following section. 
6.7 Regression Analysis: Over-investment, Gearing and Firm 
Performance Assuming Non-Linearity 
The previous results have revealed that leverage decreases over- investment. 
However, to make this sufficient to support the over-investment argument one should 
relate this to performance; in other words, over-investment destroys firm value and 
reduces performance. Therefore, to demonstrate the over-investment problem, firstly 
the expected relationship between performance and over-investment has to be 
negative, and secondly, where debt mitigates the over- investment, this should be 
related to better performance. Accordingly, two regressions will be carried out in this 
section, one to test the relationship between performance and over- investment, and the 
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second to test performance from one side and the interaction variable (leverage and 
over-investment) from the other side. 
6.7.1 Over-investment and Firm Performance 
We now proceed to test the relationship between firm performance and over- 
investment. It is expected that this relationship would be negative since over- 
investment reduces a firm's performance. The static relation between firm 
performance and over-investment implicitly assumes that an investment decision can 
instantaneously have an impact on a firm's performance. However, an investment 
decision at year t would probably affect firm's performance in later years. Therefore, 
in this project, we adopt a more realistic approach recognising that a firm's 
performance would be affected for years following an investment project. 
In this study we use a method which is very similar to the one adopted by RaJan and 
Zingales (1995). In their method, they estimate a cross-sectional model where their 
dependent variable is in year 1991 and all the regressors are four-year averages (1987- 
1990). Averaging the explanatory variable in our case would help us capturing the 
affect of investment decision on firm's performance through accounting for 
adjustments and reducing the noise. On the other hand, lagging the explanatory 
variable one period could help reducing the problem of endogeneity. 
In our model, we used the same technique as described above, but we used a4 year 
moving average for the explanatory variable and we pooled the data. This is because 
the total number of firms in Rajan and Zingales (1995) were 2583, which is extremely 
large compared to our sample (317 firms). This would suggest that a cross-sectional 
model with many observations could give significant results, while in this case, we 
used 8 cross-sectional models and the results were mainly insignificant. Accordingly, 
the following regression will be tested: 
Performance, +5 = aj 
+, 8Daverage(t+D+4) + Utt (4) 
Performance is the performance measured by RIC scaled by total assets per share at 
time t. D is the over-investment dummy 4 years moving average, which takes a value 
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4- 
of I for over-investment and 0 otherwise. Results from the above regression for both 
the UK and the US data are presented in Table 6.12 below: 
Table 6.12: Modelling Performance and Over-investment the UK and 
US Results 
UK Results US Results 
Coefficient -0.008549 -0.287850 
Std. Error 0.02474 0.1753 
t-value -0.345 -1.64 
R2 0.55 0.66 
Wald test 48.78 2.697 
*: Significant at 1%, **: Significant at 5%, ***: Significant at 10% 
As can be seen from the above table, both results are in the expected direction but 
insignificant (US data was significant at 11% very close to the 10% level of 
significance). Next, we use a 5-year performance moving average instead of 4 years. 
The results from the 5 years moving average are insignificant (worse than the 4 years 
moving average) but in the expected direction as well. 
The lack of significance may be due to losing many observations, since by using 4- 
years moving average we are losing 3 years, which could explain why they are worse 
than the 5-years moving average. To increase the number of observations, we 
combined both UK (132 firms) and US (185 firms) data in the same sample, giving 
317 firms. We then use a 4-year moving average over a period of 12 years and at the 
same time we assigned another Dummy (D2) which takes a value of 1 for UK firms 
and 0 otherwise. The results are as follows: 
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Table 6.13: Modelling Performance and Over-investment the Total 
UK and US Sample: 
DI D2 
Coefficient 
Std. Error 
-0-151651 
0.09155 
0.338687 
0.09155 
t-value - 1.66*** 3.70* 
R2 0.68 
Wald test 7.172 
*: Signiticant at 1%, * *: Significant at 5%, ***: Significant at 10%. DI is the over-investment 
dummy, D2 is the country dummy. 
The combined sample in Table 6.13 reveals that the coefficient of over-investment is 
significantly negative at the level of 9%. This means that, in line with our hypothesis, 
over-investment has a negative impact on firms' performance. This suggests that the 
null hypothesis, which states that there is no relation between firm's performance and 
over-investment, is rejected and we accept the alternative, which states that there is a 
negative relation between firm's performance and over-investment. This is expected; 
according to the over-investment argument, over-investment reduces performance. 
6.7.2 Firm Performance, Over-investment and Gearing Assuming 
Non-Linearity: 
Having shown that gearing affects over-investment in the first hypothesis and over- 
investment decreases firm's performance in the second hypothesis, it is expected to 
find the following relationship: 
I- At the lower level of gearing (below 26.67% for UK and below 20.5% for US), 
we have found that the higher the gearing the greater the probability of over- 
investment. On the other hand, in the second hypothesis, over-investment has a 
negative impact on firm performance. Therefore, it is expected that at a low level 
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of gearing the interaction between gearing and over-investment will have a 
negative impact on firm's performance. 
2- At the higher level of gearing (above 26.67% for UK and above 20.5% for US), 
we have found that the higher the gearing the smaller the probability of having 
over-investment; high level of gearing mitigates the over-investment problem. 
Therefore, it is expected that at a high level of gearing, the interaction between 
gearing and over-investment may be significantly positive. 
The above two points lead us to test the non-linearity between the interaction of 
gearing, over-investment and performance. We use three control variables: the 
natural logarithm of total sales (LnTS), the dividend payout ratio (DPU) and market 
stock price volatility. Total sales controls for firm size; a positive and significant 
coefficient for size is suggestive of managers pursuing size and growth strategies that 
are not necessarily in the principal's best interest. DPU is relevant to over-investment 
issues; if companies pay out dividends it signals two things: either they have abundant 
current cash balances and expect future cash flows, or they have future no investment 
opportunities. Firms with high stock return volatility should be careful in evaluating 
their investment decisions. The reason for including stock price volatility as a control 
variable is that if the stock price is more volatile, careful managers will reduce gearing 
in order to avoid being over-geared. Accordingly, the relationship between the 
interaction of gearing and over-investment from one side and performance from the 
other side will be tested by using the following model: 
A-PI+5 --,,: a, + [A(DIG)+, 82(DIG)2 +, 83(DIG)'+ 
, 
84DPU +, 65TS +, fl6VOI +AD 2 
laverage(t: 
t+4) 
+ Uit (6) 
The above regression is similar to the Rajan and Zingales (1995) method described 
above, where AP is firm's performance, measured by the RIC in chapter (5); (D I G), 
(D I G) 2 and (D I G)3 are the interactions between gearing and over-investment, the 
squared interaction and the cubed interaction respectively; DPU is the dividend 
payout ratio; TS is the natural logarithm of total sales; Vol. is the stock price volatility 
and D2 is the country dummy which takes a value of I for the UK and 0 for the US. 
The results from the above model are as follows: 
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Table 6.14: Modelling Performance and the Integrated Over- 
investment and Gearing: the Pooled UK and US ResujtS48 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value 
DIG -0.2616 0.125 - 2.09** 
(DIG)2 0.0126 0.0072 1.74*** 
(D I 
G)3 
-0.00017 0.00011 -1.53 
DPU -0.00014 0.00014 -1.05 
Ln(TS) -0.52 0.693 -0.752 
Vol. 0.0902 0.078 1.16 
D2 1.645 1.224 1.34 
R-) 0.649 
Wald Test 19.32* 
*: Significant at 1%, **: Significant at 5%, ***: Significant at 10% 
DIG is the interaction variable between leverage and over-investment, (D2G)2 is the squared of DIG and (D2G)' is the cubed of 
DIG; DPU is the dividend payout ratio; Ln(TS) is the natural logarithm of total sales; Vol. is the stock price volatility and D2 is 
the country dummy variable, which takes a value of I for the UK firms and 0 for the US firms. 
Table 6.14 reveals that, at low levels of gearing, the coefficient of the interaction 
variables between gearing and over-investment is statistically significant at the level 
of 5% with a negative sign. This means that a low level of gearing together with 
over-investment have a negative impact on performance. This is expected because we 
have found that at a low level of gearing, over-investment increases i. e. debt does not 
mitigate the problem; rather debt makes it worse and therefore the problem of over- 
investment should have a negative impact on firm's performance. On the other hand, 
the positive and significant coefficient (significant at the level of 8%) of the squared 
of the interaction variable between gearing and over-investment suggests that a 
middle level of gearing does mitigate the over-investment problem and therefore, it is 
associated with a positive effect on firm performance. Moreover, and in line with the 
previous results, the non-significant coefficient of (DG) 
3 suggests that a very high 
48The turning points of a cubic function can be calculated by differentiating Pt, 5 with respect to the x 
variables i. e. 
'(G, G 2G3, DG, DG 2 and DG 3, letting dP/dX =0 and solve for X. to determine whether X is 
a maximum or minimum turning point, calculate the value of d2 P/d 
2X. If d2 P/d 2X > 0, the turning point 
is a maximum, if d2 P/d 2X <0, the turning point is a minimum. 
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level of gearing has no further effect on firm performance; high gearing does not 
monitor the over-investment problem. This suggest, and in line with the previous 
results, that the relationship between gearing, over-investment and performance is 
quadratic rather than cubic. Moreover, the negative sign of (DG) 3 (although it is not 
significant) could be because gearing reduces the over-investment problem and a very 
high level of gearing (extreme values) might negate the performance. In addition, the 
positive and non-significant coefficient of the country dummy suggests that there are 
no differences across our sample, namely, the UK and the US sample. 
The implications of this finding are: 1) the relation between firm's performance from 
one side and the interaction of gearing and over-investment from the other side can be 
explained by a non-linear function. 2) The non-linear function has revealed that 
gearing has a different impact on over-investment at different stages; neither low nor 
high levels of gearing mitigate the over-investment problem - rather it gets worse. 
This could be explained by the fact that neither low nor high level of gearing does 
play a monitoring role in forcing managers not to waste the cash on non-profitable 
projects, because managers might not feel the pressure of high debt serving payments 
at low level of gearing. On the other hand, a middle level of gearing plays a 
monitoring role in reducing the over-investment problem, and that has a positive 
impact on firm performance. However, a high level of gearing is again associated 
with a non-significant but negative effect on performance. This could be explained by 
the fact that a high level of gearing could be associated with financial distress. This 
finding leads us to reject the null hypothesis and to accept the alternative, which states 
that a certain level of gearing does reduce the over-investment problem and therefore 
improves firm performance. This finding is in line with Jensen (1986,1993) in that it 
confirms the existence of the free cash flow problem and introduces one factor that 
could mitigate this problem. 
6.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter, Jensen's argument (1986,1993) has been tested; he argues that 
managers undertake wasteful negative net present value projects because they derive 
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private benefits from controlling more assets. This is what is called over-investment 
or empire building. He provides illustrative calculations of the destruction of 
shareholder value in a number of the world's largest corporations. Several important 
features of our analysis we believe extend the literature on the empirical work 
concerning the agency problem, more precisely, Jensen's free cash flow argument. 
Our analysis, distinct from previous empirical studies, introduces a simple way of 
identifying the over-investment problem. Second, we use a performance measure that 
is based on theoretical and empirical work and accounts for the cost of capital. Our 
analysis incorporates the dynamic nature of the response of a firm's performance to 
investment decisions and controls for endogeneity through lagging the explanatory 
variables one period. 
Using both FTSE 500 and S&P 500 firms, the results support the principal-agent 
models based on private benefits of investment (empire building, managerial 
entrenchment, perquisite consumption). We find that at low levels of gearing (< 26% 
for UK and < 20.5% for US), the higher the gearing the greater the over-investment 
problem, whilst at a higher level of gearing (> 26% for UK and >20.5% for US), the 
higher the gearing the lower the probability of over-investment, except that very high 
levels of gearing have no impact on the over-investment problem (G3 was 
insignificant). This could suggest that the relationship between gearing and over- 
investment is a parabolic function. Moreover, we find that over-investment and firm 
performance move in opposite directions. At a low level of gearing, where we find 
that gearing increases the over-investment problem, the interaction between gearing 
and over-investment has a significant negative impact on firm performance. At a 
middle level of gearing, where gearing mitigates the over-investment problem, the 
interaction between gearing and over-investment has a significant positive impact on 
firm performance. Again, at a high level of gearing, the interaction variable between 
gearing and over-investment has again a non-significant negative impact on firm 
performance. 
The above findings lead us to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative, 
which states that gearing, to a certain level, can mitigate the over-investment problem. 
Moreover, our results suggest that only a middle level of gearing mitigates the over- 
investment problem, since a low level of gearing increases the probability of over- 
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investment and hence affects a firm's performance negatively. On the other hand in 
line with the first finding, which suggests that a high level of gearing has no impact on 
the over-investment problem, the interaction of gearing and over-investment has no 
impact on firm performance but the sign was negative. This could be because when 
over-investment is financed by very high gearing, the interaction effect on 
performance is negative. An important implication of our model is that certain levels 
of gearing, i. e. a middle level, play a monitoring role in reducing the over-investment 
problem and hence leads to better firm performance. We have found that debt at a 
low level increases the over-investment rather than decreases it. This could be 
because a low level of gearing does not put enough pressure on managers in terms of 
interest rate and in fact increases a firm's financial slack. 
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4 Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
In this thesis the relationship between capital structure and firm performance was 
examined first theoretically and then empirically using panel data from both FTSE 
500 and S&P 500 over 12 year period. In these firms, individual shareholders are 
partial owners, whereas the firms are controlled by professional management teams. 
In this context, the inherent separation between ownership and control plays an 
important role. For this reason, we adapt Jensen's (1986) argument in which he 
explains that firms may engage in projects with negative NPV, because managers 
pursue growth (which is not necessarily in the interest of shareholders) and derive 
benefits from investment. Managers are hypothesised to be empire-builders and 
continue to choose investment projects even after all positive net present value 
investments have been taken. According to agency theory, this problem arises from 
incentive misalignment between shareholders and managers. In this thesis, we 
establish a link between the previous mentioned theory and firms' performance. To 
illustrate further, thesis adapts Jensen (1986) argument, and empirically tests the 
proposition that debt disciplines managers and mitigates the over-investment 
problems and therefore this should lead to better firm performance. In this concluding 
chapter, we will summarize the preceding chapters and discuss the results of the 
empirical study. In addition, we will describe the contribution and the limitation of 
this thesis and topics for further research. 
7.2 Summary of Chapters 
The capital structure literature starts with the seminal paper by Nobel Laureates 
M&M (1958). In this paper, under stringent assumptions, capital structure choice is 
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found to be irrelevant for the value of the firm. Subsequent theoretical studies have 
investigated the relevance of capital structure by relaxing the assumptions in the MM 
paper and studying the consequences. Empirical studies provide tests of these 
theories. This literature is reviewed in Chapter 2. Agency problems play a crucial 
role in the recent capital structure literature. Information differences and divergences 
of interests between groups of stakeholders lead to agency problems. With these 
problems agency costs are associated. Agency problems are closely related to capital 
structure decisions. On the one hand, capital structure decisions may cause agency 
problems. On the other hand, capital structure may serve to mitigate agency problems. 
Studying listed firms highlights agency problems between managers and shareholders; 
the shareholders have ownership right in the firm, but the management controls the 
firm - the managers may have incentives to maximise their own wealth at the expense 
of the shareholders. This leads to the over-investment problem and is one of several 
agency theory-based hypotheses that explain capital structure decisions. Other 
agency-based capital structure hypotheses are derived from alternative agency 
problems including moral hazard, i. e. between shareholders and bondholders or 
between insiders and outsides stakeholders, or agency problems including adverse 
selection. Aside from the agency-based explanations, tax and bankruptcy-based 
hypotheses may explain capital structure choice. In the empirical literature, the 
above-mentioned theories have been reviewed extensively. The majority of the 
empirical studies are based on data sets of US firms. According to the empirical 
researchers, most of the theories have been proven relevant in explaining the firms' 
capital structure choices. 
From Chapter 2, we realised that in Jensen's (1986) model there are incentives and 
disciplining roles in using debt. These incentives and disciplining roles in using debt 
should logically lead to a better performance. Therefore, a theoretical relationship 
between capital structure and firm performance is established. This theoretical 
relation was tested empirically in Chapter 5 to conclude whether a certain level of 
gearing can lead to a better firm performance. 
The performance measure is presented in Chapter 3. It can be seen from this chapter 
that there is substantial criticism continues of traditional performance measures based 
on ratio analysis (i. e. profitability ratios) that ignore the cost of capital. For this 
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reason, it was decided to exclude such performance measures and to look at models 
that take into consideration the spread between the return on capital and the cost of 
capital. It is clear from the literature that the RI models and the DCF are the most 
competing models in many of the recent academic books and research papers. 
Although, these models are preferable to ROA, they are measuring value rather than 
performance. However, the first difference can be used as a perfon-nance measure but 
with correction for dividend. It was difficult to infer from the prior literature whether 
one of these approaches is superior to the others. Because of their theoretical 
equivalence, these models should provide the same valuations when the cash flows 
are projected consistently to infinity and equivalent discount rates are applied. In 
practice, however, horizons over which the cash flows can be reasonably projected are 
limited, and discount rates are estimated subject to errors. These practical 
considerations cause some academics and practitioners to prefer one valuation model 
to another. 
DCF, as discussed in the literature, looks at the valuation of firms more explicitly than 
performance, while RI can be used for performance more explicitly than DCF. For 
example, RI models have an advantage over the DCF model in that they are useful 
measure for understanding a company's performance in any single year, while 
discounted cash flow is not. Since the purpose of this project was to look at the 
performance measurements rather than valuation, it seemed logical to use RI models, 
in accordance with their function to evaluate periodic performance, rather than DCF- 
Therefore, DCF was not used in this project as a performance measure. 
On the other hand, as can be seen from the literature, an obvious limitation concerns 
the absence of a leverage concept in the OhIson (1995) model. His model was based 
on risk neutrality, and this does not Permit the required return to reflect any 
compensation for the inherent risk in equity securities or firm specific risk. In 
addition, it should be noted that certain difficulties would be encountered in 
implementing the linear information dynamics in Ohlson (1995) model, which frames 
the stochastic time series behaviour of abnormal earnings. The difficulty is in setting 
parameter values such as vt which represent other information in the model. On the 
other hand, Frankel and Lee (1998) adapted the residual income model in which the 
cost of capital is risk-adjusted by using an overall assessment of the perceived risk of 
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the investment as a whole. This leads to a more easily implemented model and 
therefore leads to preference for the Frankel and Lee's (1998) modified RI model over 
OhIson's (1995) model. Chapter 3 concludes that the RI in Frankel and Lee (1998) 
model will be tested empirically in order to see the possibility of using it as a 
performance measure. 
The first empirical study is presented in Chapter 4. In this study, we tested whether 
the defined RI (the Frankel and Lee (1998) model) model can, to a significant degree, 
capture cross-sectional variation in market stock prices of the non- financial FTSE 
500 and S&P 500 firms using panel data over a 13-year period of time. Parametric 
and non-parametric tests were carried out. In parametric tests, we used a fixed effect 
within group to estimate the regression. The results for both UK and US firms 
support the hypothesis that RI can explain more than 75% of the cross-sectional 
variation in market stock prices; this is in line with Frankel and Lee (1998) who find 
that the model explains more than 70% of the cross-sectional variation in stock prices. 
We further tested this model cross-sectionally and we controlled for heteroscedasticity. 
The results from cross-sectional regression also support the hypothesis and support 
the findings from the panel data regression. We also tested this model for each 
portfolio in our sample and the results also support the hypothesis. 
We used non-parametric tests to compare our results with Frankel and Lee (1998). 
The results of Spearman's correlation between the RI model and the stock prices were 
very high (more than 80% for UK and more than 72% for US) and significant at the 
1% level. This is in line with Frankel and Lee (1998) who found that the model 
explains more than 70% of the cross-sectional variation in stock prices. 
The second part of Chapter 4 was to determine firm performance based on the RI 
model, since this model estimates the firm's equity value and not its performance. 
The latter can be done in one of two ways: 
From an accounting point of view, the first difference in Equation (2), namely 
the first difference between Vt+l and Vt divided by Vt represents firm 
performance. Therefore, the determination of firm performance using 
Equation (1) will lead to the following Equation (2, page 122): 
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Peformancet = Vt - Vt-l + Dividend, (2) 
The reason we add back the dividend is that it is a component of performance that is 
not included in Vt. 
9 The value of equity at a particular point in time (Vt) is largely dependent on 
the value of equity in the previous period (Vt-j). The actual value created in a 
certain period of time consists of earnings (including dividend) over and above 
the cost of capital employed, which is the Residual Income Component (RIC) 
of the residual income model as defined in Equation (1) and is represented in 
Equation (3.1), page 122: 
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The RIC from the accounting point of view represents a performance measure over 2 
years. Furthermore, Equation 3.1 was scaled by total assets per share to take into 
consideration firms' size and to insure that the calculated performance would not be 
driven by firms' size. As the concern of this study was performance rather than 
valuation, it can be argued that the performance measure can manifest itself in the 
residual income component rather than in book value and continuing value. The last 
two parts (book value and continuing value) are important to value companies and not 
to calculate their performance. 
Accordingly, two regression analyses were carried out to test for Equations (2.1) and 
(3.1). The results from both regressions lead us to conclude that both Equation (2.1) 
and Equation (3.1) can partially explain stock price performance (first difference). 
The two results support the argument that the RIC model or the first difference from 
equation (1) can explain to a certain level the stock price performance and both can 
therefore be used as a dependent variable to test the relationship between firm 
performance, gearing and over-investment problems. 
In Chapter 6 we present our second empirical model. Issues of gearing, over- 
investment and firm performance are studied in order to test the relationship between 
them. Over-investment plays a key role in the agency theory, and finding a good 
proxy is Important in order to provide a good empirical investigation of the agency 
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theory. In this thesis, we introduced a very simple way to proxy for over-investment 
problem. We used low growth opportunities (as measured by Tobin's Q) together 
with company's capital expenditures above its industry median. We used this proxy 
because first, the difficulty in measuring FCF and second, even if we found a good 
proxy to measure FCF, FCF together with low growth opportunities does not 
necessarily lead to an over-investment problem as suggested in the literature. We use 
publicly listed data of non-financial FTSE 500 and S&P 500 companies. Initially, we 
use a logit model in order investigate whether gearing mitigates the over-investment. 
The results from both FTSE 500 and S&P 500 indicate that gearing mitigates the 
over- investment. As expected we find that the higher the gearing the lower the over- 
investment. We use both book value of gearing and market value of gearing. 
Furthermore, we control for industry differences by dividing each company's book 
value of gearing and market value of gearing by its industry median; the results reveal 
no differences from the initial ones. 
We next address the issue of linearity i. e. is the effect of gearing on over-investment a 
continuous function. Different levels of gearing may have different impacts on over- 
investment. For this reason, we split our sample into four quartiles based on median 
gearing. We took the top to represent the top level of gearing and the bottom to 
represent the bottom level of gearing. The two quartiles in the middle are middle 
gearing. We run the same logit model for each group. As we expected, the results 
showed that different levels of gearing have a different impacts on over-investment. 
This led us to test for a non-linear relationship between gearing and over-investment. 
Interestingly, we found out that a quadratic relationship between gearing and over- 
investment was significant. More precisely, we found that at low levels of gearing, 
(i. e. < 26% for UK firms and < 20.5% for US firms) as gearing increases the 
probability of over-investment increases as well. On the other hand, at a higher level 
of gearing (i. e. > 26% for UK firms and > 20.5% for US firms) the higher the gearing 
the lower the probability of over-investment. The explanation of the above results is 
that managers at a low level of gearing do not feel the pressure of debt serving 
payments, and therefore debt may not play a monitoring role. However, results from 
a higher level of gearing revealed that debt has a negative impact on over- investment, 
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managers are motivated not to over-invest and therefore, a higher level of debt does 
monitor managers' behaviour. 
We next tested the relationship between firm performance and over-investment. This 
is important because the results will reveal whether the over-investment is a problem 
or not (i. e. value destroying). In order to test the hypothesis we expected a negative 
relationship between firm performance and over-investment. If the opposite is found, 
then the whole concept of over-investment as a problem would be questionable. We 
used a fixed effect regression to test the relationship between firm Performance and 
over- investment. The static relation between firm performance and over-investment 
implicitly assumes that an investment decision can instantaneously have an impact on 
firm's performance. However, an investment decision at year t would probably affect 
firm's performance in later years. Therefore, in this thesis, we adopt a more realistic 
approach recognising that firm's performance would be affected for years following 
an investment project. The results provide some support for the hypothesis that over- 
investment destroy firm value since the coefficient of over-investment is significant 
and negative only at the level of 9%. This implies, in line with our hypothesis, that 
over-investment has a negative impact on firms' performance. 
The final step in Chapter 6 was to empirically test the relationship between the 
interaction variable of gearing and over-investment from one side and firm 
performance from the other side. We expected to find the following relationship: 
1. At a low level of gearing (< 26.67% for UK and < 20.5% for US), we found 
that the higher the gearing the greater the probability of over-investment. On 
the other hand, in the second hypothesis, over-investment has a negative 
impact on firm performance. Therefore, it is expected that at a low level of 
gearing the interaction between gearing and over-investment will have a 
negative impact on firm's performance. 
2. At the higher level of gearing (> 26.67% for UK and > 20.5% for US), we 
found that the higher the gearing the smaller the probability of having over- 
investment; a higher level of gearing mitigates the over-investment problem. 
Therefore, we expected that at a high level of gearing, the interaction between 
gearing and over-investment might be significant and positive. 
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The two points above led us to test the non-linearity between the interaction of 
gearing, over-investment on one side and the performance on the other side. We also 
used three control variables: the natural logarithm of total sales (LnTS), the dividend 
payout ratio (DPU) and volatility. The results revealed that, at a low level of gearing, 
the coefficient of the interaction variables between gearing and over-investment was 
statistically significant at 5% with a negative sign. This implies that a low level of 
gearing together with over-investment have a negative impact on firm's performance. 
This was expected because we found that at a low level of gearing, over-investment 
increases with gearing; debt does not mitigate the problem of over-investment but 
makes it worse and the over-investment should therefore have a negative impact on 
firm's performance. On the other hand, the positive and significant coefficient 
(significant at the level of 8%) of the quadratic of the interaction variable between 
gearing and over-investment suggests that a middle level of gearing does mitigate the 
over-investment problem and, it is therefore associated with a positive effect on firm 
performance. Moreover, the non-significant coefficient of (DG) 3 suggests that a very 
high level of gearing has no impact on over-investment and therefore, has no further 
impact on firm performance and therefore, very high gearing does not monitor the 
over-investment problem. However, the associated negative sign of the of (DG)3 
coefficient on firm performance, although it is not significant, could be because 
financing over- investment, with very high gearing, negatively affects performance. 
Summery of the main hypotheses and the results is presented in the next page: 
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Table 7.1: Summery of the Tested Hypotheses 
The Hypotheses tested in this thesis Approved 
Hl,: The defined Residual Income model can, to a significant degree, Yes 
capture cross-sectional variation in market stock prices of the sample 
over a significant period of time. 
H2, : The first difference of the defined Residual Income model can, Yes 
to a significant degree, capture the first difference of the cross 
sectional variation in market stock prices of the sample over a 
significant period of time. 
H3,: The defined Residual Income Components can, to a significant Yes 
degree, capture cross-sectional differences in the performance of the 
market stock prices of the sample over a significant period of time. 
1-141: There is a negative relationship between gearing and over- Yes 
investment. 
1-151: There is a negative relationship between over-investment and Yes 
firm performance. 
1-161: the interaction between the presence of over-investment and level Yes 
of gearing is related to better firm performance. 
7.3 Contributions and Managerial Implications of the Study 
After surnmarising the results of this thesis, we can ask whether we have advanced the 
knowledge in the area of capital structure and firm performance. There are several 
important features of our analysis that we believe, extend the literature on the 
empirical work of agency problem; more precisely, Jensen's free cash flow argument. 
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Firstly, whereas most studies investigate US firms our sample comprises both UK and 
US firms. Secondly, we used a performance measure (RIC) with a solid theoretical 
underpinning that is also empirically tested. Thirdly, in Chapter 5, we highlighted the 
possibilities of using the RIC as a performance measure, since it outperforms the 
simple residual income model (higher R 2) . The RIC represents the residual income 
component of the value in the RI model, and accounts for cost of capital. Fourthly, 
our analysis, distinct from previous empirical studies, introduced a simple way of 
measuring the over-investment problem i. e. a combination of capital expenditure and 
growth opportunities (Chapter 4). Fifthly, our analyses are based on panel data. The 
panel character of the data permits the use of statistical techniques that reduce the 
model specification bias or omitted variable bias. Sixthly, in Chapter 6 we have 
shown that the relationship between gearing, performance and over-investment is non- 
linear. Finally, our analysis in Chapter 6 incorporates the dynamic nature of the 
response of firm performance to investment decisions and controls for the 
endogeneity by lagging the explanatory variables one period. 
The main finding of this study suggests that only a middle level of gearing mitigates 
the over-investment problem, since a low level of gearing increases the probability of 
over-investment and hence affects a firm's performance negatively. On the other 
hand in line with the first finding, which suggests that a high level of gearing has no 
impact on the over-investment problem, the interaction of gearing and over- 
investment has no impact on firm performance but the sign was negative. This could 
be explained by the fact that gearing reduces over-investment and extreme value 
might negate the performance. An important implication of our model is that certain 
levels of gearing, i. e. a middle level, play a monitoring role in reducing the over- 
investment problem and hence leads to better firm performance. We have found that 
debt at a low level increases the over-investment rather than decreases it. This could 
be because a low level of gearing does not put enough pressure on managers in terms 
of interest rate and in fact increases a firm's financial slack. Therefore, middle level 
of gearing plays an important role in disciplining managers, reduces the over- 
investment problem and hence increases firm's performance. 
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7.4 Limitations of this Study 
The primary limitation of this study is the lack of complete data availability, primarily 
due to the incomplete data sets provided by financial databases. The available 
databases did not provide information for certain variables and had missing data for 
some of the variables that were present. Managerial ownership is a very important 
variable in the content of agency problems and firm performance, and incorporating 
such a variable could help us in explaining more about the motivation of over- 
investment. However, the managerial ownership variable was unavailable in the 
financial Datastream, and we had to omit this variable from our analysis. Moreover, 
the levels of significance for certain results were not very high (9% rather than 5%). 
7.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
The investigation in this thesis is not complete and further research remains to be 
done in the field of capital structure and firm performance; more precisely, in the 
relationship between investment, gearing and firm performance. For example, one 
could extend this study by incorporating the under-investment together with the over- 
investment hypotheses as well, to test the possibilities of obtaining the optimal 
investment. A second topic that arises from this research is to investigate the 
relationship between gearing, firm performance and diversification (such as 
acquisitions). Empire-building is arguably more likely to be expressed in acquisitions 
rather than purchases of fixed assets (we have seen from Chapter 6 that the levels of 
significance were low). A third topic for ftirther investigation is the composition of 
both debt and equity to identify the gearing level. In this thesis, debt and equity have 
each been treated as homogeneous. However, several forms of debt and equity exist 
and each form has specific characteristics that are relevant to capital structure 
theories. In this area, Barclay and Smith (1995) study the determinants of debt 
maturity, while Houston and James (1996) and Johnson (1997) investigate the choice 
between public debt, bank debt and private debt. However, these studies are single 
equation models in which the choice of the structure of debt and its determinants are 
UniS 
173 
4 assumed to be independent of other capital structure decisions. A study that includes 
both the choice for the maturity and sources of debt, and the debt-equity choice may 
yield interesting results with respect to capital structure choice. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 3. A: Derivation of the Continuing Value Formula 
This appendix proves the equivalence of the two recommended continuing formulas 
by Copeland et al (1994): the free cash flow perpetuity formula and the value-driver 
formula. The Two formulas are as follows: 
cv = 
FCF 
WACC - 
NOPLAT I-g 
(r 
WACC - 
Since the denominators are identical, we only need to prove that free cash flow can be 
expressed by the following equation: 
FCF = NOPLAT I-g 
r 
Where: 
FCF = free cash flow. 
NOPLAT = net operating profits less adjusted taxes. 
g growth rate in NOPLAT. 
r rate of return on net new capital invested. 
First, they define free cash flow as the company's operating profits less the net new 
capital invested. 
FCF = NOPLAT - In, 
Where In is the net increase in invested capital over and above replacement capital. 
As long as the return on existing capital employed remains constant, they state that, a 
company's NOPLAT in any period equals last period's NOPLAT, plus the return in 
earns on last period's net investment in new capital. 
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NOPLAT .= NOPLAT T-1 + 
(r X InTJ 
This Equation can be rearranged to show that the change in NOPLAT equals the rate 
of return on new investment times the amount of new investment. 
NOPLATT - NOPLAT T-I ý 
(r X InT-I ) 
Dividing both sides by last year's NOPLAT calculates the growth rate in NOPLAT 
9 --,::: 
NOPLA T, - NOPLA 
TT-i 
rxIn T-1 
NOPLAT,. 
-, 
NOPLATT-1 
g=r x NOPLAT,. 
-, 
Solving for the amount of investment required increasing NOPLAT at the rate g, and 
substituting for the first definition of free cash flow gives the free cash flow 
calculation in terms of the key value drivers. 
In = NOPLAT xg 
r 
FCF=NOPLAT- NOPLATxg 
r 
FCF = NOPLAT I-g 
(r 
The ratio g/r can be called the net investment rate, as it represents the ratio of new 
investment to NOPLAT, which is consistent with a growth rate of g and a rate of 
return r. 
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4 Appendix 3. B: Balance Sheet before and after Adjustments 
Table 3.1: Accounting-Based Balance Sheets 
Assets: Liabilities and Net Worth: 
Current assets Non-interest-bearing current liabilities (NIBCLs) 
Net goodwill Interest-bearing current liabilities (IBCLs) 
Fixed assets Long-term debt 
Equity (net of write-off) 
Total assets Total Liabilities and net worth 
Adapted from Bacidore et al (1997) 
Table 3.2: Economic Book Value Balance Sheet 
Assets: 
Current assets (with inventory at FIFO) - NIBCLs 
Gross goodwill 
Fixed Assets 
Economic book value of assets in place 
Liabilities and Net Worth: 
IBCLs 
Debt (+capitalised leases) 
Equity (+adjustment for 
Deferred taxes, goodwill 
Amortisation, write-offs, 
LIFO reserves, etc. ) 
Total liabilities and net worth 
Adapted from Bacidore et al (1997) 
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Appendix 3. C: Development of REVA 
Bacidore et al (1997) state that the financiers must earn at least their opportunity cost 
of capital on the invested capital. This condition implies that this cost of capital must 
be subtracted from operating profits to gauge the firm's financial performance. EVA, 
for that reason, defines net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) and subtracts a capital 
charge for the economic book value of assets in place. The economic book value of 
assets in place is the measure of the capital provided to the firm by its financiers, but 
does this amount truly represent the capital used to generate this operating profit? 
They believe the answer to that question is negative. For the firm to create a true 
44operating" surplus for its financiers in a given period, its operating profit at the end 
of the period must exceed a capital charge that is based on the total market value of 
the capital used at the beginning of the period, not simply the economic book value of 
its assets in place. The capital commitment of the firm's financiers is represented by 
the total market value of the firm, not simply the economic book value of the assets in 
place. 
For that reason, they modified the EVA measurement and defined a new performance 
measure, a Refinement of EVA (REVA). The motivation for the REVA refinement to 
EVA stems partly from EVA's use of the economic book value of assets while the 
capital charge for the firm is derived from a market-based WACC. The REVA for a 
given time t is defined as: 
REVAt = NOPA T, - k,, 
(MVA, 
j) 
Bacidore et al (1997) 
Where NOPA T, is the firm's NOPAT at the end of period t and HVA, -, 
is the total 
market value of the firm's assets at the end of period t-](beginning of period t). k., is 
the weighted-average cost of capital and MVA, -, 
is given by the market value of the 
firm's equity plus the book value of the firm's total debt less non-interest-bearing 
current liabilities, all at the end of period t-1. 
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Bacidore et al (1997) pointed out that the difference between the market value of the 
firm and the economic book value of its assets in place represents the market's 
assessment of the value of the firm's current and future investment opportunities. 
They added that for the firm to create a true "operating" surplus for its financiers in a 
given period, its operating profit at the end of the period must exceed a capital charge. 
This capital charge is based on the total market value of the capital used at the 
beginning of the period, not simply the economic book value of its assets in place. 
The capital commitment of the firm's financiers is represented by the total market 
value of the firm, not simply the economic book value of the assets in place. The key 
distinction between EVA and REVA is that REVA assesses its capital charge for 
period t on the market value of the firm at the end of period t-I (or the beginning of 
period t) rather than on the economic book value of the assets in place 
Their empirical results indicate that the proportion of positive REVA that corresponds 
to positive abnormal returns is significantly higher than the same proportion for EVA. 
Thus, although EVA on its own predicts abnormal returns fairly well, REVA 
performs significantly better. 
However, Ferguson and Leistikow (1998) show that REVA is inconsistent with 
finance theory and with wealth maximization. Consequently, it is inappropriate for 
measuring operating performance and rewarding management. They also show that 
EVA is consistent with finance theory and wealth maximization and is appropriate for 
measuring operating performance and rewarding management. Based on the 
argument that Bacidore et al (1997) made which stated that an appropriate measure of 
operating performance must correlate highly with abnormal stock returns, Ferguson 
and Leistikow (1998) argue that this view seems plausible because management 
decisions that change shareholder wealth also cause corresponding abnormal returns. 
Financial theory suggests, however, that no appropriate single-period measure of 
operating performance should be highly correlated with abnormal stock return, for the 
following reasons: 
As stated by Ferguson and Leistikow (1998), an unanticipated management operating 
decision produces a corresponding abnormal stock return at the time it becomes 
known. Multiplying this return by the beginning stock price gives the decision's 
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impact on shareholder wealth. The value of operating decisions, however, typically 
comes from their impact on operating performance in subsequent periods. Thus, an 
operating decision can add substantial value in the period in which it is made even if it 
reduces that period's operating performance and there is no reason to expect an 
appropriate measure of one period's operating performance to be significantly 
correlated with the same period's abnormal stock returns. Therefore, they concluded 
that Bacidore et al 1) s belief that a good financial performance measure should correlate 
highly with abnormal stock returns is wrong. They also added that Bacidore et al 
provided no confidence that their REVA-based independent variable is useful for 
explaining abnormal stock returns. 
Ferguson and Leistikow (1998) thus, disagreed with the Bacidore et al opinion that a 
true operating surplus for investors in a given period requires an operating profit at the 
end of the period that exceeds a capital charge based on the firm's market value. In 
fact, Ferguson and Leistikow (1998) argue that the operating link to investors' 
abnormal stock returns reflects a capital charge based on net asset value, not stock 
price. They state that the capital used to generate the firm's operating profit is not the 
market value of its stock, as Bacodore et al believe. Certainly, they stated, it is the 
investors' capital, and a firm's capital is not the same thing as the investors' capital. 
Thus, they argue that the invested capital which generated operating profit is net asset 
value, not the market value of the firm's stock. 
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Appendix 3. D: The Derivation of the OhIson (1995) Model 
a 3.1. D: Derivation of the formula: d, = x, - y, + Rf yl-I 
a 
Xa =X x, = x, - 
(Rf 
- 1)yl-l This means that I- 
Rf YI-I + Y, -, meaning 
that: R,. yl-I = x, -xIa+ yj_j ... 
(1) 
Combined with formula (A2a): y, = y, -, - 
d, + x, ... (2) 
a (2) implies: d, = x, - y, + Rf yl-I 
00 
3.2. D: Derivation of the formula: P, y, +I R-E, [Y, +, df T=1 
d, 
+j =xa- yl+l + 
Rj. y, (From the previous derivation) 1+1 
Substitute the above equation with the PVED formula implies that: 
P=. R -E a+R 
Iz r=1 fI 
IXI+I 
- YI+I f Y1 
"0 YI+I 00 
P="R -E, [x, z E, +ZE, 
[R-Rfy, ] 
frf 
r=1 
Rf r=1 
00 00 
Since 7 y1+1 E, Oas r -> oo and E, 
[R -'Rj. y, 0, this implies that f 
T=I 
R T=I f 
00 
P, y, + Rf-E, 
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4 Appendix 5. A: Non-Parametric Test- Spearman's Correlation 
Table A. 1: Speaman's Correlation Matrix between V and P. 
UK Correlation Matrix US Correlation Matrix 
p I p 
v VOT v1 . 717* 
-. Correlation is significant at 1% level (2-tailed). 
The above table reveals that the correlation between the value represented in Equation 
(2) and the stock prices is almost 81% for UK sample and 72% for US sample. This 
is in line with Frankel and Lee (1998) who find that the model explains more than 
70% of the cross-sectional variation in stock prices. 
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Appendix 5. B: The Transformed Variables 
Both V and P in both UK and US firms do not fall in a nice non-nally distributed curve. 
Unfortunately, nonparametric techniques tend to be less "powerful". An alternative is 
to transform the variables logarithmically. For this reason, the original variables in 
both US and UK were transformed into logarithms and the new results are presented 
in the following table: 
Table 5.6: UK and US Results. the Transformed Variables 
UK Results US Results 
Coefficient 0.502643 0.489471 
Std. Error 0.04632 0.017357 
t-Statistic 10.9* 28.2* 
R-squared 0.809399 0.879204 
ChiA 2-Statistic 117.8 123.2 
Prob (ChiA 2-Statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 
* Means significant at I% level 
Looking at the results in the above table, R-squared (goodness of fit) is 80.9% and 
87.92% for UK and US respectively, so it is clear that the new regression based on 
variables logarithmically transformed provides higher R2 but the level of significant 
did not change for both UK and US data sets. This is expected since natural logarithm 
usually smooth the relationship between variables and this usually leads to a higher R2 
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Appendix 5. C: Price / Book 
Residual Income Model. 
Value in Comparison with Price / 
The sample is analysed for both Price/Book value and Price/Residual Income 
valuation model. The results of these analyses can be found the following table: 
Method R-Squared Level of Significance 
UK us UK us 
Price/Book value (Bt) 56% 68% 1% % 
Price/Residual Income 
Valuation (Vt) 
77% 76% % % 
The above results are in line with the findings of Frankel and Lee (1998) who finds 
that the Price/Book value has the ability to predict the value of a firm, but the 
Price/Residual Income model performs better. 
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Appendix 5.1): The Simple Residual Income Model in Comparison 
with First Difference and Residual Income Component. 
Method R-Squared Level of Significance 
UK us UK us 
RIC from F&L (1998) 22% 29% 1% 1% 
F&L (1998) first 
difference 
22% 26% 1% 1% 
The Simple Residual 
Income 
11% 20% 1% 1% 
From the above table it is clear that the RIC outperforms both F&L first difference 
and the simple residual income model. R2 from the simple residual income model, on 
the other hand, is lower than R2 in both RIC and first difference. 
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Appendix 6. A: Over-investment and Debt-Equity Ratio Assuming 
Linearity. 
We estimated model (1) using logt model and we used debt-equity ratio instead of 
gearing the results were as follows: 
Modelling D (over-investment) by Logit results from UK and US data: 
UK Data 
C BD/E 
UK Data 
C MD/E 
US Data 
C BD/E 
US Data 
C MD/E 
Coefficient 0.14789 -0.278 0.1358 -0.3751 0.523 -0.3442 0.4817 -0.7132 
Std. Error 0.07156 0.08449 0.06528 0.1159 0.06267 0.04965 0.05708 0.09742 
t-value 2.. 07 -3.29 2.08 -3.24 8.35 -6.93 8.44 -7.32 
t-prob. 0.039 0.001 0.038 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Loglikelihood -1024.4862 -1066.75225 -1470.4028 -1466.64219 
Baseline 
loglikelihood 
-1031.337 -1072.992 -1503.528 -1503.528 
Test Chi- 
Squared 
13.702 12.479 66.25 73.771 
Chi-Squared 
prob 
0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 
AIC/n 1.37968576 1.38081686 1.34835421 1.34491043 
C is the constant. BD/E is the book value of debt-equity ratio. MG is the market value of debt-equity 
ratio. 
The above table reveals that for US and UK data the coefficients of both book value 
and market value of debt-equity ratio are statistically significant and both have the 
expected negative sign. The finding suggests that the higher the gearing, the lower 
the probability of over-investment. This result, leads us to reject the null hypothesis 
in the sample used in this study (over 12 years) and to accept the alternative which 
states that there is a negative relationship between gearing and over- investment. 
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Appendix 6-B: Over-investment and Market Value of Gearing 
Assuming Linearity. 
We estimated model (1) using logt model and we used the ratio of total debt plus 
preference share capital to total assets plus the difference between market value of 
common stock and book value of common equity and the results were as follows: 
Modelling D (over-investment) by Logit results from UK and US data: 
C 
UK Data 
MG C 
US Data 
MG 
Coefficient 0.01778 -0.1154 0.65216 -0.2637 
Std. Error 0.08530 0.4446 0.07284 0.3357 
t-value 0.208 -0.260 8.95 -7.86 
t-prob. 0.835 0.795 0.000 0.000 
Loglikelihood -1072.95814 -1471.62859 
Baseline loglikelihood -1072.992 -1503.528 
Test Chi-Squared 0.06738 63.799 
Chi-Squared prob. 0.7952 0.00000 
AIC/n 1.3888348 1.34947673 
C is the constant. G is the book value industry-adjusted gearing 
US data reveal similar results to Table 6.5 where the coefficient is negatively 
significant at the 1% level of significant and hence, lead to re ect the null hypothesis i 
and to accept the alternative, which states that there is a negative relation between 
gearing and over-investment. However, despite the fact that the coefficient from US 
data is negative however, it is not significant. Based on the above results, this 
measurement of market value of gearing will be ignored. 
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Appendix 6-C: Over-investment and Debt-Equity Ratio Classification 
Assuming Linearity. 
Modelling D by Logit results from US D/E ratio classification 
Top Gearing 
Constant BD/E 
Middle Gearing 
Constant BD/E 
Bottom Gearing 
Constant BD/E 
Coefficient 0.2689 -0.2999 0.3562 -0.0264 0.2408 0.99 
Std. Error 0.167 0.0751 0.1374 0.1633 0.1335 0.4559 
t-value 1.61 -4.00 2.59 -0.162 1.80 2.17 
t-prob. 0.108 0.000 0.010 0.872 0.072 0.030 
Log-likelihood -362.052506 -733.51569 -365.660653 
Baseline 
Log-liklihood. 
-374.5745 -733.5287 -368.1093 
Test ChiA2 25.044 0.0260 4.8972 
ChiA 2 prob. 0.01000 0.8717 0.0269 
AIC/n 1.31903082 1.36206609 1.33210382 
Modelling D by Logit results from UK D/E ratio classification: 
Top Gearing 
Constant BG 
Middle Gearing 
Constant BG 
Bottom Gearing 
Constant BG 
Coefficient -0.05779 -0.124846 0.544237 -0.64613 -0.421946 0.486720 
Std. Error 0.1386 0.07253 0.1381 0.2338 0.1496 0.4900 
t-value -0.417 -1.72 3.94 -2.76 -2.82 0.993 
t-prob. 0.677 0.086 0.000 0.006 0.005 0.321 
Loglikelihood -261.798138 -507.09587 -260.96829 
Baseline 
logliklihood 
-263.867 -511.1735 -261.4618 
Test Chi/12 4.1378 8.1552 0.98693 
Chi-112 prob. 0.0419 0.0043 0.3205 
1.37394863 1.36853729 1.36962651 
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The above three percentile in both US and UK data were sorted in the same way that 
gearing was sorted. it should be noted that both book value and market value of debt 
to equity ratio revealed similar results. The US data for debt-equity ratio revealed 
different results from gearing ratio where the middle percentile was negatively 
significant when we used gearing however it is in-significant when debt-equity ratio 
was used. Top percentile in the US data revealed no differences between gearing and 
debt-equity ratio. The bottom percentile for debt-equity ratio is positive and 
significant as in gearing ratio. Moreover, The UK data for debt-equity ratio revealed 
very similar results to gearing ratio. 
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Appendix 6. D: Over-investment and Debt-Equity Ratio Assuming 
Non-Linearity. 
Modelling D by Logit: the UK and US results using debt-equity ratio 
UK results US results 
Cons. BD/E BD/E2 BD/E 3 Cons. BD/E BD/E2 BD/E' 
Coeff. 0.01216 -0.0211 0.00026 2.2e 
-006 0.6021 -0.4439 0.0048 0.00029 
Std. Error 0.0567 0.0408 0.0012 3.075' 0.0785 0.1014 0.0232 0.00068 
t-value 0.215 -0.518 0.216 0.0617 7.67 -4.38 0.208 0.434 
t-prob. 0.830 0.605 0.9" . 951 0.000 0.000 0.835 0.664 
Loglikeliho 
od 
-1072.58508 -1461.51231 
Baselinelogl 
ikelihood 
-1072.992 -1503.528 
Test ChiA2 0.81351 84.031 
Prob. 0.8462 0.0000 
AIC/n 1.39093679 1.34204424 
Market value of debt-equity ratio revealed very similar results to book value of debt- 
equity ratio. The above table reveals that for UK data, the results are insignificant. It 
is significant only when we droP both D/E 2 and D/E 3. This could indicate that the 
relationship between over-investment and debt-equity ratio, unlike gearing, cannot be 
expressed by non-linearity. On the other hand, for US data, the D/E is only 
significant while both D/E 2 and D/E 3 are insignificant. This means as well, for US 
data, the relationship between over-investment and debt-equity ratio, unlike gearing, 
cannot be expressed by non-linearity. 
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Appendix 6. E Over-investment and Gearing Assuming Non-Linear 
Variables 
Modelling D by Logit: the UK and US results 
UK results US results 
Cons. MG MG2 MG 3 Cons. MG MG2 MG 3 
Coeff. -0.2968 0.05329 -0.0016 9.89e -006 0.26586 0.0323 -0.0012 6.41 e -006 
Std. Error 0.1370 0.0183 0.00064 6.23e -006 0.1125 0.1539 0.00052 5.02e -006 
t-value -2.17 2.19 -2.45 1.59 2.36 2.10 -2.37 1.28 
t-prob. 0.030 0.004 0.014 0.113 0.018 0.036 0.018 0.202 
Loglikeliho 
od 
-1061.7925 -1455.73879 
Baselinelogl 
ikelihood 
-1072.992 -1503.528 
Test ChiA2 22.399 95.578 
Prob. 0.0001 0.0000 
AIC/n 1.37699289 1.33675713 
The above table reveals very similar results to Table 6.10. 
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